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Reliable forecasting is a key success factor of most organizations and companies.
Where historical data is not available, the forecasts address questions in the far fu-
ture, information is dispersed regarding location and form, or conflicting goals or
values have to be considered, judgmental forecasting methods based on experts or
the crowd are typically applied. However, several judgmental forecasting methods
exist and each method has some individual weaknesses. Delphi-Markets are an inte-
grated approach of prediction markets and Real-Time Delphi studies. Depending on
their implementation, they allow to combine several properties of both approaches
in order to overcome individual weaknesses. Three different ways to integrate the
method are presented and discussed in this work. In order to better understand chal-
lenges and potentials of Delphi-Markets, the FAZ.NET-Orakel was instantiated and
made publicly available for evaluation and improvement of an exemplary Delphi-
Market under real-world conditions. In this context, four proposed improvements
for the integrated approach were evaluated in four research projects. These projects
correspond to the four sources of forecasting error according to the Judgmental Fore-
casting Improvement Model, introduced and derived in this dissertation as well. On
the one hand, these improvements deal with common problems of prediction mar-
kets: Cognitive errors, such as partition dependence, and motivational errors, such
as manipulation and fraud. On the other hand, these include common problems of
Real-Time Delphi studies: The selection of experts for Delphi studies and retention
during the surveys. As contributions to the overall IS research derived from the ex-
aminations of the Delphi-Markets and this dissertation, design principles for two
extensions (social Real-Time Delphi and a crowd-based approach for manipulation
and fraud detection) are formulated, implemented, tested, and suggested for appli-
cation. Further, the role of complexity and expertise in the occurrence of the partition
dependence bias is examined and a selection approach for experts for Delphi studies
based on trading data is suggested and evaluated.
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Zuverlässige Prognosen sind ein wichtiger Erfolgsfaktor für die meisten Organ-
isationen und Unternehmen. Wenn historische Daten nicht verfügbar sind, wenn
sich die Prognosefragen auf die ferne Zukunft beziehen, wenn Informationen bezüg-
lich ihrem Ort und ihrer Form verteilt sind und-oder wenn widersprüchliche Ziele
oder Werte berücksichtigt werden müssen, wird dabei in der Regel auf Experten-
oder “Crowd”-basierte Prognoseverfahren zurückgegriffen. Es gibt jedoch mehrere
solcher Prognosemethoden die auf menschlicher Beurteilung basieren und jede die-
ser Methoden bringt individuelle Schwächen und Stärken mit sich. Delphi-Märkte
sind ein integrierter Ansatz aus Prognosemärkten und Echtzeit-Delphi-Studien. Ab-
hängig von ihrer Umsetzung erlauben sie es, mehrere Eigenschaften beider Ansätze
zu kombinieren, um individuelle Schwächen zu überwinden. In dieser Arbeit wer-
den drei verschiedene Wege zur Integration der Methoden vorgestellt und disku-
tiert. Um die Herausforderungen und Potenziale solcher Delphi-Märkte besser zu
verstehen, zu verbessern und zu evaluieren, wurde im Rahmen dieser Arbeit das
FAZ.NET-Orakel als beispielhafter Delphi-Markt instanziiert und öffentlich zugäng-
lich gemacht. In diesem Zusammenhang wurden vier Verbesserungsvorschläge für
den integrierten Ansatz in vier Forschungsprojekten evaluiert. Diese Projekte ent-
sprechen den vier Arten für Prognosefehler nach dem “Judgmental Forecasting Im-
provement Model”, welches auch in dieser Dissertation vorgestellt und abgeleitet
wurde. Zum einen betreffen diese Verbesserungen häufig auftretende Probleme
der Prognosemärkte: Fehler aufgrund von kognitiven Verzerrungen (z.B. “partition
dependence bias”) oder Fehler aufgrund von problematischer Motivation der Teil-
nehmer (z.B. Manipulation und Betrug). Zum anderen betreffen diese Verbesser-
ungen häufige Probleme von Echtzeit-Delphi-Studien: Die Auswahl der Experten
für Delphi-Studien und die Abwanderung der Teilnehmer während der Befragun-
gen. Aus dieser Dissertation und der Untersuchung der Delphi-Märkte ergeben
sich einige Beiträge zur Forschung im Bereich der Prognoseverfahren die auf men-
schlicher Beurteilung basieren, sowie anderen Fragestellungen aus dem Bereich der
IS-Forschung. Dies sind unter anderem Design Prinzipien für zwei Erweiterun-
gen der Delphi-Märkte (soziale Echtzeit-Delphi-Studien und ein Crowd-basierter
Ansatz zur Manipulation- und Betrugserkennung), welche formuliert, implemen-
tiert, getestet und zur Anwendung vorgeschlagen werden. Weiterhin werden die
Rolle von Komplexität und Expertise beim Auftreten des “partition dependence
bias” untersucht und ein Ansatz zur Auswahl von Experten für Delphi-Studien auf
Basis von Handelsdaten vorgeschlagen und bewertet.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction and Motivation
I’ve read the last page of the Bible. It’s
all going to turn out all right.
Billy Graham
1.1 Motivation
Prediction markets regularly experience short-term prominence in the public opin-
ion and media when high-profile political events are approaching, such as the United
States (U.S.) Presidential Elections or the German Federal Elections. They are consid-
ered a promising alternative and benchmark to polling. Though polling, prediction
markets, and other forecasting methods (e.g., statistical models or Delphi studies)
are regularly benchmarked against each other in public media and academic re-
search, there is no consensus yet on “the one” most accurate method (e.g. Graefe,
2014; Graefe, 2017). In fact, since all methods have been steadily developed and im-
proved over the last decades, the accuracy of one method in a previous election even
seems to be negatively correlated with accuracy in an upcoming election (Graefe,
2014). Further, each method has its own strengths, weaknesses, and biases that de-
pend on the individual context of a certain forecasting problem.
Steadily, good forecasts are becoming more important, not only in politics, but
in many other areas, companies, and organizations (Durand, 2003; Blanc and Set-
zer, 2016). Thereby, accuracy is not the only measure and often other metrics (e.g.
consensus) or more information (e.g. the reasoning behind a certain expectation or
forecast) are required. Especially for decision makers that are potentially kept re-
sponsible for their decision outcomes, qualitative information on the background,
relationships, and the reasoning behind certain opinions are important as well.
It has been long known that the combination of forecasts from different methods
often yields superior or at least more robust accuracy (e.g. Graefe, 2014). In contrast,
a more recent development is the combination or convergence of several methods
itself. This approach does not only raise the forecast accuracy, but brings together
individual advantages of each method in order to overcome certain challenges. One
example are expectation surveys, combining polling and hidden markets1 in order to
make polling more robust against biased samples (George Mason University, 2015;
Teschner and Weinhardt, 2012a). In this thesis, the concept of “Delphi-Markets”
1Hidden markets are prediction markets in which the market mechanism is concealed by an inter-
face that only asks for expectations and associated parameters.
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is introduced, representing such a novel combined approach that integrates pre-
diction markets and Real-Time Delphis (RTDs)2 – both feedback based approaches.
The integration of these methods promises to address several shortcomings of each
method, e.g., it allows enriching prediction market forecasts with qualitative feed-
back or addresses the expert selection process for Delphi studies. The approach was
developed in the context of the DFG3 supported project MInPuD4 and made pub-
licly available as the forecasting platform “FAZ.NET-Orakel” in cooperation with
the online magazine of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, FAZ.NET.
In the light of recent developments of the political environment and society, pre-
diction markets are very likely to grow more important in the future. Therefore,
it is relevant to keep improving this methodology by addressing some of its chal-
lenges. The current public opinion draws the picture of an increasingly politically
polarized society (Yang et al., 2016). There is a link with emerging Information and
Communication Technologies (ICTs) that are used more and more for political adver-
tising (Greer and LaPointe, 2004; Lee et al., 2014). At the same time, certain political
opinions are publicly stigmatized (Brug, Fennema, and Tillie, 2000), which is why
a lack of “truth-revelation” can become (and already is) a real challenge in politi-
cal research (Kennedy et al., 2017). In addition, traditional political opinion polls
are expensive and chronically under-budgeted, which is only one reason for the in-
sufficient quality and lack of necessary adjustments to usually distorted samples
(Kennedy et al., 2017).
In this context, prediction markets have some very favorable properties. In con-
trast to polls that are usually used for election forecasting, prediction markets do
not ask for the opinion or voting behavior of individuals, but for their expectations
about the outcomes. This allows prediction markets to create forecasts that are more
robust against distorted samples and also allows to create accurate prediction based
on relatively few participants (Green, Armstrong, and Graefe, 2007). Further, pre-
diction markets provide continuous forecasts that rapidly adapt to new information,
while polls only reflect “snapshots” that may be quickly outdated (Graefe, Luckner,
and Weinhardt, 2010). Other favorable properties are, e.g., anonymity or their poten-
tial incentive compatibility (Jurca and Faltings, 2008; Schlag, Tremewan, and Weele,
2015; Green, Armstrong, and Graefe, 2007). Therefore, there is also no doubt that
prediction markets have enormous potential to generate and improve forecasts and
the forecasting methodology of companies and other organizations (Buckley, 2016)
- but there is also a need for improvement (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006a). Several
publications deal with deficiencies of prediction markets, errors and inaccuracies in
their forecasts, manipulation, and systematic biases. Some weaknesses of predic-
tion markets may be addressed by the integration of prediction markets with the
RTD methodology, while RTDs have their own weaknesses that may be reduced by
prediction markets. However, the detailed design of an integrated approach can
have multiple forms, bearing individual potentials and challenges, which are out-
lined in this dissertation. One specific form is implemented in the FAZ.NET-Orakel
and further refined. In the continual competition of forecasting methods and in face
of recent developments regarding ICTs, society, and politics, it is of utmost impor-
tance to further investigate potentials and challenges of new approaches, such as the
2RTD is an approach for forecasting based on an expert panel. In several rounds the experts are
faced to the same or related questions and to the aggregated opinion of the previous round. The
approach aims to reach consensus among the experts. See Section 2.3 for further Details.
3Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
4DFG sponsored project (WE 1436/12-1), “Methoden-Integration von Prognosemarkt und Delphi-
Studie”, (engl.: Integration of the methods prediction market and Delphi study)
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suggested integration of prediction markets and RTDs, the Delphi-Markets.
In order to improve prediction markets, this dissertation highlights four poten-
tials and challenges that were addressed in four distinct research projects and per-
formed in the context of the prediction market FAZ.NET-Orakel or related to pre-
diction markets in general. These four research projects shall improve the suggested
integrated approach from a holistic perspective and are therefore derived from the
four sources of error of the Judgmental Forecasting Improvement Model (JFIM), in-
troduced and explained in detail in Section 2.1.3. The JFIM shows that forecasting er-
rors are never only caused as a mere design problem of a certain method, but always
in interaction of the method itself with a human factor (motivation and cognition).
This also yields the structure of this thesis.
1.2 Structure of Dissertation
First, Chapter 2 explains relevant background information on prediction markets,
RTDs, forecasting in general, and the research methods applied. Chapter 3 intro-
duces and elaborates on the concept of Delphi-Markets with its challenges and po-
tentials and describes the FAZ.NET-Orakel as one instantiation in detail. The fol-
lowing chapters improve the Delphi-Markets regarding the four errors identified in
the JFIM. Chapter 4 highlights the potentials of the Delphi-Markets regarding the
sampling error. The selection of experts for RTD studies is a current challenge to the
RTD method and its rigor (Hasson and Keeney, 2011). It is evaluated with which
accuracy the prediction market component can be used to select potentially knowl-
edgeable participants to be invited as experts to the RTD survey. Chapter 5 high-
lights the problem of the non-response error. RTD studies regularly lack sufficient
retention of the participants, which makes their results questionable and less gen-
eralizable (Cuhls, 2003). A social Real-Time Delphi (sRTD) approach is suggested
and evaluated in order to raise retention in the FAZ.NET-Orakel artifact. Chapter
6 deals with the problem of cognitive biases. As all events have to be formulated
as distinct shares, the partition dependence bias is especially problematic in predic-
tion markets (Sonnemann et al., 2013). In this thesis it is shown that the predic-
tion market design, as well as the selection of the participants (due to their proper-
ties, especially expertise) can have a significant influence on the occurrence of this
bias. Chapter 7 improves Delphi-Markets and prediction markets in general regard-
ing motivational biases, especially manipulation and fraud. Right from the launch
of the FAZ.NET-Orakel in March 2017, manipulative and fraudulent attacks were
recorded on the prediction market. This motivational bias is commonly known and
recognized as one potential stumbling block for widespread practitioner adoption
of prediction markets (Buckley and Doyle, 2017). This thesis improves the manipu-
lation and fraud detection and prevention based on Action Design Research (ADR)
with several design suggestions and principles. The crowd-based approach for ma-
nipulation and fraud detection suggests a solution for several problems in detection
and handling of potentially manipulative or fraudulent cases. Each of the Chapters
4 to 7 is concluded with a discussion. However, Chapter 8 summarizes the results
of each spotlight, discusses them on a meta level, and provides a short outlook into
future work.
4Chapter 2
Foundations
In these democratic days, any
investigation into the trustworthiness
and peculiarities of popular judgments
is of interest. The material about to be
discussed refers to a small matter, but
is much to the point.
Galton (1907, p. 1)
2.1 Group- and Crowd-based Forecasting
2.1.1 A brief Introduction in Judgmental Forecasting
Judgment has always played an important role in forecasting (Lawrence et al., 2006).
Though, in the last 30 years, it sometimes seems to have become commonplace
among academics to warn against judgments in favor of statistical models, prac-
titioners never shared this skepticism (Lawrence et al., 2006).
The errors of human judgment have been the subject of research of several fa-
mous researchers. Daniel Kahneman, an outstanding scientist and Nobel memorial
price laureate, has dealt all his lifetime in his works on judgment under uncertainty
with the heuristics of human information processing, and exemplifies his own dev-
astating forecasting ability in several examples. During his national service in the
Israeli Army, he was faced the task to predict cadets’ success in the officer training.
He and some colleagues observed the cadets in group tasks to assess their leadership
skills, personality, communication capabilities, and so on in order to assess their suc-
cess in an officers training. After a discussion on each cadet, he felt almost perfectly
sure about each cadet’s future, but his predictions finally turned out to be only a lit-
tle better than blind guess (Kahneman, 2012). He became a victim of the “illusion of
validity” bias, a heuristic that makes our brain jump to conclusions from only little
evidence, not taking into account how big these jumps are. Heuristics and biases
in human cognitive reasoning distort our judgment and trick our assessments and
perceptions of probabilities and confidence (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
Another famous experiment by the renowned researcher in forecasting, Philip E.
Tetlock, demonstrated in a large experimental study with a “[...] big group of experts
– academics, pundits, and the like – [...] [and] thousands of predictions about the
economy, stocks, elections, wars, and other issues of the day” (Tetlock and Gardner,
2015, p. 10) that the “experts” are no better than random guessing (Tetlock and Gard-
ner, 2015). This experiment became famous with the “dart-throwing chimpanzee”
comparison.
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These and similar stories led to a general distrust in judgmental forecasting and a
shift towards other, mostly statistical methods. With the rise of computers and better
accessibility of data, statistical and quantitative models became more present in fore-
casting. However, these methods seem not to be fully capable to solve the challenges
of forecasting. On the one hand several big failures become publicly known, such as
the $400 Million experiment of Nike where wrong software forecasts led to massive
inventory write-offs (Lawrence et al., 2006). On the other hand, they had limitations
especially in the long-view as researchers and decision makers are often confronted
with high uncertainty, new technologies, and new ideas frequently. In these situa-
tions analytic techniques and basic scenario methods often cannot be used, due to
a lack of specific information or technical and historical data (Linstone and Turoff,
2002c). However, reliable forecasting and assessment of future developments have
always been key success factors of governments, companies, and organizations and
are becoming more and more strategic resources (Durand, 2003).
In the light of the challenges mentioned above (and some more), many researchers
tried to improve forecasting – judgmental, statistical, and quantitative. In short- and
mid-term forecasting, and where historical data is present, combined approaches
find vast application (Lawrence et al., 2006). For instance, Decision Support Systems
(DSSs) access historical data and other data sources and generate a forecast that is
then often revised and adapted in a second loop by a human forecaster (Lawrence et
al., 2006) – or the other way around (Knöll and Simko, 2017). In mid- and long-term
forecasting or in forecasting where no historical data is available, methods were de-
veloped to help forecasters in considering all relevant information and to reassess
and adapt their evaluations, simultaneously overcoming systematic biases. Those
are, e.g., the Delphi method (e.g. Linstone and Turoff, 2002c), prediction markets
(e.g. Luckner et al., 2012), or other methods1 (e.g. Atanasov et al., 2016; Rothschild
and Wolfers, 2013). All these methods are judgmental forecasting methods. Though
there is no universal definition, one may consider all methods as judgmental fore-
casting methods that are mainly based on subjective information of individuals (Judg-
mental Forecasting 2009). Sometimes, attempts for definitions use phrases like “ex-
pertise based on experience” or “relying on subjective information” (e.g. Armstrong
and Green, 2018), however, most definitions also mention that this subjective fore-
cast may also rely on quantitative data that is processed by the individual. Therefore,
this thesis applies the following working definition on judgmental forecasting:
Forecasting methods in which a human individual or group/crowd processes
underlying and potentially dispersed information in order to generate a forecast or
at least a part of a forecast are considered as methods of “judgmental forecasting”.
Judgmental forecasting methods also include intention surveys or intention polls
that do not collect individual expectations, but individual plans or behavior (Arm-
strong, 1985). However, the focus of this work is on those methods that collect indi-
vidual expectations: Expectation based methods.
However, there exists a variety of expectation based methods in judgmental fore-
casting and different contexts favor different methods, as they are, e.g., more prone
to certain errors. Their overall forecasting error is driven by several “sources” and
1E.g., expectation polls or peer prediction schemes.
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FIGURE 2.1: Decomposition of the total forecasting error in opinion
based forecasting (a three-dimensional graph). Adapted from Arm-
strong (1985, p. 83).
some methods deal better with certain errors than others. Armstrong (1985) de-
composes the overall forecasting error in judgmental forecasting into a three-dimen-
sional error model which is illustrated in Figure 2.1. Besides an error in the expec-
tation of each forecaster itself (individual variance of estimation), the three-dimen-
sional model distinguishes between (1) response error, (2) non-response error, and
(3) sampling error. These components are arranged as three dimensions in a room
to illustrate that they are largely independent of each other. The total error can then
be interpreted as the vector sum of each component. Armstrong initially defined the
model in 1985 for “opinion-based forecasting”, which would now, more than twen-
ty-five years later, correspond to what is currently referred to as “expectation-based
forecasting” and is, therefore, regarded as valid for judgmental forecasting in gen-
eral.
In the following, the three components are described more in detail.
The response error describes a wide field of errors that are caused by individual
biases or decisions of individuals. According to Curtis and Wood (2004) and Skinner
(2009) such biases can be divided in (i) cognitive biases and (ii) motivational biases.
Cognitive biases are the result of decisions based on simple heuristics or “rules of
thumb” (Evans, 2012; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and also include those biases
and heuristics described by Kahneman (2012). Probably the best known cognitive
biases are the anchoring and adjustment heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) or
the status quo bias (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991). A prominent represen-
tative in economics is the endowment effect or the quasi-endowment effect (though
less prominent in judgmental forecasting) (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991;
Gimpel, 2007). Overall, there are more than 100 cognitive biases (Benson, 2016).
According to Müller-Trede et al. (2018) one big advantage to utilize crowds for fore-
casting is the basic idea that individual errors of the forecasters are averaged out.
And there exists large evidence confirming this for many biases. However, several
studies, among others in the context of prediction markets, showed that expectation
based forecasting is not excepted from these errors. Currently, many studies address
cognitive biases in decision-making (e.g. Jung and Dorner, 2018) and forecasting,
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both in RTD studies or traditional Delphi studies2 (e.g. Winkler and Moser, 2016)
and prediction markets (e.g. Sonnemann et al., 2013).
Motivational biases are errors that occur if individual participants have some
interest in changing, distorting, or biasing the results away from their true val-
ues(Curtis and Wood, 2004) or other incompatible interests that distort the predic-
tion. Many of these phenomena are better known under the term manipulation (and
fraud) in prediction tasks. They may, however, also be caused by fear of stigmati-
zation (e.g., a participant does not reveal his true belief, as it fears that its opinion
is socially not accepted) or untruthful revelation because of other reasons (e.g., if
anonymity is not guaranteed or not perceived) (e.g. Kennedy et al., 2017).
The sampling error describes the problems when the sample does not adequately
represent the population. Although there is consent that expectation-based forecast-
ing is much less prone to sampling errors (Rothschild and Wolfers, 2013; Winkler
and Moser, 2016), there are several studies that demonstrated the judgment bias in
Political Stock Markets (PSMs)3 (Forsythe, Rietz, and Ross, 1999; Berlemann and
Schmidt, 2001; Graefe, 2014; Kranz et al., 2014). In prediction markets, as an instance
of expectation- and crowd-based methods, the sampling error is existent and has a
measurable, though small impact on the forecast accuracy. However, in expert-based
judgmental methods, such as the Delphi method, the selection of the experts has
been identified as a key determinant for the success, the validity of the results (ac-
curacy), and the broadness of the discussed opinions (Welty, 1972; Hill and Fowles,
1975; Green, Armstrong, and Graefe, 2007).
The non-response error describes all problems that arise from non-respondent
subjects. The non-response error often also leads to a sampling errors. A sample
may adequately represent the field and information available; however, if not all
participants answer, a skewed sample may be the result (Armstrong, 1985). This
phenomenon is also referred to as self-selection bias (Heckman, 1990). Basically, this
problem exists in all group- and crowd-based forecasting methods and occurs at the
beginning of a forecasting process as well as during the process. During the process,
such cases are called drop-outs: Subjects that initially participated in the process, but
do not answer or respond to subsequent parts of the process. In the Delphi method,
drop-outs are a persistent problem and still a challenging factor for the success of
studies (Mullen, 2003; Reid, 1988; Walker and Selfe, 1996).
It is to note that these types of error are not independent of each other. Self-selec-
tion, as a non-response error, ultimately leads to a sampling error. Sampling errors
may be caused by cognitive biases, such as the judgment bias. In many cases it is not
possible to analyze solely one type of error. Therefore, the evaluation of forecasting
methods should always consider different perspectives and should be performed in
a holistic approach.
2.1.2 Judgmental Forecasting Methods
As already mentioned in Section 2.1.1, there are various validated and applied fore-
casting methods. Each method has its own strengths and weaknesses in different
contexts. Armstrong and Green (2018) identified 17 valid forecasting methods that
2The Delphi method is likewise the already introduced RTD method an approach for forecasting
based on an expert panel relying on the key properties anonymity, iteration, controlled feedback, and
statistical group response.
3PSMs are prediction markets with a focus on the outcome of election and political decisions.
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are reported and applied in literature and practice. Among these are nine judg-
mental methods and five quantitative methods. Two further meta-methods are con-
structed as combinations of single or different methods. The judgmental methods
are the following (Armstrong and Green, 2018, p. 4):
• Prediction markets4
• Multiplicative decomposition5
• Intentions surveys6
• Expectations surveys
• Expert surveys (Delphi, etc.)7
• Simulated interaction8
• Structured analogies9
• Experimentation
• Expert systems10
Armstrong and Green (2018) argue that often forecasting methods are only applied
to specific problems for the reason that the conducting researcher is familiar with the
method. E.g., many students become familiar with polls and the related methodol-
ogy during their time at university. If confronted with a forecasting task in their later
life, polling seems a promising option, as they know and understand the methodol-
ogy and the necessary steps. Nevertheless, an expert based approach or a prediction
market may have been more fitting to the context. Due to a lack of knowledge and
effort in the consideration of advantages and disadvantages, the student will still
use polls. For this reason, Armstrong and Green (2018) created a check list that shall
be used to compare all forecasting methods and to find the best for each specific
forecasting task. These methods can be understood as “archetypes” of judgmental
forecasting.
Finally, in many cases different models fit a specific problem and even if the as-
sumable best model is found, due to very high variances in forecasting accuracy, an-
other model might have performed better. Graefe et al. (2015) demonstrated on his-
torical data from the U.S. Presidential Elections 1976 to 2012 that the high accuracy
of a method in a preceding election was negatively correlated with high accuracy
of the same method in the upcoming election. This basically means that a method
that performed good on a certain forecasting task in the past may still perform bad
in the same task in the future (or at least worse than other methods11). To select the
best method for a certain context is, therefore, arguably hard and sometimes even
subject to “luck”. In many use-cases, e.g., elections, a variety of methods would be
applicable and potentially successful.
4Explained in detail in Section 2.2.
5The forecasting problem is represented as a product of smaller forecasting problems.
6E.g., election polls.
7Explained in detail in Section 2.3.
8A form of role-playing that is used to forecast decisions by people, e.g., in conflict situations. Naïve
subjects are introduced to specific roles and instructed to engage in realistic interactions until a decision
is reached (Armstrong and Green, 2018).
9Experts are asked to suggest situations that were similar to the target situation, rate their similarity
as well as map outcomes in the suggested situation to outcomes in the target simulation. Afterwards,
a forecast is calculated based on the provided estimations on similarity and outcomes (Armstrong and
Green, 2018).
10Experts describe their process of making forecasts step-by-step, such that it can be implemented
as software (Armstrong and Green, 2018).
11It has to be noted, that the ongoing development and improvement of the methods (also by a raise
in computing power and available data) may effect these high variances in forecasting accuracy.
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2.1.3 The Judgmental Forecasting Improvement Model (JFIM)
The three-dimensional error model from Armstrong (1985) identifies sources of er-
ror for group- and crowd-based judgmental forecasting approaches. However, the
impact of certain sources of errors often cannot be mapped directly to the outcome
accuracy. If a sample error occurs in an expectation based judgmental forecasting
method, you cannot simply calculate how much better the accuracy would have
been if the sample was not distorted. Even an experimental setup would not fi-
nally solve this problem, unless it would be carried out over a very long period, as
variance in forecasting is too large. This was demonstrated by Graefe et al. (2015)
on historical election forecasts. The same argumentation is valid for motivational
factors: Though it definitely leads to an error in the forecast, this often cannot be
quantified properly. Therefore, an investigation on the advantages of a new fore-
casting approach, such as the integrated approach of the Delphi-Markets that are
introduced in this thesis, has to be evaluated on other quality measures that better
fit each individual improvement.
For this reason, this dissertation develops and applies the Judgmental Forecast-
ing Improvement Model (JFIM) as a meta model to identify starting points for im-
provement. The JFIM maps the core aspects of a judgmental forecasting method by
Lyon and Pacuit (2013) (adjustable by the researcher) to the external factors of the
participants and to the four types of error discussed above. Lyon and Pacuit (2013)
identified six “core aspects” of wisdom of the crowd in the context of individual
judgment, judgment aggregation and collective judgment. These six aspects are ca-
pable to describe a crowd-based (judgmental) forecasting application or platform
from a design perspective:
• (1) The output.
• (2) The recruitment.
• (3) The inputs.
• (4) The elicitation method.
• (5) The aggregation method.
• (6) The standard of evaluation.
In order to improve judgmental forecasting methods, it is possible to adapt and mod-
ify these design elements or decisions.
Figure 2.2 reassembles the core aspects by Lyon and Pacuit (2013) graphically,
but from a Information Systems (IS) design perspective:
• The elicitation (4) and aggregation (5) assemble the forecasting mechanism (method)
and are therefore illustrated as an underlying platform (box).
• Illustrated as a black circle in the center, the output (1) is defined as the tar-
get of the underlying forecasting project and fully based (dependent) on the
mechanism.
• The standard of evaluation (6) is a added as vertical box to illustrate its inde-
pendence of the forecasting mechanism. Its shape (box) indicates its indirect
influence on the outcome, analogically to the elicitation and aggregation ele-
ment.
• The recruitment (2) and inputs (3) are the interfaces of the crowd’s estimation
to the forecasting method and finally to the output. Their shape indicates their
direct influence on the output. As they are dependent of the underlying fore-
casting mechanism they intersect with the boxes of elicitation and aggregation.
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FIGURE 2.2: Judgmental Forecasting Improvement Model.
However, in contrast to the elicitation (4) and aggregation (5), they are much
more question specific.
However, neither the recruitment nor the inputs are completely unbiased. The
motivation (7) of the crowd and its individuals, as well as their cognition processes
(8) interfere with the forming and submission of the expectations and also have an
impact on the output, the final forecast (Kloker and Kranz, 2017; Watts, 2015; Evans,
2012). Analogical to the recruitment and inputs, the motivation and cognition have a
direct influence on the output. However, cognition is in part moderated by the elic-
itation, for which reason the two shapes intersect (Does the elicitation method pro-
vide framing, anchors, or other heuristic cues?). The motivation is also influenced
by the aggregation (Does an individual estimation really matter? Or is it concealed
by the aggregation?). Therefore, the two shapes also intersect.
This way of assembling the core design elements and crowds properties of a
judgmental forecasting method provides some further value: When this new model
is integrated with the three-dimensional error model of Armstrong (1985), the error
components can be located in the touch points of the four quadrants (see Figure
2.2) as they are often the result of the interaction between design elements and the
crowds’ properties. The JFIM is therefore capable to give at least a first reference
point, where the design has to be adapted in order to reduce certain biases or errors.
• To reduce the sampling error one have to consider if the recruitment processes
leads to distorted samples. For opinion based judgmental forecasting methods,
such as polls, this would mean to select a sample in a representative manner.
For expert based approaches of judgmental forecasting or prediction markets,
it is necessary to select the participants according to their cognition (e.g. exper-
tise) in order to have an optimal sample.
• To reduce the non-response error one may intend to adapt the recruitment pro-
cesses and or the motivation of the participants. This is possible by providing
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external incentives, but also by, e.g., increasing intrinsic motivation using social
cues.
• To reduce the cognitive biases (response error) one may consider how the cog-
nition and the inputs are influenced by the elicitation mechanism and the way
the inputs have to be provided.
• To reduce motivational biases (response error) it is necessary to monitor the
inputs provided by the participants to detect fraud or manipulation. But it is
also necessary to enrich the forecasting method (or application) with preventive
design elements that decreases harmful motivation.
In order to improve the integrated approach introduced in this thesis, this model
will be applied and all four touch points will be addressed within an individual
research project.
2.2 Prediction Markets
2.2.1 A brief History of Prediction Markets
The “wisdom of crowds” is the basic principle underlying all prediction markets.
The term was coined by Galton and his experiment during the show of an annual
fat stock and poultry exhibition in 1906 (latter referred to as the “Galton Experi-
ment”) (Galton, 1907; Shrier et al., 2016). For 6 pence persons could buy stamped
and numbered cards and submit their estimate on the weight of a specified ox. The
average competitor was not likely to be an expert in oxen, not more than a voter
on the political issues that he casts his vote on. However, to the surprise of Galton,
the “vox populi” (voice of the people) was astonishingly accurate. The median was
0.8% away from the true value, the average only little more (0.85%) (Shrier et al.,
2016). Galton (1907, p. 5) concludes that “[...] [this] result is [...] more creditable to
the trust-worthiness of a democratic judgment than might have been expected.”.
The “wisdom of crowds” is explained statistically with an additive error model
(Shrier et al., 2016). If an individual forecast Yi is a function of the true value x
and an individual error ei(x) and this individual error is unbiased and independent
(Ex[ei(x)] = 0 ∀i), the average forecast should be very close to the true value x
if the sample is large enough. However, by simply averaging all estimations, the
accuracy is only given if the individual forecasts Yi reflect the true estimation of each
individual forecaster. Markets are an aggregation mechanisms that usually does not
have the problem of untruthful revelation of information, as they yield expected
financial losses.
Another famous example in the history of prediction markets occurred in 1984
in the U.S.. An examination of the relationship between the weather and the orange
futures revealed that the price of the futures at market closing predicted the errors
in the weather forecasts of the minimum temperature in the later evening (Shrier
et al., 2016). Orange trees cannot deal with temperatures below zero degrees Celsius
for more than a few hours. Orange farmers, therefore, observe the weather very
carefully. Based on their observations and experience they often can make better
estimations on the local weather than any centralized weather models. In order to
make profit, they trade on these orange futures as well and their knowledge becomes
reflected in the price of the future. The example of the orange futures is therefore a
good example that the crowd is capable to collect and hold a huge amount of public
and private, and centralized and dispersed information (Shrier et al., 2016). Markets
are capable to give the crowd an incentive for revealing this information.
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In the founding article “The use of knowledge in society”, Hayek described this
property of markets: “Fundamentally, in a system where the knowledge of the rel-
evant facts is dispersed among many people, prices can act to cordinate [!sic] the
separate actions of different people in the same way as subjective values help the
individual to cordinate [!sic] the parts of his plan“ (Hayek, 1945, p. 526). Markets
provide people with incentives to use their information, while observing the feed-
back on the opinion of the other participants. Valid information helps participants
to detect over- or under-valuations in the market and allow the participant to realize
profits by trading. The trading activity, however, leads to changes in the current mar-
ket price and therefore reflects the new information to all market participants and
observers. With the “efficient markets hypothesis”, Fama (1970) formulated the fact
that all available and relevant information is reflected in the market price. There are
different levels of strictness, but in the strong form of the efficient markets hypothe-
sis, it is said that the price would be unaffected by any disclosure of information that
was previously known to a person (Malkiel, 2003; Sewell, 2011). It is not to assume
that (all) prediction markets are strong efficient markets, but according to Snowberg,
Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2005, p. 370) prediction markets “[...] seem to satisfy at least
the weak form of the efficient markets hypothesis”. Basically, this means that the
revelation of private information may affect the market price, but there are no profit
opportunities from applying strategies that simply rely on past prices (price follows
a random walk)12. Based on this principle, prediction markets function basically ac-
cording to the following process, illustrated in Figure 2.3: (1) The crowd shares some
common information, as well as every individual collects and has some private in-
formation. According to this information each individual forms its own expectation.
(2) Based on this expectation, each individual can calculate how much it values one
share in the prediction market. If they perceive the price as to low, they buy shares,
as this results in an expected profit. Otherwise, if they perceive the price as to high,
they sell. (3) This trading results in a price that continuously adapts to changing
information according to the beliefs of all individuals. (4) It also serves as a public
information to the crowd on the crowds’ belief.
Prediction markets became famous with the introduction of the Iowa Electronic
Markets (IEM) (Berg, Forsythe, and Rietz, 1997). Since 1988 it allows students to
trade on the outcomes of diverse events in politics and finance. Especially prominent
are the forecasts for the U.S. Presidential Elections, as they outperformed large-scale
polling organizations (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). Over time, however, their ap-
plication spread above many other contexts.
2.2.2 Contexts in which prediction markets were used
Nowadays, prediction markets are used in a variety of fields (Luckner et al., 2012).
For instance, Table 2.1 gives a brief overview on prediction markets and their con-
texts. Many prediction markets cannot be sorted in one single category. Therefore,
Table 2.1 should just give an impression and should not be regarded a complete and
exclusive list. Prediction markets experienced their greatest visibility in the area of
politics. However, in sports and alongside sports betting they are also regularly ap-
plied. Application in companies and organizations (e.g., for DSS, Foresight Sup-
port System (FSS), Idea/Innovation/Project Management) is currently becoming
more and more popular (Prokesch, Gracht, and Wohlenberg, 2015; Buckley, 2016;
12A third variant of the efficient market hypothesis is the semi-strong from efficiency. Here prices
adjust rapidly to publicly available information. These adjustments are unbiased, so no excess returns
are possible by trading on this information.
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FIGURE 2.3: Basic process of a prediction market. Participants col-
lect dispersed information and trade according to their expectations
on the market. The market price serves as new information to the
traders.
Soukhoroukova, Spann, and Skiera, 2012; Remidez Jr and Joslin, 2007). Other ap-
plications, such as science, are less prominent. Prokesch, Gracht, and Wohlenberg
(2015) argues strongly for their application for economic indicators and Teschner,
Stathel, and Weinhardt (2011) found that prediction markets perform at least com-
petitive with Bloomberg forecasts. Accordingly, the Handelsblatt and the Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung (two large German news magazines) featured and still
feature prediction markets for economic indicators within the context of their online
news magazines.
2.2.3 Interpreting prices as forecasts
As to Figure 2.3, in prediction markets forecasting issues are modeled in contracts,
which define the rule how the market will pay out the traders regarding the realiza-
tion of an event. One reason for the large applicability of prediction markets is the
fact that contracts can be modeled in a way that the prices can be directly interpreted
as probabilities with respect to the event to be predicted (Wolfers and Zitzewitz,
2006b). This makes it easy for participants to translate their expectations into trad-
ing. There are, however, different types of contracts. These are (1) winner-take-all
contracts, (2) index contracts, and (3) spread contracts (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004).
• Winner-take-all contracts pay out the maximum amount (often 100 or 1 Money
Unit (MU)) if an event happens, otherwise nothing. “Will candidate XY win the
election?” is such an example. The market price of a contract c(y) for an event
y can then be directly interpreted as the probability p(y) that event y occurs.
• Index contracts pay according to a certain rule based on the realization of an
event. “How much percent will candidate XY achieve?” is such an exam-
ple. A rule would, e.g., define that the contract pays 1 MU for each percent
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Area Examples References
PSM IEM (rm), Wahl$treet (c),
PESM Wahlboerse (rm),
Wahlfieber, Pollyvote Pre-
diction Market, Economic
Indicator Exchange (EIX) (c),
Predictit (rm)
Luckner, Kratzer, and Wein-
hardt (2005), Graefe (2017),
Franke, Geyer-Schulz, and
Hoser (2005), and Franke,
Geyer-Schulz, and Hoser (2006)
Sports STOCCER (c), TradeSports (c,
rm), Smarkets (rm), Betfair
(rm)
O’Connor and Zhou (2008)
Economic
Indica-
tors
EIX (c), Kurspiloten (c) Teschner, Stathel, and Wein-
hardt (2011)
Science DAGGRE (c), SciCast (c), Dreber et al. (2015), Laskey,
Hanson, and Twardy (2015), and
Powell et al. (2013)
Enter-
tainment Hollywood Stock Exchange
(HSX), Fame Project (rm)
Pennock et al. (2001)
All of the
above
Intrade (c, rm), Hypermind
(rm), FAZ.NET-Orakel, Pre-
dictious (rm, bc), Augur (rm,
bc), Metaculus, NewsFutures
(c)
Bruneel et al. (2018) and Peter-
son et al. (2018)
DSS, FSS,
Idea/-
Innova-
tion/Pro-
ject Man-
agement
Google, HP, Deutsche
Telekom, Yahoo, General
Electrics
Cowgill, Wolfers, and Zitze-
witz (2009), Prokesch, Gracht,
and Wohlenberg (2015), Buck-
ley (2016), Van Bruggen et al.
(2010), Rohrbeck, Thom, and
Arnold (2015), Keller and Gracht
(2014), Soukhoroukova, Spann,
and Skiera (2012), and Spears
and LaComb (2009)
Others Climate Change, Swine Flu
Pandemic, Research Evalua-
tions, Education, ...
Munafo et al. (2015) and Buckley
and Doyle (2015)
TABLE 2.1: Selected popular prediction markets and their area of ap-
plication. (c = closed, rm = real money, bc = blockchain-based)
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of vote-share. The market price of a contract c(y) for an event y can then be
interpreted as the mean value of the realization of this event E[y].
• Spread contracts pay according to a certain rule based on a property of the ex-
pectations on the realization of an event. Usually this is, that a contract doubles
its price if the realization of an event y is larger (smaller) than a certain thresh-
old y∗ and pays 0 if it is below or equal (above or equal) this threshold. This
contract design allows to elicit the median value of the expectations from the
participants (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004).
2.2.4 Advantages of Prediction Markets
Prediction markets feature several further beneficial properties that are the reason
for their wide application: (1) fast reaction to new information (Graefe, Luckner, and
Weinhardt, 2010), (2) continuous forecasts (Graefe, Luckner, and Weinhardt, 2010),
(3) immediate feedback, (4) easy implementing of incentives (partly incentive com-
patibility) (Jurca and Faltings, 2008), (5) implicit long-term weighting (Arrow et al.,
2008), (6) gamification is possible (Buckley and Doyle, 2017), and (7) the collection
of expectations (Rothschild and Wolfers, 2013). A detailed investigation of these and
further advantages, as well as the disadvantages, will be given in Section 3.1.
2.2.5 Ongoing Discussions and Current Developments
As many other forecasting methods, prediction markets are continuously evalu-
ated and developed. For instance, Kranz (2015) adapted the market-engineering
framework (Weinhardt, Holtmann, and Neumann, 2003) and introduced “continu-
ous market-engineering” as a process to continuously enhance and adapt markets to
changing environments. Wolfers and Zitzewitz formulated in 2006 the “Five Open
Questions About Prediction Markets”, which then where the (1) attraction of unin-
formed traders, (2) limited contractibility, (3) manipulation, (4) calibration for small
probabilities, and (5) separating correlation from causation (Wolfers and Zitzewitz,
2006a). This is a not full list of issues that have driven, and still do, current discus-
sions and research on prediction market yet, of which a few shall be highlighted in
the following paragraphs.
Accuracy
The probably never ending “ongoing discussion” is regarding the accuracy of pre-
diction markets. In the field of politics, there is almost common sense that predic-
tion markets produce competitive results (compared to polls), which was demon-
strated by various studies (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004; Berlemann and Schmidt,
2001; Rothschild, 2009). First euphoric studies that attributed prediction markets
with a superior forecasting capability (e.g. Berg, Nelson, and Rietz, 2008) could not
be positively reevaluated on following elections. In recent elections, prediction mar-
kets rather show an alternating success. While in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections,
prediction markets did not “succeed” (Graefe, 2017), they were among the most ac-
curate methods in the 2017 German Federal Election. The accuracy of prediction
markets is usually bench-marked against polls and other forecasting methods. And
in fact, since all methods have been steadily developed and improved over the last
decades, the accuracy of one method in a previous election seems even to be neg-
atively correlated with accuracy in an upcoming election (Graefe, 2014). Even be-
tween prediction markets with different market mechanisms there exist significant
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differences regarding accuracy. Klingert and Meyer (2018) found in simulations that
some mechanisms (e.g., Continuous Double Auction (CDA)) result in better accu-
racy levels than others. This was, however, also strongly dependent on the actors
and the environment.
There is an ongoing discussion, if prediction markets do not aggregate private
information but only reflect the results of the latest polls. This, however, would not
suggest the application of prediction markets in a context where no public polls are
available or when polls are not reliable13. Erikson and Wlezien (2012) conclude on
this discussion that the truth lays somehow in between. According to the findings
of Erikson and Wlezien (2012) prediction markets “worked remarkably well” before
polls are available. However, as soon as public opinion polls are available the elec-
tion markets seem to follow the polls. In the case of the Brexit, Fry and Brint (2017)
could not find supporting evidence for this statement, in fact they appeared remark-
ably unresponsive. One may argue for both sides, but the hypothesis that markets
only aggregate poll information, which would imply that they only work when polls
are available, has to be rejected. Prediction markets put the question in a different
way than the usual voter intention polls. Prediction markets ask for the expecta-
tion of each participant on the outcome of the event. Rothschild and Wolfers (2013)
are comparing intention polls and expectation polls and conclude that expectation
polls yield better results than intention polls. They describe the effect that the an-
swers one receive in expectation polls are “[...] about as informative as if they were
themselves based on a [...] [intention] poll of approximately twenty friends, family,
and coworkers” (Rothschild and Wolfers, 2013, p. 41). Same should be valid in pre-
diction markets. While in intention polls, every participant has to reveal his voting
preference, the trader does not have to reveal her preference and can keep “anony-
mity”. The superiority of expectation polls was also robust when biased samples
were used (e.g. in the context of U.S. Presidential Elections, only democrats or only
republicans) (Rothschild and Wolfers, 2013). Graefe (2014) is also comparing opinion
surveys to expectation surveys as well as to prediction markets, expert forecasts, and
quantitative methods. The dominance of the expectation surveys over the opinion
surveys was also a robust finding in his studies. A weak dominance of the expecta-
tion surveys over prediction markets was demonstrated by Miller et al. (2012) (2008
U.S. Presidential Election, 19.000 respondents vs. Intrade prediction market). Graefe
(2014) attributes these findings to a biased sample of traders in the IEM (white, male,
well-educated, middle- and upper-income, in majority conservative voters) as well
as other biases. However, Graefe (2014) concludes that expectation surveys and pre-
diction markets are, regarding their accuracy, at least competitive models. Both find-
ings support the hypothesis that prediction markets do not only aggregate public
opinion polls but also the opinion, the “common sense”, of their private environ-
ment and relationships (peer group).
Graefe (2011) compared the accuracy of prediction markets in a meta analysis
of previous studies in the context of companies. Graefe (2011) showed that predic-
tion markets performed better (+6% accuracy) than econometric models, but only
competitive to other methods of combined judgment. However, Graefe (2011) also
concludes that the heterogeneity of application areas and the lack of more studies
makes it very difficult to evaluate this matter on a more resilient basis. Some studies
were distinctly more accurate (+28%), others clearly worse (-29%) compared to the
13In domains other than politics this would be bookmaker odds, expert forecasts, etc. (Spann and
Skiera, 2009; Straub, Teubner, and Weinhardt, 2016)
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benchmarks. Regarding economic indicators, Teschner (2011) demonstrated com-
petitive accuracy compared to the Bloomberg publications, sometimes even weeks
before. Spann and Skiera (2009) assessed the accuracy of prediction markets against
betting odds and tipsters in the area of sports. While prediction markets and bet-
ting odds performed competitive, tipsters were significantly worse. Atanasov et al.
(2016) assessed prediction markets in the context of geopolitical events. While pre-
diction markets performed continuously better than simple averages of individual
forecasts, other aggregation mechanisms performed at least competitive or better.
It is to conclude that prediction markets are no panacea for forecasting problems,
but are in many cases a competitive forecasting method that provides many other
beneficial properties besides high accuracy. In addition, in areas besides politics,
sports, and economics, where the outcomes can be observed objectively, evaluation
may also be subject to manipulation or other strategic influences (Munafo et al., 2015;
Prokesch, Gracht, and Wohlenberg, 2015). All in all, assessment of prediction market
accuracy remains, often due to a lack of benchmarks, difficult in many areas, such
as, e.g., idea management and evaluation.
Real Money vs. Play Money and other Incentives
Proper incentives are a key element and challenge in prediction markets. In predic-
tion markets run on real money, these proper incentives are usually given: Good pre-
dictions causes gains, bad predictions causes losses and every participant is, there-
fore, given an incentive to trade according to his true beliefs (Blume, 2012). How-
ever, in many countries real money prediction markets are considered as gambling
and would therefore require a gambling license, which is usually not the case for pre-
diction market providers. Play money prediction markets are used instead. In play
money prediction markets, however, bad predictions do not cause real (financial)
losses. And good predictions also cause no real (financial) gains. As proper incen-
tives are not given any longer, new incentive schemes are used, such as prizes for
the top ranked traders or lotteries among all participants (Luckner, 2006). There is,
however, the question if these incentive schemes, which do not necessarily pay off in
a linear relationship to the performance and usually do not punish bad predictions,
still perform well. Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004) addressed this question and com-
pared results from a real money prediction market (TradeSports) to a play money
prediction market (Newsfutures) in the context of the National Football League
(NFL). Their findings indicated that there is no positive nor negative effect on the
accuracy. Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004), however, noticed that knowledge and moti-
vation are two essential factors for the accuracy and “[...] traders on both websites
are obviously motivated and, at least in general, knowledgeable about the issues be-
ing traded” Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004, p. 250). In a later study, Servan-Schreiber
(2017) demonstrated that there was also no difference in the field of politics. Gruca,
Berg, and Cipriano (2008) also found no difference in the field of entertainment and
Slamka, Soukhoroukova, and Spann (2008) found no difference in diverse areas at
least regarding the reaction to new information. Rosenbloom and Notz (2006) and
Diemer and Poblete (2010), however, found a difference in favor of real money pre-
diction markets in non-sports events and “diverse events”. Servan-Schreiber et al.
(2004) argues that money is only one way to motivate knowledgeable participants.
Other methods may be community, bragging, rights, or prizes. The way of motiva-
tion may, however, have an “[...] impact as well on the kind of person that registers
to trade” and while real money may better motivate information discovery, play
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money “[...] may yield more efficient information aggregation” (Servan-Schreiber
et al., 2004, p. 250).
Luckner (2006) and Luckner and Weinhardt (2007) examine how a proper in-
centive scheme in play money prediction markets has to be designed. Interest-
ingly, they found that performance-compatible payment schemes, where partici-
pants could “lose” money, performed worse than a fixed payment scheme or rank-or-
der tournaments. Both studies suggest the rank-order tournament as the dominant
payment scheme (regarding accuracy).
However, in rank-order tournaments a special problem occurs: All one-shot win-
ner-take-all contracts require a counterpart contract that makes the overall market
more complex for the participants. Assume a contract for an event Y: “Will candi-
date XY win the election?”. Now assume that the average expectation of all traders is
80%: E(y) = 0.8; which is the most likely value. Let the estimation of the traders fol-
low a normal distribution around 0.8: Ei(x) = Φ(x). A first trader k has a very good
estimate on the most likely values and trades shares around 0.8. A second trader j
has an estimate that is too low and will sell all shares until 0.3. A third trader l has
an estimate that is too high and will buy all shares until 0.9. In this setting, though
trader k has the best estimate, either trader j or l will receive the highest payout, as
the contract will either pay 1 or 0. In one-shot markets it is therefore always better to
take the risk and bet “double or quits”. To solve this problem, it is necessary to in-
troduce a counterpart contract ¬y: “Will candidate XY not win the election?”. Trader
k will trade shares around 0.2. Trader j will buy all shares until 0.7. Trader l will sell
all shares until 0.1. However, both contracts combined, trader k will now have the
highest payoff. The counterpart contract ¬y solves the problem, however, leads to
the fact that every trader has to trade his preference twice. In an attenuated form,
the same problem exists in one-shot index and spread contracts as well.
Market Scoring Rules and Combinatorial Prediction Markets
Traditional prediction markets face diverse problems, such as low liquidity (Li and
Vaughan, 2013) or the difficult modeling of dependent events (Powell et al., 2013).
Market makers are one solution to this problem. Market makers offer for each secu-
rity a price (or two prices) to which they are willing to accept buy and sell orders.
Therefore, each participant is instantly able to trade. These prices are usually cal-
culated based on market scoring rules. The most popular is the Logarithmic Mar-
ket Scoring Rule (LMSR) by Hanson (2002), also called: “Hanson Market Maker”.
Proper scoring rules are incentive compatible, which means that only the true re-
port of an agent maximizes its expected profits (Hanson, 2002)14,15. Though many
positive properties, market scoring rules still have open questions. Many, includ-
ing the LMSR, are dependent on a liquidity parameter that basically moderates the
14A market is incentive compatible if traders cannot obtain a higher profit through not revealing
their true preferences, fraudulent actions, or if participants avoid participation (also, as they fear ma-
nipulation). According to the no-trade theorem, no rational trader should trade in a CDA market.
However, the presence of noisy traders in a market makes the CDA a positive sum game for the ratio-
nal traders and therefore “individual rational”(Kyle, 2016). In contrast, prediction markets based on
scoring rules are only incentive compatible in the short run. Intelligent traders understand the influ-
ences of their trading on other participants and can realize more profits by first misleading the market
participants by trading into the false direction and later trade according to their true preferences (Chen
and Pennock, 2010).
15If prediction markets and or market scoring rules are really incentive compatible, especially in the
long term, is an ongoing discussion. Ban (2018) argues that the LMSR is not incentive compatible but
suggests three further adaptions which fulfill all requirements.
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effect of a single trader on the market price. Setting this parameter, which has a sig-
nificant influence on the forecasting accuracy, has long been perceived rather as art
than science (Pennock, 2010). Karimi and Dimitrov (2018) only recently suggested
an approach to calculate the optimal liquidity parameter. Due to the lack of real
world data based evidence, it cannot be concluded yet, if this approach works for all
prediction markets.
The LMSR has one further unique advantage that is especially important for
combinatorial prediction markets (Hanson, 2002). While in traditional prediction
markets it is only possible to trade the probabilities for an event p(A) or an event
p(B), combinatorial markets also allow to trade the probability of the conditioned
events p(A|B) or p(B|A) (and the negated events). The LMSR ensures that, given
tree events A, B, and C, an adjustment of the conditioned event p(A|B) does neither
change p(B) nor p(A|C) (Powell et al., 2013).
In combinatorial prediction markets each asset is therefore traded by a LMSR and
the assets are connected to each other by a Bayesian network (Powell et al., 2013; Sun
et al., 2012). Therefore, the law of total probability has to be fulfilled always and an
asset has to have the same price if it is traded directly or with its equivalent condi-
tioned probabilities. A trade, however, also leads to the updating of several proba-
bilities and can result in a potentially intractable computational problem if too many
relations between questions are defined. Sun et al. (2012) developed and evaluated
an algorithm for updating the Bayesian network computational efficient.
DAGGRE and SciCast are two examples of such combinatorial prediction mar-
kets. In an experimental setup in the DAGGRE prediction market, it could not be
shown that combinatorial prediction markets were clearly superior to flat prediction
markets in a “murder mystery” scenario (Powell et al., 2013). It is concluded that the
relations between markets have to be very strong to benefit from the conditioned
probabilities. Laskey, Hanson, and Twardy (2015) suggest and apply combinatorial
prediction markets as a tool to aggregate human (experts) and artificial forecasters.
Their prediction platform, named SciCast, is a prediction market to forecast geopo-
litical events and was operated from 2012 to 2015 by the George Mason University
(George Mason University, 2015).
Complexity and Information Overload
Various authors argue that the high complexity of prediction markets and limited
understanding of participants are a hurdle to the adaption and use of prediction
markets (Teschner and Weinhardt, 2012a). Chen, Li, and Zeng (2015) argue that com-
plexity factors such as dynamic prices, complex pricing mechanisms, and time-de-
pendent and dynamic payoffs pose high cognitive load to its participants that raises
entry barriers and lowers intention to participate (especially for non-sophisticated
users). According to Chen, Li, and Zeng (2015) this complexity is mainly driven by
the selected market mechanism (market micro structure (Weinhardt, Holtmann, and
Neumann, 2003)). Therefore, Chen, Li, and Zeng (2015) suggest a fixed odds market
design.
Teschner and Weinhardt (2012a) decided not to change the underlying market
mechanisms, but the interface. Markets that hide its complexity with easy to use
and intuitive interfaces are “Hidden Markets” (Seuken, 2010). Actually all LMSR
markets are also hidden markets. In an experimental study, Teschner and Weinhardt
(2012a) found surprising evidence that orders submitted with the hidden market
interface (trading wizard) were more likely to be profitable, more likely to be market
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orders, and smaller in average. It is suggested that complex market interfaces lowers
performance by increasing participants’ cognitive load.
Yang, Li, and Heck (2015) examined the effect of the information transparency
level on different measures in prediction markets. The degree of visibility of orders
in the order book also moderates cognitive load. There is potentially a trade-off
between the information gain of a transparent order book and information overload.
The key findings of Yang, Li, and Heck (2015) state that a semi-transparent market,
a market where the top three buy and sell orders are displayed, leads to the best
accuracy and most interactions between traders. A full-transparent market showed
no significant further improvement.
Non-observable Events
One disadvantage of most standard prediction market implementations is the mod-
eling of contracts for events with a non-observable outcome (Garcin and Faltings,
2014). According to Sprenger, Bolster, and Venkateswaran (2007) these markets are
called conditional prediction markets. In these markets only one of many options
will be realized (if at all), such as in the case of prediction markets for idea evalu-
ation (e.g. Soukhoroukova, Spann, and Skiera, 2012), or that the realization may be
too far in the future. One approach to solve this problem is suggested by Garcin and
Faltings (2014). Contributions to the forecast are rewarded, if later contributions con-
firm this estimation (simplified: if the price or probability was moved into the same
direction). To implement a proper scoring rule in this case, it would be necessary
to know the posterior probability distributions of each participant or an additional
question that functions as a “Bayesian Truth Serum” (Prelec, 2004; Witkowski and
Parkes, 2012). In the case of Garcin and Faltings (2014) latter was replaced by the
current poll result. The approach is then called “peer truth serum”. Garcin and Falt-
ings (2014) demonstrated comparable performance to prediction markets in the con-
text of Swiss ballots. Therefore, the authors suggest their approach as an alternative
to prediction markets where outcomes may not be observable. Further limitations
seem to lay in the required existence of poll results (or comparable numbers). It is
also not discussed how prone the approach is to manipulation and fraud.
Slamka, Jank, and Skiera (2012) named prediction markets with non-observable
events “2nd generation prediction markets” or “G2” markets. These G2 markets
just pay off according to the last fixed price as employed by several previous studies
(e.g. Dahan et al., 2011; Soukhoroukova and Spann, 2005; LaComb, Barnett, and
Pan, 2007). Slamka, Jank, and Skiera (2012) found that this payoff scheme resulted,
as expected, in a worse accuracy. However, this was only by 4.4% (topics: sports,
politics, and economics). It has to be noted that such markets are, however, more
prone to manipulation and fraud.
Manipulation and Fraud
Manipulation and fraud in prediction markets is a very common problem. A de-
tailed investigation is postponed to Section 7.
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2.3 Real-Time Delphi
Contents of this section are in part adopted from Kloker et al. (2018c).
See Section A.1 for further details.
2.3.1 A brief History of Real-Time Delphi
The RTD technique is an advanced concept based on the conventional Delphi method,
which is already covered by an extensive body of literature. Delphi studies aim
to find consensus on questions regarding the future among a panel of experts in
a structured and anonymous communication process with feedback. The conven-
tional Delphi method was first introduced by the Air Force-sponsored RAND Cor-
poration in the 1950-1960s (Linstone and Turoff, 2011). The objective was (and still
is) to “[...] obtain the most reliable consensus of opinion of a group of experts [...] by
a series of intensive questionnaires interspersed with controlled opinion feedback”
(Linstone and Turoff, 2002b, p. 10). The first study on the Delphi method was pub-
lished by Gordon and Helmer (1964) and evaluated the methodology on questions
with time-horizons of 10 to 50 years. This publication formed the foundation of
a number of Delphi studies in non-defense areas and triggered discussions on the
methodology in literature (Linstone and Turoff, 2002b). At the same time the num-
ber of conducted Delphi studies also exploded: Hundreds in the 1960s and already
thousands in the mid of the 1974s (Linstone and Turoff, 2002b).
In 1975, Linstone and Turoff published a book titled “The Delphi Method” dis-
cussing the technique and its applications so far (Linstone and Turoff, 2002b). Today
it is considered to be the basic literature for defining the main characteristics and
key elements of the conventional Delphi method. According to Rowe, Wright, and
Bolger (1991) and Dalkey, Brown, and Cochran (1969) the Delphi method displays
four key elements: (1) anonymity of the survey participants, (2) controlled feedback,
(3) statistical group response, and (4) iteration.
The basic procedure of a Delphi study is illustrated in Figure 2.4. In a tradi-
tional Delphi study, experts receive a questionnaire in paper-and-pencil form from
a monitoring team. During a defined time horizon, they give their responses while
assessing the specific scenario alternatives by scales of measurement and option-
ally provide reasons for their estimation. Subsequently, the questionnaires are sent
back, and the individual arguments and judgments are summarized by the moni-
toring team. The group results serve as a basis for a new questionnaire, which is
sent back to the respondent group. The experts then have the chance to examine the
group feedback and, thereon, reevaluate their original answers. This process can be
repeated several times resulting in the occurrence of “structured communication”
between the participants, free of “inter-personal” and hierarchical effects, and social
pressure (Klein and Garcia, 2015). This makes it especially applicable also for con-
texts, where different, conflicting interests have to be considered or participants are
in an unequal dependency relationship to each other (Linstone and Turoff, 2002b).
Though this basic scheme and the four key principles, the Delphi method was
often adapted in order to fit real-world problems and specific contexts (Landeta,
2006). These adaptions also led to the use of the Delphi method in contexts that
are not necessarily related to forecasting, such as “budget allocation” or “examining
the significance of historical events” (Linstone and Turoff, 2002b). Nevertheless, in
forecasting the method is still widely adopted and Landeta (2006) summarizes “[...]
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FIGURE 2.4: Process of a traditional Delphi study.
that the Delphi method continues to be used and is a valid instrument for forecasting
and supported decision-making” (Landeta, 2006, p. 478).
Rowe, Wright, and Bolger (1991) and Rowe and Wright (1999), however, criticize
that a real evaluation of the Delphi method is difficult and leads to a distorted es-
timation of the quality of the forecasts and conclusions. They advocate that future
research needs to elaborate on the mechanics of judgment change within the groups
during the rounds and the underlying processes.
Despite the great popularity, the conventional Delphi method also shows some
weaknesses, such as the large time frame needed to perform studies, the lack of
real-time presentation of results, and the elaborate tasks of the facilitator. The first
and second have been addressed by the introduction of the RTD (Gordon and Pease,
2006), empowered by the advanced ICT then available to a broad audience. RTD16
is an online adaption of the Delphi method that allows participants to access the
answers and estimation of other participants not only in the upcoming round, but
immediately after submitting (or even before) their own estimation, and, therefore,
in “real-time”. Access to the study is usually also possible at any time.
Within the last decade, RTD detached itself from the traditional Delphi method
and was researched in several studies, though several arguments and definitions
still referred to literature of traditional method (Gnatzy et al., 2011; Landeta, 2006).
Research on RTDs is based on many studies performed in the last decade. Several
publications report the implementation of RTD platforms and present the basic pro-
cedures (Abadie, Friedewald, and Weber, 2010; Gary and Gracht, 2015; Schuckmann
et al., 2012). In 2011, Gnatzy et al. developed a modified RTD technique based on
the idea of Gordon and Pease (2006). The focus of Gnatzy et al. (2011) is laid on the
visual statistical group feedback and a higher level of expert guidance through the
survey by a one-screen-one-question design.
2.3.2 Real-Time Delphi: Definition and detailed Process
However, current implementations of RTDs differ strongly according to certain as-
pects regarding the process and the definitions, for which reason they are hard to
grasp. This dissertation applies the following working definition:
A Real-Time Delphi (RTD) is an online implementation of the Delphi method,
where users can interact with the platform online and at any given time.
16The term Real-Time Delphi was already used by Clayton (1997), which meant a Delphi performed
during a real meeting. However, this naming was not picked up by other authors.
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FIGURE 2.5: Process of a Real-Time Delphi study.
A schematic illustration of the process is provided in Figure 2.5. Two central
differences distinguishes the process from a traditional Delphi process. First, there
are no explicit rounds anymore. Participants are initially invited (and potentially
remembered on a regular basis) to access the study which is available online. Af-
ter their initial estimations, they can decide for themselves, if and when they want
access the survey for a second (third, fourth...) time in order to reevaluate new feed-
back and their own estimations. Second, the feedback is not summarized by the
researcher in between the loops, but summarized and displayed to the expert in-
stantly.
However, there is also no clear definition of the process and many variants of
RTDs exists (Goodman, 2017).
2.3.3 Ongoing Discussions and Current Developments
Retention
One problem with the traditional Delphi method as well as the RTD is the lack
of retention of participants over multiple rounds. According to Mullen (2003) and
Walker and Selfe (1996) the response rate in Delphi studies needs to be at least 70%.
Reid (1988) notes that the panel size has a strong influence on the drop-out rate.
Large panels tend to lead to less retention of participants than small panels with
less than 20 members. In RTDs the problem is expected to be much larger, as in-
dividual’s contribution and involvement becomes smaller. This effect is known as
“Social Loafing” and is present in online communities as well (Lampe et al., 2010).
Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) argue that the researcher has the possibility to contact
the drop-outs and ask them to participate, but this can be, depending on the budget,
related to a disproportionate effort (Ishikawa et al., 1993). However, the technolog-
ical concept of RTD and its asynchronous character would allow distinctly larger
panels. To draw upon this potential, it is necessary to bind users strongly to the
platform and the survey. This can be accomplished by enabling participants to ex-
perience online presence. The experience to feel “present” in the online community
is a prerequisite to attribute actions and reactions on the platform to oneself and
build up “reputation”. Bolger and Wright (2011) found that in “traditional” Delphi
studies the promise of gaining social reputation raises motivation to commit to the
study and raises retention. To address this issue, the current thesis evaluates a social
Real-Time Delphi, described and evaluated in detail in Section 5.
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Selection of Experts
The selection of experts for a RTD study is also one key challenge to the method. It
often defines, which points are discussed and taken into account and also influences
the overall accuracy. Recent approaches suggest to select participants based on their
performance in related questions rather than based on reputation (which is common
in the traditional Delphi method). Budescu and Chen (2017) build up on the idea
that aggregated opinions often outperform individual experts17 and improve this
by selecting those individuals out of the crowd that perform relatively18 better, which
means in detail “relative to the crowd’s contribution”. Therefore, a new measure of
contribution is introduced. By this approach of creating a new crowd of experts (top
positive contributors) Budescu and Chen (2017) shows in two studies the superiority
of their proposed model (forecasting current events and economic forecasts of the
European Central Bank). This thesis suggests the selection of experts based on their
trading behavior in related prediction markets. Details on this approach are outlined
in Section 4.
2.4 Overview on selected Research Methods
Within the scope of the presented research several research methodologies were ap-
plied, which will be, very briefly, described in this section.
Literature Review A literature review (e.g. Webster and Watson, 2002) intends to
analyze relevant research articles in order to gain an extended understanding of
the current state and the relationships in a given topic. A guided process helps
the researcher to identify all relevant articles given some predefined inclusion and
completeness criteria and helps to categorize important common findings and con-
structs. It is a key step for theory development, as well as to derive research gaps.
CRISP-DM The CRoss Industry Standard Process for Data Mining (CRISP-DM)
(Wirth and Hipp, 2000) is a generic process that gives advice on the necessary steps,
their order, and implementation of data driven (research) projects. It is regarded as
the de-facto standard in data mining projects, though it is relatively high level and
therefore allows possibilities for adaptions. The method basically distinguishes be-
tween the phases of: Business understanding, data understanding, data preparation,
modeling, evaluation, and deployment; which are arranged in an iterative cycle and
connected by different uni- and bidirectional sequential paths.
Online Experiments Online experiments (web-based experiments, internet exper-
iments) are experiments not performed in a laboratory facility but dispersed using
internet-enabled (private) devices. They are very common in psychology and judg-
mental forecasting as well (Reips, 2007). Online experiments have the advantage of
being more flexible regarding scale and time (and therefore often more cost effec-
tive), however provide less control on the subjects and their environments (internal
validity). Especially if the subject of matter is an online tool, however, online exper-
iments provide a more natural evaluation environment (external validity).
17The wisdom of crowds
18In contrast to absolutely of traditional weighting models, where the weight is based on absolute
past performance (Budescu and Chen, 2017).
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Design Science Design Science Research (DSR) (Hevner et al., 2004) is a research
method that focuses on the design of innovative artifacts in order to extend human
and organizational capabilities, rather than trying to develop and verify theories that
explain human or organizational behavior. It bridges the gap from kernel theories
from IS, but also other related fields, into the implementation into artifacts of actual
use. An iterative process guides the researcher through relevant steps in the research
project.
Action Design Research ADR (Sein et al., 2011) is a special form of Design Science
and has its focus on projects that are implemented and evaluated in a given organi-
zational context during development and use. Therefore, it meets the requirements
of projects that have several organizational restrictions and considers them in the
artifact’s design and evaluation.
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Chapter 3
Delphi-Markets: Integrating
Prediction Markets and RTD
Two are better than one, because they
have a good reward for their toil. For
if they fall, one will lift up his fellow.
Ecclesiastes 4:9+10, ESV
3.1 Approaches and Potentials
Contents of this section are in part adopted from Kloker et al. (2019) and Kloker,
Straub, and Weinhardt (2017a).
See Section A.1 for further details.
3.1.1 Potentials for an Integration
Both judgmental forecasting approaches, Delphi studies1 and prediction markets,
pursue similar goals in many respects. Both methods aggregate many individual
opinions (Green, Armstrong, and Graefe, 2007) and can be described as feedback
methods (Sprenger, Bolster, and Venkateswaran, 2007). This means that both meth-
ods reflect the (aggregated) opinion of the group back to all participants in order to
give them the opportunity to correct their own assessments. In addition, both pro-
cedures are anonymous (or quasi-anonymous (Kochtanek and Hein, 1999)), making
it difficult or impossible to identify other participants. Prediction markets are usu-
ally designed as online platforms, a fact that makes the integration with the RTD
method particularly interesting. The RTD concept, initially introduced by Gordon
and Pease in the year 2006, is an online adaptation of the traditional Delphi method
to reduce the duration of surveys. It is characterized in particular by an asyn-
chronous feedback cycle (Kloker et al., 2016). The concept of RTD, which adapts
the rigid round-based character of the Delphi method to an asynchronous individ-
ualized process, can be easily compared and combined with market participation.
A cross comparison of the fields in table 3.1 quickly and clearly shows that the two
methods could potentially complement each other in many respects and that some
advantages or compensation could be derived from various respective weaknesses.
1If Delphi studies are mentioned in the following, it is always referred to an implementation as a
RTD. In all other cases the opposite will be explicitly pointed out.
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TABLE 3.1: Selected strengths and weaknesses of prediction markets
and Real-Time Delphi compared.
Prediction Markets Real-Time Delphi
St
re
ng
th
s
• Incentives and partially incentive
compatible (Jurca and Faltings, 2008)
• Gamification (Buckley and Doyle,
2017)
• Implicit long-term weighting of par-
ticipants (Arrow et al., 2008)
• Fast reaction to new information
(Graefe, Luckner, and Weinhardt,
2010)
• Tendency to challenge current fore-
cast (Green, Armstrong, and Graefe,
2007)
• Large panel sizes possible (Green,
Armstrong, and Graefe, 2007)
• Continuous forecast (Graefe, Luck-
ner, and Weinhardt, 2010)
• Immediate feedback on estimation
(Kranz, Teschner, and Weinhardt,
2014)
• Robust against distorted samples
(Kranz et al., 2014)
• Collects qualitative and back-
ground information
• Hypothetical questions and long-
time horizons are possible (Lin-
stone and Turoff, 2002b)
• More than one question at the
same time possible
• Questions can be changed after
new insights
W
ea
kn
es
se
s
• No qualitative information
• No background information (and re-
lationships)
• Not every question can be trans-
formed in contracts (causalities, hy-
pothetical questions) (Wolfers and
Zitzewitz, 2006b)
• Observable events are necessary
(Slamka, Jank, and Skiera, 2012)
• Low visibility for alternative points
of view
• High complexity (Green, Armstrong,
and Graefe, 2007)
• Difficult to achieve incentive
compatibility (Green, Armstrong,
and Graefe, 2007)
• Difficult to motivate partici-
pants for long-term participation
(Mullen, 2003)
• Tendency for conformity
(Woudenberg, 1991)
• (Only) medium to large sized
panels (Vernon, 2009; Green,
Armstrong, and Graefe, 2007)
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Potentials for Prediction Markets
All information in prediction markets is expressed in price-quantity bundles. For
this reason, prediction markets do not permit qualitatively differentiated statements
by individual participants, e.g. on the basis of which information and against which
backgrounds market participants act and change the market forecast.
By integrating prediction markets and RTDs, participants in a prediction mar-
ket can be given the opportunity to substantiate their assessment qualitatively or
to share information. Basically, there is no incentive to share new information in
prediction markets, as these can be used to make a profit. However, the potential
gains are usually quickly realized for a single participant, so that participants are
willing to exchange it for other information (Kloker, Straub, and Weinhardt, 2017a).
In many RTD applications, participants can only see arguments if they participate
in the survey themselves. In the sense of reciprocity, but also on the basis of self-
-expression/self-promotion and prestige (reputation), the exchange of information
is stimulated (Kloker et al., 2016). While in classical prediction markets all partici-
pants have to acquire information independently of each other, participants in RTD
studies learn directly from the other participants. New ideas or scenarios can also
be communicated better than via market prices. According to Green, Armstrong,
and Graefe (2007), this information exchange leads to a higher efficiency in the in-
formation search and also to less information cascades. The latter especially because
participants know the background of a price movement and do not have to evaluate
and conclude on price movements of which they do not know the important infor-
mation and the background. A first potential (P1) is thus the improved flow and
exchange of qualitative information.
The one-dimensional representation of a question as a stock increases the ab-
straction load of the participants in the case of complex predictions. Even simple
markets are a hurdle for many participants who have little background knowledge
about stock trading. Many potential participants lack the necessary knowledge of
how expectations are translated into market prices (Green, Armstrong, and Graefe,
2007). This can lead both, to the bounce of participants (with all resulting prob-
lems such as distorted samples), as well as to trades that actually does not reflect
the participant’s expectation properly. The hidden-market approach (Teschner and
Weinhardt, 2012a) solves this problem at least partially. In addition, relationships
and causalities are difficult to map into contracts, while they are easy to query in
RTD studies. A second potential (P2) of an integration with RTD is, therefore, the
more flexible design of the prediction object and forecasting question.
Further secondary potentials are, depending on the implementation, a lower
number of participants (Abramowicz, 2004), a higher robustness to manipulation
(Green, Armstrong, and Graefe, 2007), a better visibility of alternative viewpoints
and a higher acceptance of the results by the individual participants (Graefe and
Armstrong, 2011). According to Carvalho (2017) the accuracy of a LMSR prediction
market may also profit from a round-based participation structure.
Potentials for Real-Time Delphis
In Delphi studies the selection of participants (experts) is the crucial factor for the
quality of the results and therefore still a potential weak point (Gordon, 2007; Welty,
1972; Ammon, 2009). For participants without (enough) background knowledge
or if all participants draw from the same pool of information, the application of
the Delphi method is not advisable or purposeful (Green, Armstrong, and Graefe,
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2007; Sniezek, 1990). The selection of experts is also one of the key points that is
regularly discussed as a problem to the rigor of the Delphi method (Hasson and
Keeney, 2011). In many Delphi studies the participants were selected on the basis
of their reputation, which does not necessarily reflect their individual forecasting
quality (Hill and Fowles, 1975), and this at often relatively high costs (acquisition,
wage/compensation) for participants with a high reputation (Welty, 1972). As a
third potential (P3), the prediction markets can be used in integrated approaches
for the selection of experts or participants that potentially carry information and or
show very high forecasting accuracy. Procedures are described in Kloker, Straub,
and Weinhardt (2017a) and Section 3.1.2.
Another problem of Delphi studies is the decreasing motivation of the partic-
ipants during the process (Cuhls, 2003), since the traditional Delphi process often
turns out to be very rigid and lengthy for the participants. Though the RTD ap-
proach shortened the process, the problem is still present (as already briefly dis-
cussed in Section 2.3.3). The problem results in high drop-out rates, which can be
met only conditionally in traditional Delphi studies (Okoli and Pawlowski, 2004;
Reid, 1988). Prediction markets offer the possibility to set intrinsic and extrinsic in-
centives and motivate the participants to a long-term participation, as this results in
the largest profits (Green, Armstrong, and Graefe, 2007). The permanent and active
participation in the Delphi study can benefit from an integration of these methods
(fourth potential (P4)).
Winkler and Moser (2016) deal with cognitive heuristics that lead to systematic
errors in predictions in Delphi studies. Persistence of such errors, as, e.g., the anchor-
ing and adjustment heuristic, is demonstrated also by Wilde, Ten Velden, and De
Dreu (2018). Winkler and Moser (2016) and Wilde, Ten Velden, and De Dreu (2018)
recommend thoughtful creation of proper incentives as a countermeasure. These can
be of a financial nature, given in the form of reputation (Winkler and Moser, 2016),
or can also be designed as “accountability for the predictions by the participant”,
so that they have to bear the consequences (Wilde, Ten Velden, and De Dreu, 2018).
According to the literal sense of the English proverb “Put your money where your
mouth is”, participants in prediction markets must also prove the credibility of their
arguments with an “investment” or “bet”, which can certainly stimulate renewed
reflection (Levin, Chapman, and Johnson, 1988). Depending on the underlying mar-
ket mechanism, a performance-compatible or even an incentive-compatible environ-
ment can be created (Chen and Pennock, 2010; Luckner and Weinhardt, 2007). As
the provision of arguments may be accompanied by the giving of a trade2, this may
further raise the credibility and confidence of a single argument and provide partic-
ipants with further information. As a fifth potential (P5), RTD studies benefit from a
prediction market through better incentives, reduction of cognitive distortions, and
possibly information enrichment of arguments.
A last problematic characteristic of RTD studies, depending on the respective
context, is that they are basically designed to find a consensus and thus implicitly
suppress disagreement (Green, Armstrong, and Graefe, 2007). As a result, only opin-
ions that lie outside the current consensus are questioned, while a consensus opinion
is simply accepted. In prediction markets, profits from a good forecast can be real-
ized only if the own opinion deviates from that of the “crowd”, thus the current
market price (Green, Armstrong, and Graefe, 2007)3. Therefore, every opinion must
be questioned and challenged. Nevertheless, in RTD studies the formation of two or
2See later the integration approach in Section 3.1.2.
3Apart from manipulation and uninformed trading strategies.
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FIGURE 3.1: Integration at user-level. Prediction market and a RTD
platform are operated in parallel. User can participate actively on
both platforms and possibly transfer information between the plat-
forms.
more opinion clusters is possible (Gnatzy et al., 2011). As a sixth potential (P6), pre-
diction markets offer the advantage that a consensus, the price, is (must be) found
even for questions in which different views of the world and values meet and or
opinion clusters arise.
Another secondary potential is, depending on implementation and market mech-
anism, the given incentive compatibility4 (Chen and Pennock, 2010).
3.1.2 Integration Approaches
However, the term Delphi-Markets, as a term for approaches to integrate RTDs with
prediction markets, does not yet make a concrete statement about the versatile pos-
sible forms of this integration. Not all potentials mentioned in the Section 3.1.1 can
be realized in every integration approach. Three approaches to integration are pre-
sented below, to give an impression of the broadness and possible application sce-
narios. A distinction is made between the integration on a user-, market-, and ques-
tion-level.
Integration at User-Level
For user-level integration, a prediction market and a RTD platform are operated
in parallel. The two platforms are connected via a common user base. This ap-
proach is also described in Kloker, Straub, and Weinhardt (2017a) and applied in
the FAZ.NET-Orakel. Figure 3.1 illustrates the basic concept. The same participants
(or a subset) that trade on the prediction market also participate in the RTD study.
Therefore, information of the market flows into the RTD study, while information
discussed in the RTD study may become reflected in the prediction market.
The focus of this integration approach is on a panel of prediction market partici-
pants. This panel has various features: (1) It includes both informed and uninformed
participants (Gruca and Berg, 2007). (2) All participants have a certain interest in the
subject (Servan-Schreiber et al., 2004). (3) Participants of the panel possess both pub-
lic, and private information (Gruca and Berg, 2007). The participants act according
4At least for the estimation. Does not apply for the submission of truthful arguments.
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to their expectations in the prediction market and are confronted with the expecta-
tions of the other participants. For a user-level integration, a RTD survey can now
access the participants of this panel. Besides the option to invite all participants
from thematically connected markets to the RTD survey, which would only partially
solve the problem of selecting experts for the Delphi round mentioned in Section
3.1.1, three interesting alternatives for the selection of participants are conceivable
(Kloker, Straub, and Weinhardt, 2017a):
• “The Topscorer”: In prediction markets, participants are usually ranked on the
basis of their trading success, which according to Hayek (1945) can be achieved
only by participants with true (and private) information in the long run. Partici-
pants who in the top positions of the rankings are more likely to have important
and correct information and thus qualify for the RTD study as experts.
• “The Potential”: A problem of the ”The Topcscorer” procedure is that a really
meaningful ranking for a market can only be calculated after the market has
been paid out. For those RTD surveys for which there was no related market
recently paid out, experts cannot be selected based on their trading success and
their position in the ranking. The selection procedure “The Potential” there-
fore selects participants based on their trading behavior. It can be shown that
certain behavior in prediction markets is correlated with a higher probability
of success. Attributes of such behavior can be learned and then used to select
experts. Details are outlined in Section 4.
• “The Bohemian”: This selection procedure also selects the participants for the
RTD survey based on their current trading behavior. The difference to the selec-
tion procedure “The Potential” is that not only participants with a high proba-
bility of success, but with dissimilar trading behavior are selected. Participants
who are more likely to act as buyers may have different information or points of
view than participants who are more likely to act as sellers. Against this back-
ground it seems sensible to consider both opinions in the Delphi survey and to
invite them as participants. In particular, these participants, whose trading be-
havior appears to represent opinions that differ from those of the mainstream,
have potentially new, interesting, or at least previously unnoticed information
and points of view that may be of relevance for the Delphi survey. This selec-
tion procedure thus leads to a high degree of heterogeneity.
In addition to the selection procedures mentioned above, a random selection
would also be possible, since participation in the market already implies a general
level of knowledge on the subject. Also conceivable would be a self-selection strat-
egy, according to which the participants themselves decide whether they want to
participate in the Delphi survey. According to Green, Armstrong, and Graefe (2007),
only these participants participate in the market, who think that their private infor-
mation has not yet been considered in the previous forecasts.
Actions in the RTD platform therefore have no direct (rule-based) influence on
the prediction market or the market forecast. Nevertheless, participants can ex-
change information between the platforms. In markets, traders usually make profits
very quickly from available information, which is why they lose value for the indi-
vidual trader within a short time (see Fama (1970), Market Efficiency, Section 2.2.1).
In order to make further profits from future price developments, traders are con-
stantly dependent on acquiring new information. Among other things, this can be
done in exchange with other experts in the RTD survey, which encourages the par-
ticipants to actively participate in the Delphi survey in the long term.
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FIGURE 3.2: Integration at market-level. A RTD is performed in the
context of a prediction market. Participation in the RTD is not possi-
ble without participation in the prediction market.
Another advantage of this integration approach is that the design of the market
and RTD can be adapted completely independently of each other to the specific re-
quirements of the respective context. This also applies to the way participants are
invited by the market to the RTD platform. Kranz, Teschner, and Weinhardt (2014)
recommend here, however, to use an integrated solution, which allows to answer
single questions from the Delphi study directly from the prediction markets.
User-level integration thus raises the first and the third potential (P1, P3) and
should be used when technical integration is not desired or possible, when conduct-
ing the RTD survey is to be decoupled from profit-seeking incentives and trading
strategies, or when participants are recruited from multiple pools of people, some
of whom have no understanding of markets. In particular, RTD studies benefit from
this integration approach especially if the objective selection of participants is of
great importance or not possible otherwise (for example due to a lack of historical
data on potential participants).
Integration at Market-Level
For market-level integration, a RTD is basically operated within the context of a
prediction market. This approach is applied in the same name online platform del-
phimarkets.net and is described in Figure 3.2 conceptually. The figure shows that ba-
sically every prediction market is regarded as a RTD study and the submission of an
order is also the submission of an answer to the RTD study (and can be accompanied
by an argument).
The prediction market with the market question (forecasting target of the mar-
ket) is at the center of the approach. This is also the first limitation of this approach.
Since a market can only answer one question at a time, the RTD survey also con-
sists of only one question. The market acts directly as an aggregation mechanism for
the individual opinions of all participants. Prediction market participants have the
option to provide the underlying information and background each time they place
a trade order. Therefore, each comment is also attributable to a price-increasing or
price-reducing effect and thus, in theory, a positive or negative effect on the variable
or probability to be predicted. Ensuring the “optionality” of an argument is crucial,
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as otherwise many trading strategies aimed at small profits, which are calming the
market and providing liquidity, would be prevented. The arguments can then be
sorted visually, e.g., as in delphimarkets.net, on the sides of the market according to
a positive and negative effect on the price. If a participant disagrees with an argu-
ment and wishes to write a counterargument, he must necessarily accompany the
argument submission of with a trading order. The advantages of this approach are
explained in the fifth potential (P5).
This approach has some advantages and disadvantages which have to be weighed
up depending on the application. Depending on the market mechanism, integration
at market level creates a performance- and or incentive-compatible environment
for forecasting the market question, which is why it can be assumed that partici-
pants forecast truthfully and with less cognitive heuristics (Wilde, Ten Velden, and
De Dreu, 2018; Levin, Chapman, and Johnson, 1988). In addition, this approach
allows participants to be intrinsically motivated by the opportunity to share their
knowledge (to make a contribution), or extrinsically, by means of a ranking list,
by prizes, or even by trading with real money, in the long term. This promotes
active and long-term participation in the market and the RTD survey as well as a
continuous search for information by the participants (Gangur, 2016). The question
about play or real money is thereby subordinated for the forecast accuracy (Ser-
van-Schreiber, 2017)5. Another advantage is the user-friendly design of the interac-
tion. Market-level integration, theoretically, allows to display all relevant elements
in one view, eliminating the need to switch between different platforms or views.
The last advantage of this approach is, as already mentioned in Section 3.1.1, that a
market always finds a price, even if different values and opinions are opposed. Ac-
cording to Linstone and Turoff (2002a) the Delphi method is used in particular also
for such questions, in which conflicting values and goals have to be considered. A
market for finding a consensus price and an argumentation in the style of the RTD
for exchanging point of views can complement each other very well here.
A disadvantage of this approach is that although incentive compatibility is achiev-
able for the forecast, this does not necessarily also apply to arguments. In some cir-
cumstances, the opposite effect even have to be expected. Participants could use the
arguments to lure other participants on the wrong track and profit from the result-
ing trading orders on the market. Manipulation is a relevant aspect in prediction
markets in decisions regarding mechanism and design (Kloker and Kranz, 2017). A
further disadvantage results from the fact that prediction markets can actually only
be used for questions for which a realization in the foreseeable future is to be reg-
istered (Green, Armstrong, and Graefe, 2007). Since in the other case the incentives
for providing the truthful estimation are no longer guaranteed, the market price
may become object of pure speculative and signaling strategies6. Regardless of the
time horizon, there can also be other difficulties (complexity or connections between
events) that make the formulation of a question into a tradable contract as a market
question very difficult or impossible (Green, Armstrong, and Graefe, 2007; Wolfers
and Zitzewitz, 2006b). In this context, “Combinatorial prediction markets” (Laskey,
Hanson, and Twardy, 2015) offer an interesting option. They allow the modelling of
5According to Servan-Schreiber (2017) the choice between play and real money primarily affects
the self-selection of participants and thus only indirectly on the forecast(-quality), whereby prediction
markets are robust against unbalanced samples in general.
6If insiders trade new information, the price moves. This small price movement can be interpreted
by other participants as a signal for new information working in a certain direction and, potentially,
assessed as credible. This often leads to further price movements in the same direction. This effect can
also be used to mislead the market and then make profits from the resulting price movements.
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FIGURE 3.3: Integration at RTD-question-level. The aggregation of
each Delphi question is carried out by means of a market mechanism.
dependencies between individual markets and would thus address the problem of
formulating complex questions as contracts as well as the fact that so far only one
market question is possible. However, no implementation or discussion of the in-
tegration of a combinatorial market with the Delphi method is known. Finally, the
increased complexity of a market is also an obstacle for participants who do not fully
understand the market or do not want to deal with it, but would still participate in
the RTD study.
Integration at market level therefore raises the first, fourth, fifth and sixth poten-
tial (P1, P4-6) and should be used when the issue of forecasting can be represented
in one market. The market will benefit from the arguments, while the RTD study
will be gamified by the market. However, many Delphi studies will not suit for the
break down to one market question, which is why the advantages for the prediction
market clearly outweigh within this approach.
At this point, the question arises to what extent this approach differs from a
simple (or combinatorial) prediction market with a “forum” or “comment box” for
each market question. These are two points in particular: (1) Each comment (or
argument) is associated with a price movement, so it is not possible to comment
without trading at the same time. In addition, such arguments will increasingly refer
to concrete information rather than merely commenting on the question in general
or being related to secondary discussions (e.g. fun comments, flaming, etc.). (2) In
contrast to simple forums, in RTDs the comments of other participants are usually
not visible until an own assessment has been made. In principle, this would also be
possible with the trading price (depending on the underlying market mechanism).
Integration at RTD-Question-Level
Basically, for the RTD-question-level integration, a classic RTD is implemented. Only
the aggregation of the individual answers to each question takes place on the basis
of markets.
The integration is shown schematically in Figure 3.3.
The focus here is on the RTD survey as such and also follows its process. For
each individual question, a prediction market is applied in which the participants
can trade according their expectations regarding this (forecasting) question. How-
ever, there are two problems with this approach: (1) Integration at Delphi ques-
tion level can become very complex and time-consuming for participants due to the
many markets. (2) In addition, the questions in Delphi surveys are usually themati-
cally related and conditional. This also results in markets that condition each other,
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which promotes arbitrage and signaling strategies with their potentially negative
consequences (truthful response is no longer the dominant strategy).
Hidden markets with scoring rules and combinatorial markets can address these
two problems, but only with trade-offs. The use of hidden market can remedy the
complexity and time intensity. Depending on the market mechanism used, the Del-
phi survey with integrated market cannot be distinguished from other Delphi sur-
veys (Teschner and Weinhardt, 2012a; Laskey, Hanson, and Twardy, 2015). If proper
scoring rules are used (and this is communicated to the participants), incentive com-
patibility can also be maintained. Various proper scoring rules are known, the most
probably implemented is the Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule (Hanson, 2002) (see
also Section 2.2.5). However, the survey partly loses its playful character, which
promotes long-term motivation, and also the money metaphor, which could induce
deeper considerations (Levin, Chapman, and Johnson, 1988).
However, other advantages remain. This is in particular the long-term implicit
weighting of the participants depending on their past forecasting accuracy. Partici-
pants with good forecasts increase their portfolio value and thus also their market
influence. In contrast, poor long-term forecasters lose their influence on the fore-
cast. Combinatorial markets can prevent arbitrage and signaling strategies, as they
can reflect the conditions between the individual markets. However, using combi-
natorial markets implies several other limits of restrictions on the contract design7.
Moreover, combinatorial markets are currently only known on the basis of market
scoring rules and no other market mechanisms.
An open question that has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis is whether and
how the individual markets (for the individual questions) can be fairly combined
into an overall ranking without, in turn, promoting arbitrage possibilities and sig-
naling strategies. In addition, a selection of experts by the market, as in P3, is no
longer possible.
The integration at the Delphi question level thus raises the first and second po-
tential (P1, P2) from a prediction market’s perspective. From a RTD’s perspective,
more importantly, the approach yields the fourth, fifth, and sixth potential (P4-6).
Delphi studies benefit from the long-term motivation of the participants, the ad-
ditional information supporting the individual arguments, the potential incentive
compatibility, the stronger long-term weighting of better participants, and the need
for consensus.
This approach is therefore recommended for very complex issues where it can
also be assumed that the participants have trading experience (or at least a basic
understanding). The variant with hidden markets is recommended if only the for-
mer applies, but not the latter, which, however, somewhat weakens the long-term
motivation.
Prokesch, Gracht, and Wohlenberg (2015) presented an approach to integrate
Delphi studies with prediction markets, which can basically be seen as integration
at the RTD-question-level with hidden markets. As a market mechanism, however,
a scoring rule was implemented that not resulted in what one would understand
under the term “trading”. Therefore, the term Delphi-Market is not entirely appro-
priate and the advantage of classical markets like implicit long-term weighting and
the money metaphor are not existent. As in a traditional Delphi study, Prokesch,
Gracht, and Wohlenberg (2015) have explicitly selected the participants beforehand.
Nevertheless, this approach could beat the relevant benchmarks (Prokesch, Gracht,
7Only winner-take-all contracts can be connected within a combinatorial market. Index or spread
contracts are not possible, limiting the type of possible questions.
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and Wohlenberg, 2015) and shows that Delphi-Markets, applied correctly and in the
right place, can compensate the mutual weaknesses of the individual approaches.
3.1.3 Conclusion on Integration Approaches and possible Future Devel-
opments
The previous sections have outlined three different approaches to give an impression
of possible implementations. The integration on user-level highlighted particularly
the potential for expert selection for the RTD study by the market. The integration
on market-level shows how a prediction market can benefit from the advantages
of Delphi studies (qualitative information). The integration on RTD-question-level
took up the potentials for Delphi studies, which result from the market.
Besides these, an integration of the methods may also be possible in other design
concepts. However, in most cases, a combination is only effective if an observable
event is subject of the prediction, as otherwise the prediction market cannot be paid
out and no performance- or incentive-compatible incentives are given. Although
there are approaches to the application of prediction markets for non-observable
events or events for which no commonly accepted payout value can be determined
(Slamka, Jank, and Skiera, 2012), however, these always entail losses in accuracy and
raise susceptibility to manipulation (Kloker and Kranz, 2017).
Delphi-Markets are currently still relative rarely implemented and lack method-
ological research (Prokesch, Gracht, and Wohlenberg, 2015). However, the studies
yet known report encouraging results. A significant obstacle and permanent lim-
itations for the use of Delphi-Markets are certainly the increased complexity and
the likewise greater implementation effort, which are not justified for every field
and case of application. The formalization and validation of the Delphi-Markets as
a self-contained research and forecasting approach is still pending and hinders its
wide adaption. The variety of possible combinations, however, does not facilitate
this task. This dissertation has a focus on the integration on user-level and highlight
several points also mentioned in this section.
In general, future research will have to focus in particular on quantifying the
theoretically derived potentials, such as the objective selection of experts (P3), or the
positive effects of the market structure on the aggregation of expectations for each
individual question, as well as the increased (long-term) motivation in RTD studies.
3.2 FAZ.NET-Orakel : Instatiation of a user-level integrated
Delphi-Market
In Section 3.1 the integration approach on a user-level was introduced. The FAZ-
.NET-Orakel is, as far as this is known, the first tool that combines prediction mar-
kets and RTD in a way where participants are shared among both platforms and the
prediction market is used to recruit participants (experts) for the RTD study. Many
of its features are investigated in detail in the following chapters. This section, how-
ever, shall outline the basic project setting and development that put restrictions to
the later design and evaluation methodologies. This overview presents all necessary
contextual information in order to assess and put later results in their larger context.
The FAZ.NET-Orakel, in general, is a prediction market with all corresponding
advantages, but also flaws and problems. Many of the later investigations will re-
flect this fact. However, during the research project, a RTD platform was fully inte-
grated within the FAZ.NET-Orakel, accompanying several forecasting tournaments,
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especially the 2017 German Federal Election. As the RTD enables, unlike as in tradi-
tional prediction markets, the “creation of a heterogeneous pool of beliefs”, the FAZ-
.NET-Orakel can therefore be regarded as a Group Wisdom Support System (GWSS)
in the sense of Wagner and Back (2008), who formulated a Design Theory for the
class of GWSSs.
3.2.1 Project Setting and Objectives
The FAZ.NET-Orakel is a prediction market running within the online news maga-
zine of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, FAZ.NET (http://faz.net). It is a joint
project of the Institute of Information Systems and Marketing (IISM) at Karlsruhe In-
stitute of Technology (KIT) (lead), the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and the IW
Köln. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung is one of Germany’s largest newspapers
(0.76 Million Reader, 2017) and the FAZ.NET online magazine likewise one of Ger-
many’s largest online magazines (10.29 Million visitors in January 2018) (Wikipedia,
2018). The FAZ.NET-Orakel is the successor of the EIX prediction market that was
formerly run in cooperation with the Handelsblatt, another large German online
magazine, which was, however, shut down after four years of operation in autumn
2013. While the EIX only featured economic figures and politics, the FAZ.NET-Ora-
kel features markets for politics, economic figures, sports, and other current hap-
penings. The project is online since March 2017. The FAZ.NET-Orakel receives high
public visibility, as the FAZ.NET regularly publishes articles on the current forecast-
ing competitions and results. The prediction market is publicly available to all read-
ers of FAZ.NET and beyond, though trading is tied to a FAZ.NET account that can
be created free by any holder of an e-mail address. The FAZ.NET is responsible for
advertising the platform and is organizing prizes for the tournaments. Until Sum-
mer 2018 prizes worth more than e20,000 have been raffled or distributed among
the best traders.
The FAZ.NET pursues, besides supporting research, two objectives with the FAZ-
.NET-Orakel: (1) Offer their readers an innovative service to engage in order to raise
readers engagement and retention and (2) generate own predictions for elections to
use and benchmark in news articles. Though the accuracy of the FAZ.NET-Orakel
was not evaluated in the course of the research questions underlying this thesis, the
FAZ.NET-Orakel regularly predicted events with very high accuracy. Figure 3.4 ex-
emplary illustrates the accuracy of the FAZ.NET-Orakel in comparison with other
German forecasting institutions in the context of the 2017 German Federal Election.
The FAZ.NET-Orakel was during the complete time between March and October
2017 either the best or at least among the best third of the forecasters. In the “hot
period” approximately two weeks before the election, only Infratest dimap predicted
the result with equal accuracy and some days earlier than the FAZ.NET-Orakel.
Within the university context, the FAZ.NET-Orakel is developed at the IISM at
the chair of Prof. Weinhardt in the context of the MInPuD project. The IISM is re-
sponsible for the development, operation, and maintenance of the FAZ.NET-Orakel.
Objectives of the IISM are to further develop and understand prediction markets and
related phenomena. Especially this contains the improvement of prediction markets
by integrating RTD studies.
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FIGURE 3.4: The FAZ.NET-Orakel in comparison with other forecast-
ing institutions (2017 German Federal Election).
3.2.2 Project Development
The development of the FAZ.NET-Orakel started in the end of 2016 as the contact
to the FAZ.NET intensified after some months of informal and non-committal rela-
tionship. In December 2016 the basic design of the FAZ.NET-Orakel was adopted to
the design of FAZ.NET and approved by the department for corporate design of the
FAZ.NET. In January 2017 a one-week test period was conducted for which former
participants of the EIX have been invited. Thereafter, the shared login was final-
ized and at the end of January the necessary contractual agreements were signed.
In February and March 2017 the platform was completely debugged and load tests
were performed in load generators and with humans in a small lab setting.
The go live for all FAZ.NET readers was in March 2017. The first round of the
tournament was running until the end of September 2017, which corresponded to
the 2017 German Federal Election. For this period, prizes worth more than e10,000
were raffled and or distributed. As the market itself was operated with play money,
no further incentives were given.
Early in March 2017, several fraudulent cases were observed, for which reason
a fraud detection algorithm based on Blume, Luckner, and Weinhardt (2010) was
implemented. Until August 2017, several other fraud and manipulation prevent-
ing elements were implemented. The RTD platform was launched in June 2017 for
the Federal Election. After the price round end of September 2017, the end of the
second tournament was dated to the end of July 2018, which corresponded to the
FIFA Worldcup 2018. In October 2017 the crowd-sourced fraud and manipulation
detection tool was implemented and launched. Until February 2018 several small
improvements have been added. However, the general interest in the platform and
the number of fraudulent attempts dropped distinctly after the Federal Election.
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FIGURE 3.5: Software architecture of the FAZ.NET-Orakel.
3.2.3 Technical Perspective
The technical development was completely performed by the author. The FAZ-
.NET-Orakel relied on the Java web framework Grails, starting from version 3.0,
which was continuously updated during the project to 3.3. Grails is a Groovy8-based
Model-View-Controller web framework built on top of Spring Boot9. Due to the
specific requirements of the FAZ.NET, however, several functionalities of the frame-
work had to be enhanced. The architecture is illustrated in a simplified form in
Figure 3.5. The back-end was provided in a virtual machine operated by CentOS
Linux in the server cluster of the Forschungszentrum Informatik (FZI) in Karlsruhe.
A PostgreSQL database was used to store the data. A daily backup ensured data se-
curity in case of any downtimes or other potential data inconsistencies. An Apache
Tomcat server, installed on the virtual machine, hosted the Grails10 application to the
World Wide Web. The Grails application contained (1) Grails Services, responsible
for the data persistence layer and computational tasks, (2) Grails Controller, respon-
sible for the business logic layer and application flow as well as basic data accesses,
and (3) Grails Views, responsible for the presentation layer. The sessions were man-
aged by the standard implementation of Spring Security as included in the Grails
framework. However, this was extended by a custom Login-Security-Adapter (Fil-
ter-Chain-Element) capable to read the session cookie from the FAZ.NET-Ecosystem
and manage a shadow-session of the FAZ.NET session in the Spring Security context
accordingly.
8Groovy is a programming language compatible with and a super set on Java.
9Spring Boot is a large Java framework with comparable functionality as Java EE.
10https://grails.org
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If a user logs in into the FAZ.NET environment, it is assigned a Single Sign
On (SSO) cookie from the evolverSSO SSO solution that provides this service in the
FAZ.NET ecosystem. At a page request to the FAZ.NET-Orakel, this cookie is com-
pared by the Login-Security-Adapter with session data from the evolverSSO and in
case of verification, a shadow session is created in the Spring Security component.
This component checks the authorities of the user agent in the component levels
Grails Controller and Grails Services. Afterwards, the Grails Controller performs
the business logic and decides what will be delivered to the user agent. Computa-
tional expensive tasks and write tasks to the database are performed in the Grails
Services. This is due to the fact that Grails Services are run as “Singleton Beans”
and therefore ensure better data consistency and help to prevent dead-locks on the
database. The access to the database is inter-mediated by the GORM data access
toolkit that cashes read and write accesses to raise performance. After all data is
provided and calculated it is handed to the Grails Views by the Grails Controllers
where it is visualized and enriched by the FAZ.NET header and footer. At this point
it was also distinguished if the user agent was a mobile device or a tablet/desktop.
As the content was fully responsive, only the header and footer of FAZ.NET had to
be replaced. Thereafter, the page is delivered. Every further interaction on this page
(e.g. order submission, etc.) and all updates on the page (e.g. price chart, etc.) are re-
alized in AJAX (Asynchronous Javascript and XML) and Websockets (WS). Several
Grails Jobs are running continuously and call Grails Services to provide important
services to the application (match trading orders, fetch the navigation, ...).
Visual features and gadgets, such as the price chart, MicroMarkets (or colloquial:
Washer) or the tool for manipulation and fraud detection (see Section 7) were re-
alized in D3.js11. MicroMarkets are an additional interface, besides the standard
trading form and a trading wizard, to submit one’s expectation on a certain event.
They accompanied every market and could also be embedded in FAZ.NET articles
or other external sites (see Figure 3.6). The expectation has to be submitted by set-
ting two sliders (estimation and confidence). Thereafter, the user has to click “GO”
to submit his estimation. A text below the MicroMarket indicates that a trade will
be performed based on these settings.
Figure 3.7 illustrates, how stocks, depots, and money is organized in the FAZ-
.NET-Orakel. Each forecasting topic consisted of an Accounting Entity (AE), to
which an initial amount of money was allocated. To this AE, e.g. the vote-share
of the parties in the 2017 Federal Election, several Products were related.
Each product corresponds to one single party and a user can hold stocks of each
product. Each product was traded in a CDA with a partly open order book that
revealed the best five bid and ask prices (and the respectively available stocks) to
the trader. This is close the optimal value of order book transparency determined
by Yang, Li, and Heck (2015). Stocks are not transferable between different products
and money is not transferable between different accounting entities. This is unlike
as in many other prediction markets, e.g. the EIX, where there is “one” money for all
markets/products. This design was selected, however, as it ensures that traders who
enter the contest at a later point of time, are not disadvantaged in contrast to first-day
trader and therefore not discouraged. For each AE an individual Accounting Entity
Ranking (AER) in percent was calculated. The best trader received 100%, the worst
0%. All other traders were mapped in between. A total ranking was calculated based
on these AERs based on following formula 3.2:
11https://d3js.org/
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FIGURE 3.6: User interface of a MicroMarket in a FAZ.NET article.
As both sliders have been moved, the user is now ready to submit his
estimation
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FIGURE 3.7: Concept of AEs and products. AEs bunch together logi-
cally related products, so that they can be traded with the same bud-
get (money) and are considered in the same ranking.
nom. = count(AERs) + count(arch. AERs)/2 (3.1)
score =
√
avg(AERs) + avg(arch. AERs)/2
nom.
∗ nom.
1+ nom.0.75
∗ 75 (3.2)
The formula ensures that active and long-term participation is encouraged, how-
ever, new members have also the possibility to end up in the top positions of the
ranking if they perform extraordinary good. During the tournament, old markets
were archived and therefore represented in the ranking only with half impact. At
the end of the tournament, however, all markets were closed and “archived” which
is basically the same as if there had been no differentiation. The last multiplier (75)
was dropped in the second round of the tournament.
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Chapter 4
Improving Sampling: Select
Experts based on Prediction Market
Trading Behavior
You will recognize them by their fruits.
Are grapes gathered from
thornbushes, or figs from thistles?
Matthew 7,16; ESV
Contents of this section are in part adopted or taken from Kloker et al. (2018a)
See Section A.1 for further details.
4.1 Problem Formulation
FIGURE 4.1: The presented research
project in this section addresses the
first source of errors according to the
JFIM: Sampling errors.
The Delphi method has found vast application
for predictions in where expertise from different
areas is required, or conflicting goals and values
need to be taken into account (Linstone and Tur-
off, 2002c). However, the Delphi method and its
offspring RTD, also face some challenges, such
as high drop-out rates or the difficulty of select-
ing the so-called “experts” (Kloker, Straub, and
Weinhardt, 2017a). The aforementioned factors
can have a strong influence on the forecast qual-
ity and determine which aspects are taken into
account and discussed (Welty, 1972; Goodman,
2017). The sampling of the expert panel there-
fore puts a high risk to the quality of outcome
and the rigor of each Delphi study (Hasson and
Keeney, 2011). As discussed in Section 3.1, these
weaknesses may be addressed by the integration
of prediction markets and the Delphi method. It was argued that prediction markets
may be used to select the experts (informed traders) to be invited in a RTD survey
using an algorithm (of which three were briefly described). The work presented in
this chapter is utilizing this idea and aims to define properties of trading behavior in
prediction markets that have a predictive power with regard to the trading perfor-
mance, which is defined as the profit of a trader. According to the Hayek Hypothesis
(Hayek, 1945), only traders that are carrying new and valid information will perform
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well in markets in the long term. Comprehensively, these are the experts that should
be invited for Delphi studies. However, as it is often not possible to “wait” until
the top performers are revealed after the payout of the markets, such a selection has
to be performed during the market runtime, when the market result is not settled.
Therefore, the approach has to be based solely on trading behavior. Overall, this
research addresses following research question:
• Which properties of trading behavior, if any at all, have predictive power on
the success of a trader in a prediction market?
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: First, the problem of ex-
pert selection for RTD studies, as well as the idea of an integration of prediction
markets with RTD are briefly picked up in order to understand the problem setting.
In Section 4.3, the methodological steps from finding meaningful attributes of trad-
ing behavior derived from financial literature to the evaluation of these attributes
using regressions and decision trees are introduced. Further, the data used to evalu-
ate these attributes is explained. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 report the implementation and
evaluation of the results, respectively. In the final Sections 4.6 and 4.7, the results are
discussed and it is concluded that the prediction of informed traders based on the
trading behavior is possible to an acceptable extent.
4.2 Related Work
4.2.1 Expert Selection in RTD
Prediction markets and the concept of RTDs have already been introduced in Sec-
tions 2.2 and 2.3, for which reason this will be skipped at this point.
Among the challenges that were discussed in Section 3 for the RTD approach,
the high drop-out rates and the difficulty to select the experts are among the most
noticeable (Teschner, 2012; Welty, 1972; Goodman, 2017; Rowe et al., 2015). The
aforementioned factors, especially the expert selection, may have a strong influence
on the forecast and may define which points of view are considered (Welty, 1972).
Hasson and Keeney (2011) also discusses that the selection of the experts for Del-
phi studies is in many cases not objective and therefore a real hazard to the rigor
of many former and current Delphi studies. Experts are usually selected based on
reputation (e.g., based on authorship on academic publications) or based on their
profession. However, reputation does not necessarily mean that this person is the
most appropriate in regard to the question, as he/she may have a good knowledge
about a whole field, but not about the relevant details (Hill and Fowles, 1975). Es-
pecially, a selection based on reputation may also cause high survey costs (Welty,
1972). Though, often the selection criteria are cautiously defined and, to a large ex-
tent, as objective as possible, many studies still contain the limitation that the expert
selection is driven by the experts available and known to the researcher (Rowe et al.,
2015). Therefore, it is often not certain if the expert panel’s opinion is generalizable
to “all” experts. Green, Armstrong, and Graefe (2007) emphasize the problem that
the selection of the experts largely influence the topics that are taken into account
and discussed in a Delphi study, as well as the overall quality of the results. The
method is also not suggested when all experts have access to the same pool of infor-
mation (Green, Armstrong, and Graefe, 2007; Welty, 1972). Based on these findings,
it is to conclude that the expert selection for Delphi studies still lacks a valid and
objective methodology.
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FIGURE 4.2: Research steps to find trading behavior attributes that
indicate informed traders. The process is adopted as a single cycle of
the CRISP-DM model (Wirth and Hipp, 2000).
4.2.2 Combination of Prediction Markets and RTD to select Experts
Most recently, several publications considered the combination of prediction mar-
kets with other forecasting methods. Among others, Atanasov et al. (2016), Tet-
lock, Mellers, and Scoblic (2017), and Graefe (2015) combined either the forecasts
or methods of various forecasting instruments with those of prediction markets or
prediction polls, which have led to higher-quality results. Most of them focus on the
combination of survey results (opinion polls). Prokesch, Gracht, and Wohlenberg
(2015) “combined” prediction markets and Delphi studies, which in this case only
meant pre-selecting the traders for a prediction market and using a hidden market
interface (therefore, using a market in a Delphi study). One current publication is
from Kloker, Straub, and Weinhardt (2017a) (see Section 3.1) and suggests the com-
bination of prediction markets and RTDs on a user-level, so that the market is used
for expert selection. Several approaches to this selection are described; the first ap-
proach only selects the top performers according to the ranking of the prediction
market. A disadvantage is that a valid ranking can only be generated after the mar-
ket has closed and was paid out. The second approach selects traders with very
different trading behavior to select participants with different opinions to enrich the
discussion in the Delphi study. A disadvantage is that this does not ensure that
the selected traders are real experts. The third approach suggests that an algorithm
can be developed that assesses each trader according to his trading behavior for his
likelihood to be a high performer, and hence an “informed trader”. This approach
would mean that those traders are selected as experts that are likely to carry some
information about the topic. The current work is suggesting and evaluating the ap-
plicability of such an algorithm. An earlier approach to find knowledgeable traders
was suggested by Teschner and Weinhardt (2012b) in order to give more impact to
their opinion. This approach was based on the price impact of the participants, but
could only be calculated afterwards and not during the market run-time.
4.3 Method
To evaluate the trading properties that indicate an informed trader (a high per-
former), this research follows the process illustrated in Figure 4.2. The process is
adapted from the CRISP-DM model1.
In the first step (Business Understanding), literature from the financial area was
consulted. Hypotheses regarding attributes that are, according to this literature, at-
tributed to informed traders, professional traders, institutional traders, or experts in
real-world stock exchanges were identified. These attributes are listed in Table 4.1,
though there seems to be no consensus on the hypothesis of every attribute. Such
1A brief introduction can be found in Section 2.4.
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attributes can be of the trader’s orders themselves, such as large trading volume
(Menkhoff and Schmeling, 2010; Easley and O’hara, 1987), or of the market at the
time the trader becomes active, e.g. large spread at the time of order submission
(Menkhoff and Schmeling, 2010; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988). Both properties are,
for instance, attributed to a high performer.
Due to the fact that hypotheses for these attributes are from the financial area, it
is needed to test these regarding their applicability in prediction markets. Therefore,
data of the EIX2 (Teschner, 2012) was utilized. The EIX is a prediction market that
ran for nearly four years, between 2009 and 2013, in four versions in Germany in
the context of economic indicators and political elections. In the second step (Data
Understanding), previously identified attributes were defined within the context of
this data. In the third step (Data Preparation), these attributes were generated and
extracted from the EIX data set. The implementation was based on the authors’
definitions and are briefly described in Table 4.1.
In the fourth step (Modeling), regressions were performed to check if there are
correlations between single attributes and (1) the overall amount of profit and (2)
their classification as “high performers”. In this context, high performers were de-
fined as the top five percent of each version based on the realized profit. In case (1),
a multiple linear Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was applied, showing the
impact of each attribute on the amount of profit. As the dependent variable in case
(2) is a binary categorical variable, a logistic regression was performed. Both regres-
sions show the impact of the attributes on the dependent variable. In addition, an
analysis using Classification and Regression Trees (CART) was conducted. The out-
comes are binary trees that can be interpreted as predictive models to classify further
data sets. Within a tree, the Gini-index is applied to perform the splits. Using the
Gini-index, the algorithm selects attributes for a split based on the homogeneity that
may be reached after the split. Therefore, the attributes in the upper part of a tree
can be regarded as the attributes that have the best predictive power to subset the
participants into homogeneous groups of high performer and other traders.
During the fifth step (Evaluation), it is discussed, if the identified attributes are
capable to distinguish between high performers and normal traders. Confusion ma-
trices and two measures, accuracy and precision, were utilized to evaluate the clas-
sification trees’ performances. Both measures examine the proportion of a tree’s
correct classifications but in different contexts. While accuracy takes all classifica-
tions into account, precision only considers high performers. Comparing the (top)
splitting attributes of different trees then led to the attributes that can be applied in
an algorithm.
4.4 Implementation
Data of the EIX prediction market was utilized, comprising submitted orders and
transactions, aiming to test the predictive capability of the attributes in Table 4.1 and
identify the ones to be applied within an algorithm.
The EIX prediction market was run in cooperation with the German online news
magazine “Handelsblatt” between 2009 and 2013. Within this period, four versions
of the prediction market were running consecutively, which were always changed
2Economic Indicator Exchange
3As a counterhypothesis of the statement that price-taker are more likely to make errors
4An order is considered a round order when mod 10 = 0 or mod 50 = 0, in case of an order volume
< 50 or ≥ 50, respectively.
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TABLE 4.1: Attributes, their hypothetical characteristics according to
literature in finance, and implementation.
Attribute Hypothesis Implementation References
market situation (before order submission)
market
activity
informed traders trade
in times of high activity
mean orders
+/− one hour
Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988
order
book
size
informed traders trade
in times of small order
books
median order
book size
Menkhoff and Schmeling,
2010; Admati and
Pfleiderer, 1988
spread informed traders trade
in times of large spread
mean spread Menkhoff and Schmeling,
2010; Admati and
Pfleiderer, 1988
trader behavior
order
size
institutional traders use
mid-sized orders
median order
size
Chakravarty, 2001; Barclay
and Warner, 1993; Menkhoff
and Schmeling, 2010
order
size
institutional traders use
large orders
median order
size
Easley and O’hara, 1987;
Menkhoff and Schmeling,
2010
trading
volume
informed traders have
high trading volume
ordered stocks
per day
Menkhoff and Schmeling,
2010; Easley and O’hara,
1987
limit
order
informed traders are
more likely to place
limit orders3
prop. of orders
not executed
immediately
Oliven and Rietz, 2004
trader
activity
informed traders
participate actively at
the market
mean time
between two
orders
Oliven and Rietz, 2004
round
orders
informed traders use
round orders
prop. of round
orders4
Chakravarty, 2001
market
maker
experts trade on both
sides of the order book
prop. of
products with
orders offered
on both sides
Luckner and Weinhardt,
2008; Harris, 2003
cancel
orders
professional trader
cancel orders and place
them sequentially
afterwards
not
implemented
Keim and Madhavan, 1995
exper-
ience
professional traders
learn from previous
transactions
not
implemented
Luckner and Weinhardt,
2008; Harris, 2003
skill professional traders
have high trading skills
not
implemented
Leuthold, Garcia, and Lu,
1994; Aulerich, Irwin, and
Garcia, 2013
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TABLE 4.2: Different EIX versions and their market activities (only
for economic indicators).
Version Start End Contracts Participants Transactions
EIX1 10/30/2009 10/31/2010 53 632 22,574
EIX2 10/01/2010 10/31/2011 70 221 11,454
EIX3 11/01/2011 11/15/2012 59 242 11,794
EIX4 11/05/2012 08/14/2013 64 339 16,193
in the fall of each year. For instance, short selling was introduced in 2010, which
led to an improvement in prediction accuracy (Teschner, 2012). Table 4.2 shows
the four versions of the EIX and some descriptive statistics regarding their market
activity. Regarding the forecast accuracy of the EIX prediction market, Teschner,
Stathel, and Weinhardt (2011) could show that the EIX forecasts perform competitive
to the Bloomberg-survey forecasts, often at an earlier point of time.
Within the EIX data, only the markets for economic indicators were considered,
since the field of politics is likely to bring up other traders as high performers than
the field of economics. Furthermore, the set of participants was reduced by two
criteria: a participant (1) needs to place at least ten orders and (2) has to be active for
at least three weeks. This step also leads to the result that the absolute number of
high performers in the sample (very unlikely to drop-out in this step) is re-balanced
with regard to the absolute number of normal traders. Therefore, this step should
also improve the explanatory power of the results. 457 participants remained in the
data set and 65 were classified as high performers. Important to realize is that no
high performer is lost by this reduction.
To generate the properties for the participants and the market state during each
order submit, denoted in Table 4.1, the market was “simulated” by looping and
matching the orders in their historical order. However, some attributes are not mod-
eled, as they require to assess the trader with surveys at a later point in time, which
was not possible in many cases, and seemed to us as a misappropriate effort for the
few cases left.
Based on the traders’ realized profits, their classifications, and the generated at-
tributes, regression analysis and methods of CART were applied. In this context, the
standard scores of the data set were used to prevent deterioration due to attributes
with large variances. Regarding the classification trees, the data set was split into
training and test sets by different approaches. Stopping criteria, such as minsplit
and complexity parameter, were also manipulated in order to “grow” and compare
different trees.
4.5 Evaluation
Table 4.3 reports the results of the regressions. Most notable, one finds that only a
few attributes seem to correlate significantly with high profit or the status of a high
performer. To be emphasized is the impact of the trading volume, which shows
a significant, positive correlation in both: OLS and logistic regression. Moreover,
the negative correlation of the order size with the amount of profit is important to
realize. The logistic regression further reveals that the attributes spread and market
maker seem to be suitable for the distinction among high performers and normal
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TABLE 4.3: OLS and logistic regression with attributes, profit, and
classification as high performers of EIX versions 1-4.
Dependent variable:
Profit High performer
OLS logistic
Market activity -0.013 -0.228
Order book size 0.001 0.043
Spread -0.030 0.242∗
Order size -0.126∗∗ -0.141
Trading volume 0.376∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗
Limit order 0.093∗ -0.107
Trader activity 0.083 -0.627
Round order 0.054 0.059
Market maker 0.022 0.468∗∗
Observations 457 457
R2 0.140
Adjusted R2 0.122
Log Likelihood -145.261
Akaike Inf. Crit. 310.521
Residual Std. Error 0.937 (df = 447)
F Statistic 8.056∗∗∗ (df = 9; 447)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
traders. All other attributes show no significant impact on the amount of profit or
classification as high performer.
In the scope of this analysis, several classification trees were taken into account.
Figure 4.3 illustrates one instance of a classification tree that is trained only with the
three attributes that showed a significant effect in the logistic regression. The train-
ing set consisted of every third trader, starting from the second. Within this tree, the
attribute market maker is used as the first splitting criterion. Furthermore, the at-
tributes trading volume and spread are used to classify the market participants. The
tree is then used to classify the test set, which in this context comprises all remain-
ing traders. Regarding the performance of this classification tree, Table 4.4 shows
the confusion matrix5 and both measures accuracy and precision. Regarding the
classification tree in Figure 4.3, values of 88% and 75% for accuracy and precision,
respectively, were achieved. While the accuracy shows that 88% of the trees’ classi-
fications are correct, more attention should be given to the precision value. Due to
the skewness of the data, there are fewer high performers than other traders. The
precision of 75% in this case means that three out of four traders that are selected by
the model can be considered as high performers.
By training the classification trees with all attributes and including more as split-
ting nodes, no better performances is achieved. For instance, in case three addi-
tional attributes6 to those used in the tree in Figure 4.3 were taken into account,
a marginally better accuracy of 89% can be achieved, while the precision is lower
(69%). Comparing different trees by varying the training and test set, as well as the
stopping criteria, draws a consistent picture; the different classification trees mostly
make use of the attributes trading volume, market maker, and spread to distinguish
5 Legend: acc = accuracy, class = classification, cp = complexity parameter, prec = precision
6Order book size, market activity, limit order
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FIGURE 4.3: Reduced decision tree. Trained with the attributes that
had been identified in the previous step by logistic regression. Test set
is every third participant starting from the second. Training set: The
remaining participants (minsplit = 12; complexity parameter = 0.01).
TABLE 4.4: Confusion matrix of the classification tree in Figure 4.3.
Truth
High performer Other Σ minsplit = 12
Class
High performer 6 2 8 cp = 0.01
Other 16 128 144 acc = 0.88
Σ 22 130 152 prec = 0.75
between high performers and others. A selection of the best trees is provided in
Appendix A.2. This insight is consistent with the results of the logistic regression in
Table 4.3.
4.6 Discussion
The results reported in Section 4.5 provide several insights:
Firstly, one can conclude that not all attributes derived from the literature had a
significant influence on the traders’ results in the ranking. Some, such as the order
size, showed a significant effect in the OLS regression, which is, however, reversed
to the hypothesis in Table 4.1. This may be due to the fact that the EIX had no trans-
action costs. Therefore, large orders are not necessary to reduce the proportion of
transaction costs and possible revenue. Instead, small orders may allow the par-
ticipants to better react on fast changing information. Others, such as the trading
volume or the market maker attribute, performed as expected. It can be concluded
that there may be few differences between trading in financial markets and trading
in prediction markets that cannot be further specified on the basis of these results.
The lack of a significant effect of some attributes can also be attributed to the fact that
the EIX data is much scarcer than financial trading data in stock exchanges, so that
some effects might only come to light in cases where more data is available. This
can be a limitation at this point, although it has to be discussed whether other and
future prediction markets are more “liquid” than the current one.
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Secondly, it can be concluded from the logistic regression that there are several
attributes with a significant predictive power. These are (large) spread, (high) trad-
ing volume, and the market maker attribute. When these attributes are compared
with the top split attributes of the classification tree, there is a large degree of agree-
ment. Furthermore, the confusion matrix reported in Table 4.4 shows that a division
according to these attributes leads to an acceptable classification. Similar propor-
tions of false and true classifications can be seen in the classification tree in Figure
4.3. Although the classification in both examples suggests that not all high perform-
ers were recognized, the number of false positives was very low. This result can
be regarded to be a very satisfactory result as it would ensure that the majority of
traders invited to the Delphi study are knowledgeable.
Eventually, it is to stress that this result is somewhat surprising, since one have
to keep in mind that this classification is only carried out on the basis of behavioral
attributes, and not on the basis of information about the traders’ knowledge, skills,
or experience.
4.7 Conclusion
In view of these results, it can be concluded that a selection algorithm for informed
traders or high performers in prediction markets based solely on trading behavior,
should be based on these three attributes: (large) spread, (high) trading volume,
and the market maker attribute. It was shown that the relatively accurate selection
of high performers is possible. Therefore, it is theoretically possible to simultane-
ously conduct a forecasting market and a RTD survey for the same question/con-
text and to use the prediction market to continuously invite potentially knowledge-
able participants as experts to the Delphi study. While the prediction market can
then be used as a tool to aggregate information on specific forecasting questions, the
RTD survey may be used to collect additional qualitative information and to deal
with further secondary questions and or where conflicting values and goals have
to be considered (Kloker, Straub, and Weinhardt, 2017a; Linstone and Turoff, 2002c).
Since the selection of knowledgeable experts is crucial for the success of Delphi stud-
ies (Welty, 1972; Green, Armstrong, and Graefe, 2007), this is an important finding,
which opens various possibilities of implementation. The logically subsequent and
necessary next step would be to further elaborate on which dimensions expert pan-
els, selected by common methods, differ from panels selected by a prediction market.
Furthermore, these findings contribute to the evaluation of the overall integration of
prediction markets and Delphi studies by supporting the claim of Kloker, Straub,
and Weinhardt (2017a) and Section 3.1.2 that an algorithm for selecting experts on
the basis of trading behavior is possible. In addition to this, the presented results
may also be helpful for researchers that intend to improve prediction market fore-
casts by giving experts more weight or try to distinguish informed from uninformed
traders to reduce biases, e.g., the favorite-longshot bias (Sobel and Raines, 2003).
When considering these findings, some limitations need to be taken into account.
Firstly, it should be noted that the attributes were only tested on one prediction mar-
ket and context, the EIX and economic indicators, though this still corresponds to
more than 60,000 transactions. The second limitation of the current work is that a se-
lection algorithm based on trading behavior is susceptible to misclassification at the
start of a market and only becomes more robust during the time of market activity.
This corresponds to a cold start problem, therefore, it may be useful to postpone the
start of the Delphi study for some time. Next, although supporting evidence was
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presented that the selection knowledgeable participants for a Delphi study is possi-
ble, it was not shown that this really improves the quality of the result of the Delphi
study. This, however, is suggested by theoretical considerations (Prokesch, Gracht,
and Wohlenberg, 2015; Welty, 1972). The empirical demonstration of this hypothesis
is the next necessary step in future research. Moreover, prediction markets, if they
are operated publicly, are subject to a self-selection of participants (Kranz, Teschner,
and Weinhardt, 2014). This effect has to be considered in the future research as well.
In summary, it was demonstrated that knowledgeable participants for a Delphi
study can be selected by a prediction market. As this was possible with accept-
able accuracy during market activity, this work presents a possible solution for a
much-discussed problem of the Delphi method (selection of experts (Kloker, Straub,
and Weinhardt, 2017a)). In addition, it contributes to the research of prediction mar-
kets by comparing the trading behavior of informed traders in prediction markets
and financial markets and by demonstrating that there is at least some transferability
of hypotheses. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that practitioners implement
prediction markets alongside Delphi studies based on current results and other ben-
efits such as long-term user motivation (Kloker, Straub, and Weinhardt, 2017a).
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Chapter 5
Improving Response Rates: A
social Real-Time Delphi
For, yet a little while, and the coming
one will come and will not delay.
Hebrews 10,37; ESV
Contents of this section are in part adopted or taken from Kloker et al. (2016) and
Kloker et al. (2018c).
See Section A.1 for further details.
5.1 Problem Formulation
FIGURE 5.1: The presented research
project in this section addresses the
second source of errors according to
the JFIM: Non-response errors.
For governments, companies, and organiza-
tions, reliable forecasts and assessment of future
developments has always been a central suc-
cess factor (Durand, 2003). These forecasts are
generated by statistical models, but also by hu-
man judgment. Employees or members within
organizations often carry insights and have a
gut-feeling about their daily issues that is be-
yond mere historical and technical data (Styhre,
2002). The RTD methodology is a prominent
way to create forecasts based on such “expert
panels”. However, as many other judgmen-
tal forecasting methods, in RTDs forecasts can
be distorted by non-response errors (Armstrong,
1985), which are in this particular case a re-
sult of drop-outs between Delphi rounds. Such
drop-outs (or the lack of retention) are common
in Delphi surveys, also because the Delphi rounds often take considerable time (Lan-
deta, 2006). As outlined in Section 2.3.3, retention is a key challenge in RTD and tra-
ditional Delphi studies (Mullen, 2003; Walker and Selfe, 1996; Okoli and Pawlowski,
2004; Reid, 1988). Besides for forecasting, RTD is applied in knowledge manage-
ment, e.g., to develop measurement scales (Boulkedid et al., 2011) or estimate trends
and developments (Gnatzy et al., 2011). In all these cases, drop-outs may result in
undesired effects on the results, as the panel of participants often defines, which
point-of-views and information are discussed and considered in the result or deci-
sion (Welty, 1972).
Chapter 5. Improving Response Rates: A social Real-Time Delphi 54
RTDs are also part of the integrated approach and implemented in the FAZ-
.NET-Orakel. In order to design a RTD that solves the design challenge to raise reten-
tion, it is first important to understand how a RTD is designed in general. However,
a brief look into literature on RTDs shows that different concepts are implemented
with often very different designs (e.g., regarding questionnaire layout, process, etc.).
Therefore, it is necessary to capture a standard of a RTD (Design Principles (DPs))
that can then, afterwards be extended by a new DP that raises retention. The work
demonstrated in the following sections therefore contributes in two ways: First, it
provides a summary on all reported implementations of RTDs and derives DPs for
a standard implementation of a RTD. Second, it provides the derivation and eval-
uation of a new DP from literature on retention in online communities. These two
steps are achieved in a DSR project.
Overall, this research addresses the following research question:
• How to design social elements in anonymous knowledge sharing and forecast-
ing platforms, in order to stimulate retention in multi-round settings?
The presented results show that “labeling comments” has a significant positive
influence on retention. An instantiation of a sRTD artifact is a further contribution
of this section’s work.
The remainder of this section is structured as follows: Section 5.2 gives an over-
view of literature on RTD and social interaction on online platforms, to give a foun-
dation to the underlying hypothesis. Section 5.4 introduces the procedure of the
DSR project that structured this research. Section 5.5 formulates the DPs. Section
5.6, then, reports the methodology and results of the two-fold evaluation strategy
with an online experiment and a field test. A summary of the findings and its limi-
tations, as well as a brief outlook concludes this chapter (Section 5.7).
5.2 Related Work
Real-Time Delphi Research on RTD is based on many studies performed in the
last decade. Several publications report the implementation of RTD platforms and
present the basic procedures (Abadie, Friedewald, and Weber, 2010; Gary and Gracht,
2015; Schuckmann et al., 2012). However, there is hardly any related work that car-
ries out a systematic literature review to present different approaches of RTDs or
discusses similarities and differences between existing implementations. Gordon
(2009) refers to other applications, while describing his developed version of RTD.
In Gordon, Sharan, and Florescu (2015), this view is enlarged as further techniques
are presented. This overview is useful to get an impression of the application areas
for RTD, but does not provide any comprehensive comparison of the approaches.
In 2011, Gnatzy et al. drew up a modified RTD technique based on the idea of Gor-
don and Pease (2006). After describing the developed methodology of RTD, Gnatzy
et al. (2011) compared their approach to the one of Gordon and Pease (2006). Since
Gnatzy et al. (2011) intend to point out detailed improvements of features and pro-
cess design, the comparison of the implementations is extensive and the adaptions
described thoroughly. The focus of Gnatzy et al. (2011) is laid on the visual statis-
tical group feedback and a higher level of expert guidance through the survey by a
one-screen-one-question design.
To summarize, there is currently no standard definition of RTD. However, in or-
der to perform a structured literature review and identify DPs (see Section 5.5), there
is first the need to define a minimum criteria set to decide whether an application is
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a RTD. For this reason the working definition of RTD introduced in Section 2.3.21 is
applied.
Retention in Delphi and Real-Time Delphi studies One problem with the tradi-
tional Delphi method as well as the RTD is the lack of retention of participants over
multiple rounds. According to Mullen (2003) and Walker and Selfe (1996) the re-
sponse rate in Delphi studies needs to be at least 70%. Reid (1988) notes that the
panel size has a strong influence on the drop-out rate. Large panels tend to lead to
less retention of participants than small panels with less than 20 members. In RTDs
the problem is expected to be much larger, as individual’s contribution and involve-
ment becomes smaller. This effect is known as “Social Loafing” and is present in
online communities as well (Lampe et al., 2010). Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) ar-
gue that the researcher has the possibility to contact the drop-outs and ask them to
participate, but this can be, depending on the budget, related to a disproportion-
ate effort (Ishikawa et al., 1993). However, the technological concept of RTD and
its asynchronous character would allow distinctly larger panels. To draw upon this
potential, it is necessary to bind users strongly to the platform and the survey. This
can be accomplished by enabling participants to experience online presence. The
experience to feel “present” in the online community is a prerequisite to attribute
actions and reactions on the platform to oneself and build up reputation. Bolger and
Wright (2011) found that in traditional Delphi studies the promise of gaining social
reputation raises motivation to commit to the study and raises retention.
5.3 Online Presence to raise Retention in Real-Time Delphi
“Collaboration begins with interaction” (Murphy, 2004, p. 422). The experience
of presence in online settings makes geographically separated persons behave as a
group, which enriches interaction and the sense of community. “Experience of on-
line presence” is hereby regarded as the degree a participant is feeling personally
involved in an online task, which is crucial for forming collaborative communities
(Lampe et al., 2010). In a collaborative community, members do not only share per-
spectives, but are starting to challenge other opinions, reshape their own, and re-
structure their thinking. This process leads finally to a “shared meaning” – which is
also characteristic to the Delphi method. However, online presence in online collab-
oration has the ability to start additional processes: New perspectives and meanings
as well as shared goals can evolve (Roschelle and Teasley, 1995). The second leads to
the production of shared artifacts and the intention to “add value” (Kaye, 1992). It
is not yet discussed, if these processes lead ultimately to better results in every case,
but intuitively one would say that it may improve the result in some dimension.
Leveraging this improvement for RTD has not yet happened and Linstone and Tur-
off (2011, p. 1718) predict that “[...] the future of Delphi will be in collaborative or-
ganizational and community planning systems that are continuous, dispersed, and
asynchronous.”
Online presence and the sense of community allow to build up “social repu-
tation”. In order to do this, “labeling” is a widely applied approach in forums.
Tagging or labeling (tagging with a fixed set of labels) content in “social question
answering” (e.g. Yahoo! Answers or Live Q&A), can open opportunities for richer
user interaction (Rodrigues, Milic-Frayling, and Fortuna, 2008). Lampel and Bhalla
1A RTD is an online implementation of the Delphi method, where users can interact with the plat-
form online and at any given time
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(2007) emphasize the “reputation (status) seeking” behavior of users in online com-
munities. According to Ames and Naaman (2007) there are mainly two reasons to
tag social content2: i) Providing one’s opinion on something (social interaction) and
ii) help others/oneself to find something (self-organization). Additionally, Rainie
(2007) puts that tagging allows groups to form around points of view and similarities
of interest. If persons use the same tags, they may get the impression that they prob-
ably share some deep commonalities. Tagging or labeling can therefore contribute
to RTDs in multiple ways: First, it enables users to express their opinion about ar-
guments and gain reputation. Second, it enables users to express “common sense”.
Both leads to a higher experience of online presence and therefore raise commitment
to the platform. Third, tagging and labeling are a strong instrument of (self-) orga-
nizing content. Especially for larger panels, online discussion can quickly become
confusing, if there are no means to structure and distinguish the important from the
unimportant or the interesting from the uninteresting. Lots of large online platforms
as Twitter, Facebook, Stackoverflow, FlickR, or GitHub use tagging or labeling as a
mean to allow the structuring and organizing of content. Turoff et al. (2004) already
used labels to organize content in a study which he attested a “Delphi-structure”.
However, they did not enable the users to label arguments or the inputs of other
users, so no social character can be found here. As his panel consisted of students of
a lecture and participation was mandatory, also no assumption on retention can be
derived here. In addition, his implementation did not fit the anonymity criteria, as
names of the authors of arguments were visible. Usually the Delphi method as well
as RTD build on absolute anonymity (or quasi-anonymity as argued in Kochtanek
and Hein (1999)). Gordon (2009) states the concern about spurious factors, such as
(prior) reputation, status, or other social behavior that intrude in face-to-face inter-
actions among experts. These concerns led once to the feature of anonymity in the
beginning of the Delphi method. Anonymity is a key feature of the Delphi method
and it was adopted in RTD. Therefore, the key challenge of current research is to
raise retention by increased online presence and the promise of social reputation
with labels and, at the same time, not to allow the tracking of single users long-term
and, therefore, harm the anonymity criteria. In the current work and Kloker et al.
(2016), generated user names are suggested to support the promise of social repu-
tation and retention. They may induce the feeling of addressability (and therefore
the feeling to be present online3) and that individual participants may be traced and,
therefore, can collect reputation.
5.4 The Design Science Research Project Setting
Aiming at investigating and solving the challenge of low retention by the introduc-
tion of social interaction in RTD, the DSR (Hevner et al., 2004) approach as described
by Kuechler and Vaishnavi (2008) is applied. Given the current problem and setting,
the DSR approach is perceived as promising, because it helps to understand the un-
derlying design and at the same time evaluate an appropriate information system
based on the design. As far as this is known, there are no DPs for the class of RTD
published yet. The DSR project is conducted in two consecutive design cycles (see
Figure 5.2).
2In case of Ames and Naaman (2007) photos.
3However, this does not mean to perceive the social presence of other, though this was also demon-
strated to raise reciprocity in online networks (Teubner et al., 2013).
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FIGURE 5.2: Two cycle DSR project (adopted from Kuechler and
Vaishnavi (2008)).
To create a complete and sound awareness of the problem, the first design cycle
was started with an extensive literature review on prior findings in related fields,
reported applications of RTDs, and the relevance of the problem with retention in
past applications. Based on this review, DPs for the class of RTD platforms were
derived. The literature search took all publications into account, in which a RTD
approach (or a comparable implementation), based on the working definition of a
RTD from Section 2.3.2, was utilized (implemented) and described (or evaluated).
Thereupon, a backward and forward search was conducted (Webster and Watson,
2002). Many of the relevant literature was found in the journal “Technological Fore-
casting & Social Change”, in which publishing articles about the Delphi method and
RTD had become common. By scanning available descriptions and discussions of
different RTD approaches, features were extracted and subsequently organized ac-
cording to the key aspects of the Delphi method. Thereupon, the approaches were
compared according to these features. This allows to differentiate between features
that achieved “quasi-standard”-status and features with varying implementations.
In the next steps of the first cycle, a preliminary online experiment instantiated and
evaluated a prototype of a RTD platform based on these findings in two treatments:
(1) A control-group faced a RTD platform implementing the “quasi-standard”. (2)
A treatment-group faced a sRTD platform implementing the “quasi-standard”, plus
featuring social elements.
In the second design cycle, the design was reconsidered based on the feedback
and results of the first design cycle and the prototype was instantiated into a full
IT artifact within and as a component of the FAZ.NET-Orakel. This enabled the
evaluation of the artifact under real world conditions. The combination of the lit-
erature review, the preliminary online experiment, and the field test together with
the industry partner ensures both rigor and relevance of the current research project
(Hevner, 2007). Following Venable, Pries-Heje, and Baskerville (2016), a formative
evaluation was performed, both ex ante and ex post to determine, how well the
artifact achieves its expected environmental utility. The ex ante evaluation can be
considered artificial, the ex post evaluation as naturalistic. In this context the “Hu-
man Risk & Effectiveness” DSR evaluation strategy is suitable (Venable, Pries-Heje,
and Baskerville, 2016), as the preliminary online experiment is an early formative
evaluation of the later naturalistic evaluation in the field test.
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TABLE 5.1: Summarized properties of selected RTD studies (Part I).
Publications (→) Studies by Gordon (et al.)
Properties (↓) 2006; 2007 2009 2015
Anonymity
estimations & arguments
remain anonymous
3 3 3
Statistical Group Response
aggregated estimations 3 3 3
average provided 3 3 3
other provided statistics n/a median
median,
minmax
number of responses 3 3 3
Controlled Feedback
dissension indicator flag flag n/a
consensus portal 7 7 7
group response is shown
... individual response
before before before
others arguments
3, extra
window
3, extra
window
3
arguments need ap-
proval of researcher
7 7 7
visual statistics 7 7 7
Iterative Process
access anytime 3 3 3
asynchronous process 3 3 3
hot periods 7 7 7
General Properties
objective of study: find... consensus consensus consensus
initial values in survey
beta test
panel
n/a
small pilot
group
layout of RTD 2D (matrix) 2D (matrix) 2D (matrix)
depiction of progress 7 7 7
estimation input
4 categories
(not linear)
100 and 10
point Likert
scale
numeric,
multiple
choice
argument input
3, extra
window
3, extra
window
3
internet-based 3 3 3
access to survey by...
user &
password
n/a n/a
integrated tutorial 7 7 7
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TABLE 5.2: Summarized properties of selected RTD studies (Part II).
Publications (→) Studies by European Business School (EBS)
Properties (↓) Gnatzy
et al., 2011
Schuckmann
et al., 2012
Darkow
and
Gracht,
2013
Gary and
Gracht,
2015
Anonymity
estimations & arguments
remain anonymous
3 3 3 3
Statistical Group Response
aggregated estimations 3 3 3
3
average provided 3 3 n/a 3
other provided statistics
median,
Interquartile
Range
(IQR)
median,
IQR
n/a
IQR,
Standard
Deviation
(SD)
number of responses 7 3 n/a 7
Controlled Feedback
dissension indicator color-code n/a n/a color-code
consensus portal 3 n/a n/a 3
group response is shown
... individual response
after after after after
others arguments
3, extra
window
3 3 3
arguments need ap-
proval of researcher
3 n/a n/a n/a
visual statistics 3 3 n/a 3
Iterative Process
access anytime 3 3 3 3
asynchronous process 3 3 3 3
hot periods 7 7 7 7
General Properties
objective of study: find... consensus consensus consensus both
initial values in survey
small
expert
group
small
expert
group
developed
research
framework
literature
and
experts
layout of RTD
1D
(1-question-
-1-screen)
1D
(1-question-
-1-screen)
1D
(1-question-
-1-screen)
1D
(1-screen-
-1-factor)
depiction of progress in percent n/a n/a n/a
estimation input
metric
(0-100%),
Likert (5
point)
metric
(0-100%),
Likert (5
point)
metric
(0-100%),
Likert (5
point)
metric
(0-100%),
Likert (5
point)
argument input 3, directly 3 3 3
internet-based 3 3 3 3
access to survey by...
hyperlink
(e-mail)
hyperlink
(e-mail)
n/a
hyperlink
(e-mail)
integrated tutorial 3 n/a n/a n/a
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TABLE 5.3: Summarized properties of selected RTD studies (Part III).
Publications (→) Studies by other authors/organizations
Properties (↓) Steinert,
2009
eDelfoi
Zipfinger,
2007
Anonymity
estimations & arguments
remain anonymous
3 3 3
Statistical Group Response
aggregated estimations 7 n/a 3
average provided 7 n/a n/a
other provided statistics 7 n/a n/a
number of responses 7 n/a n/a
Controlled Feedback
dissension indicator 7 n/a n/a
consensus portal
dissension
portal
n/a n/a
group response is shown
... individual response
before n/a n/a
others arguments 3 n/a 3
arguments need ap-
proval of researcher
n/a n/a n/a
visual statistics 7 n/a n/a
Iterative Process
access anytime 3 n/a 3
asynchronous process
cmark 3 3
hot periods 7 3 n/a
General Properties
objective of study: find... dissension consensus consensus
initial values in survey
project was
prototype
n/a n/a
layout of RTD
1D
(1-screen-
-1-factor)
n/a n/a
depiction of progress 7 n/a n/a
estimation input
multiple
choice
n/a n/a
argument input 3 n/a n/a
internet-based 3 3 3
access to survey by...
hyperlink
(e-mail)
n/a n/a
integrated tutorial 3 n/a n/a
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5.5 Designing Real-Time Delphi platforms
First, the DPs are derived based on a literature review on RTD platforms. Wagner
and Back (2008) defined principles for the class of GWSSs as an extension of Group
Decision Support System (GDSS). Following DPs can be understood as a refinement
of the principles of Wagner and Back (2008) for the class of RTDs. Literature reports
of many applications of RTD studies. However, only few studies reported about the
implementation of the method. Probably the two most important “clusters of publi-
cations” are those around Gordon and Pease (e.g. Gordon and Pease, 2006) and the
EBS, respectively Gnatzy et al. (e.g. Gnatzy et al., 2011). In addition, a cluster of stud-
ies are based on the eDelfoi platform (see e.g., Kuusi (1999) or https://metodix.fi).
A full comparison of the results is provided in the Tables 5.1 to 5.3 , structured ac-
cording to the key principles of the Delphi method. Hereinafter, the general findings
on an abstracted level in the form of DPs are discussed.
• Design Principle 1: Ensure anonymity
Throughout all publications of implementations of RTD platforms, it is found
that the participants remained concealed to the other participants (e.g. Gnatzy
et al., 2011).
• Design Principle 2: Provide meaningful statistical group response allowing self-location
Researchers in the field of the Delphi methodology agree that feedback is cru-
cial to achieve results of high quality in Delphi and RTD studies (Rowe and
Wright, 1999; Rowe, Wright, and McColl, 2005; Best, 1974). Iterative examina-
tion of the group response is essential to find valid consensus on a topic and
also to form clusters around alternative positions (Best, 1974). Early RTD stud-
ies only displayed basic statistical group response, like the average. Soon many
authors started to introduce more meaningful measures as the additional pre-
sentation of the median (Gordon, 2009), min-max values (Gordon, Sharan, and
Florescu, 2015), the IQR (Gary and Gracht, 2015; Gnatzy et al., 2011; Schuck-
mann et al., 2012), or the SD (Schuckmann et al., 2012). These measures help
the participant to locate his own opinion within the overall range. Less con-
formity exists regarding the presentation of the number of responses so far.
Gnatzy et al. (2011) mention the problem that the feedback pushes participants
towards conformity. However, only few authors use RTD without the presenta-
tion of the group response, as e.g. Steinert (2009), who explicitly wants to find
dissension.
• Design Principle 3: Use visual feedback to ease the understanding of the statistical
group response
Closely related to DP 2, diverse authors decided to present the statistical feed-
back in a visual form (Gary and Gracht, 2015; Gnatzy et al., 2011; Schuckmann
et al., 2012).
• Design Principle 4: Hide feedback before first estimation to avoid anchors
This DP is added as it fits more to the traditional Delphi process. Existing im-
plementations show low conformity on this, as only the EBS researchers stick
to this principle. However, Gnatzy et al. (2011) states that otherwise the experts
become consciously or unconsciously influenced by other participants while
forming their own estimation.
• Design Principle 5: Guide the expert but allow free navigation
Literature reports of two different questionnaire structures: 1D and 2D layouts.
In the 1D layout (Gnatzy et al., 2011) experts see one question per screen and
proceed to the next question by a button. This reduces information overload
Chapter 5. Improving Response Rates: A social Real-Time Delphi 62
and allows to set focus on one question. The order of the questions can be used
intentionally, for example to take the expert mentally further in the future by
every question. In contrast, in the 2D layout the experts face all questions (in
a minimized form) at one glance and can therefore choose the order to answer
questions. This is suitable for utility matrixes, decision models, input/output,
or, e.g., cross impact (Gordon, 2009). The argumentation must be opened in
an external window. Though both implementations exist, the 1D layout is im-
plemented more often. In addition, the 1D instances provide the possibility
to navigate to each question directly. So, it is argued that the user should feel
guided by the software but can access any question at any time.
• Design Principle 6: Indicate dissension to highlight where other participants have dif-
ferent opinions
Most implementations included an indicator showing the participant that his
opinion is out of the group’s estimation. This is achieved either by an “indica-
tor flag” (Gordon and Pease, 2006; Gordon, 2007; Gordon, 2009) or by a “color
code” (Gary and Gracht, 2015; Gnatzy et al., 2011). Some authors also added a
consensus portal, others suggested a dissension portal. Authors that did imple-
ment none of the above, usually used a 2D matrix layout that had a comparable
function.
• Design Principle 7: Enable argumentation to allow qualitative discussion
Argumentation is a key aspect of the Delphi method. Therefore, this is included
in all RTD implementations that are reported in literature. In one case each ar-
gument gets reviewed by an administrator before it appears for the other partic-
ipants. The administrator’s task is not to evaluate, but to check the arguments
on two criteria: First, eliminate spelling mistakes, and second, delete duplicates
to avoid information overload (Linstone and Turoff, 2011).
• Design Principle 8: Allow access at any time to make the process asynchronous
All reported implementations featured an “asynchronous process”, so that the
access was provided at any time. Gordon and Pease (2006) argue that this
comes close to the iterative process in the traditional Delphi method. Not yet
“standard” and therefore not a DP, but interesting anyway, is the approach of
Kuusi (e.g. Kuusi, 1999) to organize “hot periods”, where all participants were
additionally invited for specified one or two hour slots to forecast together. This
meets the iterative process even better, besides having other advantages (Gor-
don, 2009): First, this promotes active participation and keeps the discussion
ongoing. Second, this ensures that the experts assess the questions simultane-
ously and also recognize their personal influence shown by immediate reac-
tions of other participants.
With other design decisions that are reported in literature on RTD, either not
enough consensus or no necessity to formulate them as DPs was found. These are
in particular the realizations of following elements: “deception of progress”, “ar-
gument input”, the “estimation input”; and additional information such as: “con-
fidence”, “access to survey”, the “end” of the survey (after enough estimation or
enough time), and “tutorials and introduction”. An important issue, but not a real
DP, is that several authors are arguing that the experts should not start with a “null
questionnaire” and that initial estimations should be provided by for example a beta
test panel etc. (Gordon and Pease, 2006). An alternative is to provide extensive sup-
porting material, definitions, references, or a supportive framework (Gordon and
Pease, 2006; Steinert, 2009).
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As previously mentioned in Section 5.2, it was assumed that more options for so-
cial interaction can raise retention. So a new DP “Enable social interaction to promise
the gain of social reputation” is formulated that, however, should be implemented
in a way that does not harm anonymity.
• Design Principle 9: Enable social interaction to promise the gain of social reputation
To raise retention, it is necessary to stimulate experts to a higher commitment
to the survey (Linstone and Turoff, 2011). Therefore, it is intended to create
stronger bindings to the platform by enabling the experience of online presence.
This may be achieved by the increase of addressability or the promise to gain
social reputation (Bolger and Wright, 2011). The first one must be handled with
caution, as anonymity has still to be ensured. The second may introduce easy
to use functionality for feedback. The introduction of, for example, labels that
can be added to arguments by all participants, enables each participant to give
and receive social reputation (Rainie, 2007).
A RTD, implementing the ninth DP, can be regarded as a sRTD.
5.6 Instantiating the Design
5.6.1 Cycle 1: Prototype Implementation and Evaluation Study
For the first design cycle a prototype was instantiated, implementing design princi-
ples 1-5, 7, and 8 that is evaluated in an online experiment. As this was a one shot
experiment, DP 6 was skipped, as a dissension indicator first becomes relevant in a
second visit.
Method
A two-treatment, between-subject online experiment was conducted, following ex-
perimental procedures from experimental economics (Roth, 1986). Therefore, two
instances of the platform were set up. From a technical perspective, the online ex-
periment uses a customized web-application following guidelines for online exper-
iments as proposed by Mason and Suri (2012). The first instance implemented a
standard RTD setup. The second instance implemented a sRTD and, therefore, also
implemented DP 9. It is suggested that DP 9 raise retention in a RTD context.
Stimuli & Experiment Design: Both groups participated in a RTD survey, from
which the control group was confronted with the standard version and the treatment
group with the social version. The social elements offered together in the sRTD are
illustrated in Figure 5.3:
• Labeling: The arguments and opinions that have been added to the responses
by the participants can be marked with labels such as “good”, “bad”, or “help-
ful”.
• User names: For each question the participants receive a generated user name,
which is used to mark their arguments as their own while maintaining their
anonymity. These user names can then be used to reference a single person in
other arguments or to see which arguments were provided by the same person.
The hypotheses are illustrated in Figure 5.4.
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As a proxy to the feature “generated user names”, its perception is measured in
a (perceived) Addressability score, which is defined as the average of 10 items45. As
a proxy to the feature “labeling”, its perception is measured in a (perceived) Promise
of Social Reputation score, which is defined as the average of 9 items6. As this was
a one shot experiment and there was no additional round, retention could not be
measured directly. Therefore, as a proxy to retention, Commitment is measured by
the average of 3 items7. Each item is measured by a five point Likert-Scale. Some
items are negated to check for consistent answers. According to the theoretical con-
siderations from Section 5.3 and for the DP 9, it is argued that the (perceived) Promise
of Social Reputation (introduced by labeling, abbr. “Reputation”) has a positive effect
of Retention (H12, as shown in Figure 5.4). Based on the considerations in Section
5.3 it is also assumed that the generated user names raise (perceived) Addressability,
which influences Commitment (H11) and Reputation (H13) positively.
Participants: The participants were mainly students of Industrial Engineering,
Economics, and Business Information Systems from the KIT, Germany. From a con-
tacted 50 participants, 46 answers returned, 22 (female: 9) in the RTD and 24 (female:
10) in the sRTD8. For the analysis, only participants that completed both, the survey
and the attached questionnaire, were considered. In the RTD and sRTD participants
were asked about their opinion on the future of the automobile industry. Therefore,
it is expected that the topic does not overly attract the students nor bore them. In
addition, due to their technical background, it is to expect that they have at least
some expertise.
Procedure: The experiment was conducted in the context of a research semi-
nar. Two students spread the invitation to the RTD survey that was fully functional
among their acquaintances via e-mail. The recipients were asked to participate in
the RTD/sRTD survey and give their estimations on the future of electronic vehicles.
Participants accessed the platform using a personalized link to ensure them ending
4Items were taken from Gefen and Straub (2004), Lin (2004), and Rovai (2001). Cronbach’s α = 0.763
after the deletion of one item.
5All items are listed in Table A.2 in the appendix.
6Items were taken from Kankanhalli, Tan, and Wei (2005) and Wang and Wang (2010); five self-
formulated items were added. Cronbach’s α = 0.786 after the deletion of two items.
7Self-formulated. Cronbach’s α = 0.548 after the deletion of one item.
8A two-sample test for “equality of proportions” (prop.test()) shows no significant inequality
(p=.958) regarding the gender.
FIGURE 5.3: Social elements as offered to the treatment group (sRTD)
in the argument area of a question. Dashed boxes highlight the gen-
erated user names in the illustration. The dotted box highlights the
labels. Those elements were missing in the control group.
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up seeing their own answers when accessing the survey multiple times. Therefore,
aborting and re-accessing the survey was possible at any time. The assignment of
participants to the treatments was randomized and participants were not aware of
treatments. After finishing the survey, the participants received a questionnaire,
asking them to self-assess their experience during the survey. The follow-up ques-
tionnaire was also conducted with the same platform, however, group feedback and
the opportunity to provide arguments were suppressed. The survey was open for
one week. After ten days a mail was sent to those participants that participated in
the survey and the subsequent questionnaire, saying “thank you” for participation
and offered them the opportunity to re-access the platform to see the results, and
optionally change their provided estimations. Still, the participants were not aware
of the treatments. An event was logged, if they accessed the platform again.
Evaluation of the Prototype
As the gender was equally distributed over control and treatment group, it is not
necessary to control for it in the overall effect.
A polyserial correlation between Commitment and the treatment (“social” as ref-
erence level) showed a significant correlation (r=-.06, p=.039). The data yet reports
no significant correlation between the treatment and the revisit after the last e-mail
(ϕ-Coefficient = -.13). The other scores did show a slight, but not significant rise
from the RTD to the sRTD treatment. However, a multiple linear regression showed
that Commitment is, by a considerable portion, explained by Social Reputation.
A multiple linear regression was calculated to predict Commitment based on So-
cial Reputation and Addressability. A significant9 regression equation was found (F(2,
41) = 9.828, p=.000), with a R2 of .324. Participants’ predicted Commitment is equal
to 0.134 + 0.018(n.s.) Addressability + 0.771*** Social Reputation, where both indepen-
dent and dependent constructs were coded or measured on a Likert-Scale from 1 to
5 (“fits not at all” to “fits completely”). A power analysis (Cohen, 1988) with the
accepted error levels of α = β = 0.05 showed that the 46 observations provided
enough statistical power (required number of observations > 36). Adding gender
as an independent variable results in no significant effect of gender (0.263(n.s.) “fe-
male”).
9Significance codes for all analyses: 0 ‘***’ 0.005 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘n.s.’ 1
FIGURE 5.4: Research model for the online experiment (prototype
evaluation).
Chapter 5. Improving Response Rates: A social Real-Time Delphi 66
A weak positive correlation was, in addition, found between Addressability and
Reputation r(43)=.31* (H13)10.
As an interim conclusion, it can be said that the social treatment led to a sig-
nificant rise in self-reported Commitment of the participants to the survey and that
commitment is by a large portion explained by the self-reported perceived possi-
bility to gain social reputation. A connection between the perceived addressability
and commitment, as expected by the design element of the generated user names,
could not be shown, though it had a weak correlation with the promise to gain social
reputation. Therefore, this design element was dropped in the field test in order to
further explore the isolated effect of social reputation on retention. Nevertheless, the
feature of generated user names is recommended for future research.
5.6.2 Cycle 2: IT Artifact Implementation and Evaluation Study
For the second design cycle a sRTD artifact was, based on the prototype, instantiated
on the FAZ.NET-Orakel and a two round sRTD survey was implemented for the
2017 German Federal Election.
Method
For the evaluation of the Information Technology (IT) artifact, a field study was con-
ducted. The design element of the generated user names was dropped, due to small
effects in the prototype evaluation and as it might have confused participants on the
FAZ.NET-Orakel, which was not in the sense of the industry partner. Besides, the
artifact provided identical functionality than the prototype. The survey was con-
ducted in the context of a prediction market for the vote-share of the parties in the
2017 German Federal Election.
Study Design: The research model for the naturalistic evaluation is illustrated in
Figure 5.5. Based on the findings in the prototype evaluation that (perceived) Promise
of Social Reputation showed a positive effect (see Subsection 5.6.1), the considerations
regarding the ninth DP, and Bolger and Wright (2011), it is now hypothesized that
(positive) Social Reputation increases Subsequent Platform Engagement regarding Reten-
tion (H1) and Activity (H2). Retention is operationalized as the participation of a user
in the second round, if the user participated in the first round. Activity is an addi-
tional construct that measures the overall interaction with the sRTD in the second
round. It allows a more graduated evaluation of retention. E.g., if all participants
from the first round would have participated in the second round, it would still al-
low to further evaluate the effect of the (positive) Social Reputation.
As this was a field test, many other influences may interfere with the dependent
construct. Mere increased overall activity could also explain both, (quantitatively)
higher Social Reputation and Subsequent Platform Engagement. Because of restrictions
on the platform, no control treatment could be performed and, therefore, it is not
possible at this point to finally distinguish between causality and correlation. If a
person is very active on the platform in general, this may also explain both: Higher
Subsequent Platform Engagement and more positive feedback on its arguments. To
control for such influences, the overall activity of participants on the platform (in
10A test for mediation according to Baron and Kenny (1986) could not confirm mediation, though
the results were not finally definite. A singular linear regression from Addressability to Commitment
showed no significant effect (H11 rejected). However, H13 showed a slightly positive effect. For the
second reason, a possible mediation cannot be excluded finally.
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terms of order submission in the prediction market) was modeled in the proxy con-
struct Engagement in Prediction Market as an independent control variable with the
hypothesis that the overall increased activity has no effect on the Subsequent Plat-
form Engagement (H3 and H4) in the RTD survey. No effect of the prediction market
as a connected platform on the dependent constructs is assumed, as neither the in-
centives, nor the objectives were presented as linked between the platforms to the
participants.
FIGURE 5.5: Research model for field test (artifact evaluation).
From the collected field data, the absolute number of received positive labels
before the second round is interpreted as Social Reputation, the absolute number of
trades in the prediction market for the party results before the second round is in-
terpreted as Engagement in Prediction Market, a logical indicator if the participant
participated in the second round (either with answers, comments or labels) is inter-
preted as Retention, and the absolute number of answers, comments and labels in
the second round is interpreted as Activity. Only those participants that participated
already in the first round are considered in the evaluation.
Participants: Participants were only recruited among the participants of the pre-
diction market. Here, a certain degree of self-selection towards a knowledgeable
group can be assumed, as participation in the prediction market already indicates in-
terest and information on the topic. Participation in the RTD survey was completely
non-obligatory and not related to any of the incentives of the prediction market.
Procedure: Technically the software artifact in the field study was identical to
the sRTD prototype, besides small design adaptions to the corporate design of the
FAZ.NET-Orakel platform. For the field test a survey was implemented asking for
the relations between considerations about possible political coalitions and the ef-
fect on the expected election outcome for different parties. The survey was always
accessible by a link, prominently placed at the top of the corresponding prediction
market. Two rounds were performed. Between the two rounds, additional questions
(suggestions of the first round by the participants) were added and negatively rated
comments were deleted (which is usually the facilitator’s task (Gnatzy et al., 2011)
and supported by the labels as argued in Subsection 5.3). Round 1 (8th of July to 2nd
of August 2017) contained five questions and one question where suggestions could
be provided. Round 2 (3rd August to 24th September 2017) added five questions (to-
tal: 10 questions). The advertisement for the survey was kept at a minimum: One
on-site message at the introduction of the survey and one on-site message at the start
of the second round. These measures were taken to ensure that no initial “novelty
hype” interfered with the “normal” use of the tool. Some participants have been
introduced to the tool itself earlier in a preliminary technical test.
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Evaluation of the IT Artifact
Overall, 90 participants participated in the survey by providing answers. Demo-
graphic data is not available due to limitations by the industry partner. There is,
however, no reason to assume a distinct change of demography between the rounds,
for which reason no effect is expected (as also shown in Subsection 5.6.1). 41 partici-
pated only in the first round, 7 participants in both rounds, and 42 participants only
in the second round (which are, therefore, not considered in the regressions based
on first round activity). During the two rounds (first round), 29 (20) comments and
40 (14) labels were provided by the participants. The paths from the independent
constructs to Retention as illustrated in the research model for the field test (see Fig-
ure 5.5) due to its binary coding are tested with probabilistic regressions. The paths
to Activity due to its continuous coding are tested with linear regressions.
A simple probabilistic regression was calculated to predict Retention based on So-
cial Reputation during the first round. A weakly significant regression equation was
found (p=.093), with (pseudo11) R2 of 0.345. Participants’ predicted likelihoods to
retain participation is equal to -1.132 + 1.213. Social Reputation is measured in the ab-
solute number of positive labels that were received by a participant’s comments. A
simple linear regression was calculated to predict Activity based on Social Reputation
during the first round. A significant regression equation was found (F(1,26)=5.22,
p=.031), with R2 of 0.167. Participants’ predicted likelihoods to participate actively
in the second round is equal to 0.723 + 1.058 “content-creating activities”.
A simple probabilistic regression was calculated to predict Retention based on
Engagement in Prediction Market during the first round. A not significant regression
equation was found (p=.882), with (pseudo) R2 of 0.001. Engagement in Prediction
Market is measured in the absolute number of trades in the corresponding markets.
A simple linear regression was calculated to predict Activity based on Engagement in
Prediction Market during the first round. A not significant regression equation was
found (F(1,26)=5.22, p=.603), with R2 of 0.011.
To sum up, it can be concluded that participants that received positive feedback
in form of labels within the first round had a significantly higher probability to re-
tain in the survey for the second round. It also correlates with a higher activity in
the second round. These effects cannot be explained by a general higher activity,
as Engagement in Prediction Market had no significant correlations with the depen-
dent constructs. Therefore, these results show correlations and suggest causalities in
favor of the hypotheses, though the latter cannot be proven finally, due to a non-ex-
istent control group.
5.7 Discussion and Conclusion
In the first design cycle, eight DPs for RTD platforms were identified in literature
and formulated. The examination of existing RTD platforms showed that mainly
two central approaches are established in current research and that they differ es-
pecially regarding the survey layout and the moment when the group estimation
is presented. In both cases the DPs were formulated in a way that appeared to be
closer to the traditional Delphi method.
Subsequently, a ninth DP was added: Enable social interaction to promise the gain
of social reputation. The need for this ninth DP was derived out of the problem of the
lack of retention (Mullen, 2003; Reid, 1988; Okoli and Pawlowski, 2004) during RTD
11McFadden (1973)
Chapter 5. Improving Response Rates: A social Real-Time Delphi 69
studies and literature arguing that commitment to online platforms can be raised
by social elements (Kloker et al., 2016; Bolger and Wright, 2011; Lampel and Bhalla,
2007).
Thereafter, a prototype of the sRTD was implemented considering all DPs rel-
evant for the preliminary experiment. For the ninth DP the design decisions were
based on the suggestions of Kloker et al. (2016) (and Section 5.3), to use individually
generated user names per question to maintain anonymity and at the same time in-
troduce addressability. In addition, the possibility to add labels to arguments was
provided, so the platform promised users to perceive social reputation when oth-
ers appreciate their contributions. A two-treatment, between-subject online experi-
ment, and a follow-up questionnaire showed that the assumption that the promise
to gain social reputation by social elements raise the self-reported commitment is
valid. Though theory suggests, an interaction or positive effect of the generated
user names could not be demonstrated. This may have been due to several reasons:
First, the generated user names did resemble of vocals and consonants in order to
be readable. However, they were not common names and, therefore, may not have
induced “social presence” or were recognized as real names for real persons. Sec-
ond, participants received no explanation, how and for what reasons the user names
were generated. Based on the description next to their “own generated name” per
question, they may have assumed that each user gets an individual user name per
question. However, the experiment design did not check for this certain problem
and, therefore, the lack of social presence induced by the user names may be due to
a lack of understanding. Nevertheless, as no effect on the dependent variable could
be shown, the design element of generated user names was discarded in the field
test, though it is suggested for further evaluation in future studies.
The prototype was subsequently instantiated as a full IT artifact and evaluated
in a field study. A two round RTD survey was conducted in the context of the 2017
German Federal Election on the FAZ.NET-Orakel. A significant positive effect of
the received positive labels in the first round (Social Reputation) on Retention in the
second round and on Activity in the second round was found. These effects cannot
finally be attributed to causalities, due to the lack of a control treatment in the field
test based on restrictions of the industry partner. The research model controlled for
the effect that both may be explained by the general activity and engagement of the
participants in the overall platform, which could be refused. Therefore, both theory
and the results indicate that the introduction of social elements to RTD surveys raise
Subsequent Platform Engagement.
Limitations of the current work regarding the literature review are especially laid
in the bad accessibility of descriptions of many RTD platforms. Hence, only those,
which were described in literature, were considered. Limitations of the preliminary
experiment are the modest sample size and the questionable reliability of the self-for-
mulated construct Commitment, why strong implications should be made cautiously.
Future studies may better be based on previously validated constructs, e.g., “IS con-
tinuance intention” by Bhattacherje (2001). However, as these items also would have
required a reformulation to do justice to the round-base character of the study, it was
decided to formulate the items by our-self. Nevertheless, as RTD studies also high-
light the asynchronous character, pre-validated measures on general IS continuance
and retention independently of rounds may be the better fit for future studies. Lim-
itations of the field test are the lack of a control treatment, which was not possible in
the given context on the platform FAZ.NET-Orakel. Therefore, causality and corre-
lation cannot be finally distinguished. It is also to notice that bad comments (labeled
by the participants) were deleted between the first and the second rounds by the
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moderator to be consistent with traditional Delphi method, where this is usually
done by the researchers (Linstone and Turoff, 2011). However, this may also have
an effect that cannot be estimated in the current study design. In addition, though
a significant effect of positive social reputation on retention was shown, this does
not mean that it is just necessary to provide all participants with positive feedback
(potentially by the moderator). There is, probably, a certain trade-off between cred-
ibility and ludicrousness, which, however, can also not be derived from the current
study and should be subject to future research. At last, the field test should be repli-
cated in the future with increased observations and at several points in time to create
stronger evidence for the hypothesis and show a stable effect over time.
Nonetheless, the work at hand contributes in many ways to the current research’s
question, how to encourage participants to take part in knowledge sharing over a
long time. It enriches existing literature by formulating the DPs for RTD platforms.
In addition, the experiment and field test provided evidence in favor of the expe-
dience of the ninth DP in an experimental setting as well as with real-world data.
It was shown that implementing social elements in actual anonymous online set-
tings raised commitment and retention. So, considering the suggested ninth DP
helps researchers and practitioners to conduct RTD surveys more successfully, risk
less drop-outs, and at the same time raise commitment. This is related with less
cost and a higher probability of success. Further research may prove this claim to
be true for other knowledge management systems that require subsequent platform
engagement.
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Chapter 6
Improving Response Quality:
Cognitive Factors
Do not be deceived: God is not
mocked, for whatever one sows, that
will he also reap.
Galatians 6,7; ESV
Contents of this section are in part adopted or taken from Kloker (2016), Kloker
et al. (2017), Kloker, Straub, and Weinhardt (2017b), and Kloker, Straub, and Wein-
hardt (N.D.)
See Section A.1 for further details.
6.1 Problem Formulation
FIGURE 6.1: The presented research
project in this section addresses the
third source of errors according to
the JFIM: Cognitive biases.
The long-term success of any company and or-
ganization is based on the foresighted and good
decisions of its leaders and managers. This in-
volves investment decisions as well as the ap-
praisal of trends and potential challenges. In all
of such decision-making and forecasting, how-
ever, managers are prone to several cognitive
errors (Jones, 2014). Many strategic decisions
of managers are based on forecasts on the fu-
ture development of a certain issue. “Investing”
money in a bet on a football team can basically
be interpreted as the result of a forecast on the
winning team. The same is true for every other
investment decision.
In contrast to single expert judgments, group
forecasts have the advantage to be less suscepti-
ble to certain biases due to the fact that individ-
ual differences average out (Winkler and Moser, 2016). Stastny and Lehner (2018)
also demonstrated this in a business context, when all participants or experts had
access to the same extensive amount of information in form of a report. However,
some cognitive biases, such as partition dependence (defined in Section 6.2), still
occur systematically in prediction markets (Sonnemann et al., 2011). The occur-
rences of other (cognitive) biases, such as the home bias, the favorite-longshot bias,
or the yogi berra bias are reported by various authors (Luckner and Weinhardt, 2008;
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Woodland and Woodland, 2011; Page, 2012). In his popular science book “Thinking
fast and slow”, Daniel Kahnemann, Nobel memorial price laureate, summarized
his lifelong work on the psychology of judgment and decision-making (Kahneman,
2012). In this book, he attributes the occurrence of many biases, such as anchor-
ing and adjustment or the conjunction fallacy, that are often utilized in negotiation
strategies and advertisement, to a general inertia of our mind to become active. Kah-
neman (2012) attributes a certain laziness to the human mind that leads to the fact
that often simple “rules-of-thumb" and mental shortcuts, namely heuristics, are ap-
plied to many problems and decisions. Therefore, the occurrence of these cognitive
biases in human estimations often has nothing to do with an individual’s intellec-
tual capacity, but arguably lies with the “slothful nature” of systematic processing
(Gómez-Chacón et al., 2014). In this case our mind does not even consider all po-
tentially available and relevant information, but is led by a few heuristic cues that
are provided by the context or easy accessible in the memory. In the case of par-
tition dependence, this is the partition of the state space. However, a forecast that
is not based on all relevant and available information and is distorted by actually
irrelevant information is, in theory, not the best forecast on an event. In the case of
partition dependence, it can be demonstrated that the forecast is distorted towards
a uniform distribution in a non-rational manner, and therefore misleads forecasters
and decision makers. Bardolet, Fox, and Lovallo (2011) showed this effect in real-
world investment decisions of managers and Sonnemann et al. (2013) in the case of
group-based forecasting.
Dual-Process Theories, which have their roots in psychology and social sciences
research, provide a helpful explanation of this phenomenon (Evans, 2012; Watts,
2015). The fundamental idea of the Dual-Process Theories is that there are two dif-
ferent kinds of thinking, of which one is unconscious, fast, automated, and effortless
and the other is (at least partially) conscious, slow, and strenuous (induces high cog-
nitive load) (Evans, 2012). Mental shortcuts and cognitive biases are much more
likely to happen in heuristic processing. However, several moderators can stimu-
late or reinforce the use of systematic processing and help to reduce cognitive biases
(Watts, 2015). The complexity in which a task is presented is one example of a mod-
erator that can reinforce systematic processing. E.g., in order to create a forecast on
the next German Federal Elections, one may just ask people for the vote-share of
party XY (expectation polls1) or one may invite those people to a prediction market
on the vote-share of party XY. In the prediction market the participants first have
to translate their expectations into prices and orders and then trade, while the par-
ticipants in the first group just have to formulate their expectation. Therefore, pre-
diction markets are more complex than prediction polls. However, by this, they can
reinforce systematic processing. Zhang et al. (2013) also argues that humans may
achieve better results, if they were to consider problems deductively and with more
effort. The studies presented in this chapter address the occurrence of the partition
dependence bias in prediction markets from a Dual-Process Theories’ perspective.
Therefore, this chapter puts following research questions:
• Does complexity moderate the partition dependence bias in group-based fore-
casting tasks?
• Which further factors explain partition dependence in group-based forecasting
tasks?
1See Section 2.2.5 for an explanation.
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To answer these questions, two consecutive online experiments were conducted
that both showed significant partition dependence in their estimations. In both ex-
periments, however, the bias did not only occur as a cause of general theory of par-
tition dependence (partition of the state space), but yields strong proneness to other
factors. These are especially factors that are reported to be moderators for both, par-
tition dependence (Fox and Clemen, 2005) and heuristic processing according to the
Dual-Process Theories (Watts, 2015), e.g. expertise and motivation.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 presents se-
lected foundations on partition dependence and Dual-Process Theories. Section 6.3
and 6.4 introduce the methodology, hypotheses, experiment design, and results of
the two consecutive online experiments.
Section 6.5 discusses the results and places them within current research, as well
as it discusses the limitations. A brief summary of the contributions of this chapter
and further research opportunities concludes the section.
6.2 Related Work
6.2.1 Partition Dependence
Partition dependence is “[...] the tendency for the specific partition of the state space
to influence judged probabilities” (Sonnemann et al., 2013, p. 11779). This usually
leads to a distribution of probability estimations with a tendency towards a uniform
distribution (Fox and Clemen, 2005). The roots of research on partition dependence
lay in the pruning bias that occurs in “fault trees” (Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichten-
stein, 1978): In the Experiment 5 of Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1978), it could
be demonstrated that persons perceive the likelihood for one branch in a tree to oc-
cur lower than the sum of perceived likelihoods for the same branch when split up.
To give an example, let us assume two fault trees are designed to find the problem
of a car that does not start. A first fault tree may have three branches: Low battery,
engine failure, or other causes. A second fault tree may have four branches: Low bat-
tery, engine failure, damaged ignition coils, or other causes. The last two branches of
the second tree may be fused to the last branch of the first tree. However, experimen-
tal evidence shows that if two groups assess the likelihoods for the branches of one
tree, in average the sum of the assessed likelihood for the last two branches of the
second tree is greater than for the last branch of the first tree. This is also persistent, if
descriptions of the events were held constant (if the last branch of the first tree would
be called “damaged ignition coils or other causes”). This phenomenon is called the
pruning bias. Fox and Clemen (2005) generalized this phenomenon to the partition
dependence bias. Later, its existence was demonstrated in several other contexts
(Bardolet, Fox, and Lovallo, 2011; Tannenbaum et al., 2015; Sonnemann et al., 2013).
Bardolet, Fox, and Lovallo (2011) showed that this effect is not only attributable to
the fact that people lack of background knowledge in a certain field, but demon-
strated partition dependence in investment decisions of managers. With field and
experimental evidence and a sample of experienced managers, it was shown that
not the characteristics of the companies, but only the number of divisions of the pos-
sible options, led to a bias towards the uniform distribution. Fox, Bardolet, and Lieb
(2005) suggested that the partition dependence bias can be interpreted as a result
of diversification in multiple-item choices and can therefore occur in basically any
context and arbitrary tasks. However, Reichelson et al. (2017) argue that this is not
a satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon for two reasons: First, the effect could
also be demonstrated in single-item choices, where diversification was not possible
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(Tannenbaum et al., 2015). Second, Reichelson et al. (2017) report that they were
not able to replicate the experiment by Fox, Bardolet, and Lieb (2005) (“candy-bowl
task”) that was used to support this hypothesis. Therefore, it is assumed that an
alternative mechanism besides mere diversification is involved in the candy-bowl
task. All in all, Reichelson et al. (2017) argue that there is no support that partition
dependence occurs in arbitrary, rather than in conceptually coherent or meaningful,
tasks. Although, it is not yet quite clear which mechanisms lead to the partition de-
pendence bias, the bias occurs in a robust manner in judgmental forecasting tasks.
In addition, the bias does not “average out” in groups by aggregating many opin-
ions, as many other individual biases do (Winkler and Moser, 2016). Sonnemann
et al. (2013) demonstrated in several experiments based on prediction markets the
occurrence of partition dependence in forecasting tasks in various contexts. In these
experiments, participants were asked to forecast the likelihood that a yet unsettled
continuous variable will settle within a certain interval (e.g. the temperature at a
certain location and date below or above 0◦C). The continuous state space of the
possible outcomes was partitioned into three exhaustive and disjunctive intervals.
However, two groups of participants made their forecasts on two different sets of
intervals. This is schematically illustrated in Figure 6.2, where X is the state space
and i are the intervals.
FIGURE 6.2: Schematic partition of the state space and shift between
the groups.
The outer intervals (with subscript l or h) are open to the outer sides. In this
setting, it is possible to define a measure for partition dependence. The measure
of partition dependence pdx can be calculated by comparing the mean of prob-
abilities assigned to each interval p(i) to the overlapping intervals, e.g. pdx =
(p(i2l) + p(i2m)) − p(i1l). In the case of no partition dependence it is to assume
that the estimated probabilities for i1l should equal the estimated probabilities for i2l
and i2m. Partition dependence, however, would suggest a bias towards the uniform
distribution, which would lead to the situation that p(i2l) + p(i2m) > p(i1l).
Which factors moderate the occurrence of partition dependence (besides the par-
tition of the state space) is only rarely examined. Fox and Clemen (2005) described
in their paper that participants with greater substantive expertise show less partition
dependence and the effect may sometimes disappear when participants are particu-
larly knowledgeable. However, it is to assume that moderators for other cognitive
biases may also apply for partition dependence. Therefore, the next subsection will
have a closer look on the concept of the Heuristic Systematic Model, one representa-
tive of the Dual-Process Theories, which are usually used to explain cognitive biases.
6.2.2 Heuristic Systematic Model
Previous work on the role of judgment in forecasting, dealing with heuristics and
biases, focused on self-assessment (Harvey, 2007). Group decision-making or judg-
mental forecasting by groups is only rarely discussed. However, the relevance of
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heuristics in group-based forecasting is stated by Philip Tetlock, the initiator of the
Good Judgment Project. According to his view, “[...] the heuristics- and biases per-
spective still provides the best first-order approximation of the errors that real-world
forecasters make and the most useful guidance on how to help forecasters bring their
error rates down” (Tetlock and Gardner, 2015, p. 204). The Good Judgment Project
became famous by relatively accurate forecasts on a broad variety of topics utiliz-
ing “the wisdom of crowds”. In this context also different judgmental forecasting
methods were applied and compared, including averaging individual estimations
(expectation polls) or prediction markets.
The occurrence of biases is usually explained with the use of heuristics and men-
tal shortcuts during reasoning (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). When discussing
deductive reasoning, the idea of two fundamentally different kinds of thinking in
human information processing and reasoning is considered since the 1970 (Evans,
2012) and led to the so called Dual-Process Theories. The basic concept is that there
are two different kinds of thinking (Evans, 2012) from which one is unconscious, fast,
automated, and easy and the second is (at least partly) conscious, slow, and effort-
full (induces high cognitive load). Watts (2015) is summarizing where Dual-Process
Theories have been considered in the area of IS. In IS mainly two Dual-Process Theo-
ries are considered: The Elaboration Likelihood Model and the Heuristic Systematic
Model (Watts, 2015). Both models are variants of the dual-process approach and
vary mainly regarding wording (in order to fit certain contexts2). The naming of
the Elaboration Likelihood Model already suggests its use in the context of infor-
mation filtering and processing and is often used in Marketing research. The name
of the Heuristic Systematic Model is indicating the differentiation between heuris-
tic and systematic processing of information when opinions are built. As forming
estimations can be regarded as a subset of the tasks of forming opinions, the Heuris-
tic Systematic Model is a promising approach to explain the occurrence of biases in
current context. It also proved applicable in the context of IS (Meservy, Jensen, and
Fadel, 2013; Watts, Shankaranarayanan, and Even, 2009). The Heuristic Systematic
Model argues that “heuristic cues” trigger heuristic processing. Heuristic cues are
design elements or pieces of information that trigger heuristics and discourage peo-
ple from applying deductive reasoning since it takes more effort. An example of
such a heuristic cue is the partition of the state space. For this chapter, the word-
ing of the Heuristic Systematic Model will be applied and it will be differentiated
between “heuristic processing” and “systematic processing”.
There are several moderators that can initiate or reinforce systematic processing.
One such moderator comes in the form of warnings (Winkler and Moser, 2016). Ex-
pertise, personality, motivation, or external factors such as incentives, time pressure,
or task complexity can be considered as moderators as well (Watts, 2015) . Any-
thing that can influence cognitive capacity or effort can be considered as a possible
candidate for the role of a moderator (Watts, 2015) .
The connection between some moderators (e.g., expertise) to the use of system-
atic processing can be described as “direct”. Others, e.g. complexity, operate indi-
rectly by influencing the imposed cognitive load. It follows that it is also necessary
to understand the basic concept of the Cognitive Load Theory and how it is related
to the Heuristic Systematic Model. First, it is to differentiate between intrinsic cog-
nitive load, extraneous cognitive load, and germane cognitive load (Brünken, Plass,
and Leutner, 2003). Extraneous and germane cognitive load can be altered by the
2Different Dual-Process Theories usually also use different wording for the systems. Sometimes
they also use slightly different understandings of the interactions of the two, or more, types of process-
ing.
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design of the instructions, intrinsic cognitive load is a property of the task or mate-
rial itself (Brünken, Plass, and Leutner, 2003). Put simply, all this cognitive load is
distributed on scarce cognitive resources (capacity). When cognitive load matches
cognitive capacity we produce better results than if we do not use available cogni-
tive capacity. However, if several cognitive tasks use the same cognitive resources
we occur the phenomenon of cognitive depletion (Chen et al., 2017). Basically, this
means that our brain is overloaded and we fall back to the use of heuristics and,
therefore, are again prone to cognitive biases.
6.2.3 Biases and Complexity in group-based Forecasting
Group-based judgmental forecasting can have various forms (see Section 2.1.2). In
this section the focus is on prediction markets. There does exist a great body of
work to discuss and explain some of the forecasting errors that appear systemat-
ically with the occurrence of (cognitive) biases in prediction markets (Sonnemann
et al., 2011; Berg and Rietz, 2018; Cipriano and Gruca, 2014; Cowgill, Wolfers, and
Zitzewitz, 2009; Page, 2012; Luckner and Weinhardt, 2008; Woodland and Wood-
land, 2011). Some examples are the favorite-longshot bias (tendency to overvalue
longshots and undervalue favorites) (Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010; Page, 2012), con-
firmation bias (tendency to ignore conflicting information) (Pouget, Sauvagnat, and
Villeneuve, 2017; Cipriano and Gruca, 2014), the overconfidence bias (overestima-
tion of own skills or results) (Berg and Rietz, 2018), or – subject of this research – the
partition dependence bias (Sonnemann et al., 2013). There are different explanations
why each bias occurs based on market mechanism, market liquidity, information
spread, or motivation of participants3. However, yet there is not a clear explanation
for all biases in prediction markets, but Winkler and Moser (2016) showed that warn-
ing messages reduce some biases significantly. This already suggests that they hap-
pen during the information processing and estimation formation of each individual
(Winkler and Moser, 2016). In prediction markets, events with multiple outcomes
have to be presented as a set of different stocks. These different stocks are basically
a division of the state space, for which reason prediction markets are very prone to
this bias.
Besides the complexity of the topic (intrinsic cognitive load), the overall imposed
cognitive load of the forecasting task is moderated by the manner and mechanism in
that the estimations needs to be processed to be expressed (germane cognitive load)
(Chen, Li, and Zeng, 2015). Chen, Li, and Zeng (2015) argue in that the underly-
ing (market) mechanism has a huge influence on the cognitive load imposed on the
participant. Chen, Li, and Zeng (2015) classify different market mechanisms for pre-
diction markets according to their imposed cognitive load/complexity. They used
following dimensions for their classification: Pricing (auction vs. posted price), tim-
ing (dynamic price), revisiting (dynamic price), and benefit (dynamic payoff). Ac-
cording to Vakkari (1999), a task the complexity of a task rises, the more and longer
alternative paths to the solution exist and the less the solution is determinable. In
the case of prediction markets, a forecast cannot only be provided as the expectation
itself, but has first to be translated into prices. Then a strategy has to be found that
maximizes the expected payoff of trades given one’s expectation (for the moment
3For example, the favourite-longshot bias is attributed too low liquidity that leads to the situation
that in the border areas orders do not get matched, which can again be explained using the prospect
theory (Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010). Other explanations argue with the composition of the field
of participants (Feess, Müller, and Schumacher, 2014; Restocchi et al., 2018), the motivation of the
participants, and subsequently incentives (Servan-Schreiber et al., 2004).
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FIGURE 6.3: Basic research model for experiment 1 and 2 (based on
Watts (2015)). Complexity and other moderators’ influence to which
extent the heuristic cue (partition of the state space) affect the final
estimation.
and possibly for the future). Participating in a prediction market based on a CDA is
therefore “very” complex, while placing a bet on a betting page with predetermined
odds is less complex (Chen, Li, and Zeng, 2015). Markets featuring a market scor-
ing rule (e.g. the LMSR, see Section 2.2.5) are less complex than markets featuring a
CDA, but still more complex than posted-price markets (Chen, Li, and Zeng, 2015).
In markets with scoring rules, participants do not trade against each other directly,
but against an algorithm that adapts its offered price according to the bets of earlier
participants, minimizing his own risk. If considerations regarding manipulation,
signaling, or other strategies to take influence on other participants were left aside,
a dominant strategy is to buy or sell until either a participant has no more means, or
the offered price matches a participant’s expectation. Therefore, the translation of an
expectation into a price is much easier in markets with a market scoring rule than in
markets featuring a CDA.
6.2.4 Fusion of the Related Work into a Basic Research Model
Summarizing related work, the following research model can be formulated (adapted
from the standard Dual-Process Theories research models in IS from Watts (2015)).
The research model is illustrated in Figure 6.3.
It can be assumed that an estimation on a future event is optimal, if it represents
all the information that is available to the participants in an unbiased form. How-
ever, heuristic cues, such as the partition of the state space, distort this information.
In case of partition dependence, the estimations are biased towards a uniform dis-
tribution. The more a person is using his systematic processing, the effect of the
heuristic cue to distort the estimation is assumed to be decreased. The degree of
systematic processing is moderated by the imposed cognitive load. From this it is
derived that a more complex setting should stimulate systematic processing and re-
duce heuristic processing. Further moderators that may influence the occurrence of
the partition dependence bias are expertise as suggested by Fox and Clemen (2005),
motivation and personality traits as mentioned by Watts (2015), and experience with
markets.
While expertise, motivation, or experience with markets are properties of the
individual, complexity can be manipulated by the market mechanism. Based on the
previous section, it can be argued that a market featuring a LMSR is more complex
with regard to the definition of the sections above and puts more cognitive load on a
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participant than just providing one’s expectation in an expectation poll. According
to the Heuristic Systematic Model, it can be assumed that the occurrence of biases
should be less in the market with a LMSR (within certain boundaries). It is also
assumed that this is true for the partition dependence bias. In the classification of
Chen, Li, and Zeng (2015) this would mean to alter the pricing from “fixed” or “no
pricing” to “dynamic pricing”, and, therefore, the LMSR market comes along with
higher cognitive load. This two treatments have the advantage that the interfaces can
be designed very alike.
However, especially the effect of complexity is constrained by cognitive deple-
tion. Based on the Cognitive Load Theory and the phenomenon of depletion, theory
suggests that participants that are not used to markets may be over-strained and fall
back to heuristics. Meub and Proeger (2016) showed that complex forecasting tasks
(which induced high cognitive load) raised the susceptibility to cognitive biases (an-
choring) even in presence of monetary incentives. In addition, Sonnemann et al.
(2013) demonstrated the bias in prediction markets with continuous double auc-
tions, which are quite complex. The current work suggests to compare prediction
markets with a LMSR and simple expectation polls (Rothschild and Wolfers, 2013)
in an experiment, assuming that LMSR markets do not result in cognitive depletion.
6.3 Experiment 1
This preliminary experiment was designed and used to understand the relationships
between complexity and partition dependence, the applicability of the Heuristic Sys-
tematic Model, and other influencing drivers better.
6.3.1 Method
Stimuli & Design
The experiment consisted of three forecasting tasks on economic figures (DAX-30,
Diesel price, Deutsche Bank stock). Each economic figure can settle on a continuous
state space. This state space is divided two times into three disjunctive and together
exhaustive intervals, in such a way that the outer intervals are open to the outer side
and that they are shifted by the size of the inner interval (see Figure 6.2). Doing
so, one receives for every economic figure in the experiment a “high” and a “low”
partition (see Figure 6.2 and Table 6.1). Participants have to assess the probability
for each interval that the realization of the economic figure will fall into it. For the
intervals belonging to the same partition of the state space this probability has to
sum up to 100%. For each task, every participant faces either the low or the high
partition, never both. Therefore, partition dependence can be measured for each
forecasting task, as explained in Section 6.2. This experiment design is adapted from
Sonnemann et al. (2013), though they used markets featuring a CDA.
In experiment 1 three treatments are defined:
• In the first treatment the participants assessed the probabilities4 for each task
and interval in an expectation poll. This treatment is referred to as poll.
• In the second treatment the participants assessed the probabilities for each task
and interval in a market featuring a LMSR. Each participant was alone on this
4The probability that the realization of the event will fall into this interval.
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market. Therefore, the “initial” prices shown to the participant equaled the uni-
form distribution of probabilities over the intervals. This treatment is referred
to as lmsr1.
• In the third treatment the participants assessed the probabilities for each task
and interval in a market featuring a LMSR. The modification regarding the sec-
ond treatment is that the participants were not alone on this market. Therefore,
the “final” prices of the last participant were shown to the new participant as
the current market prices5. This treatment is referred to as lmsr2.
Lmsr1 and lmsr2 together are referred to as lmsr. The differentiation between
lmsr1 and lmsr2 allows to estimate the effect of anchoring in the market treatments
at least qualitatively. The experiment design results in six groups of participants
that were pseudo-randomly6 assigned to one of the three treatments and then again
pseudo-randomly to the high or low partition. Participants remained in their treat-
ment in all three forecasting tasks. Participants were not aware of different treat-
ments of intervals.
In line with Sonnemann et al. (2013), the participants were asked for an initial
estimation and a final estimation of the absolute value before and after each fore-
casting task. After the participants finished all forecasting tasks, they continued
with a “primary process test”7 as a proxy for the used type of processing, which is
based on Brakel, Shevrin, and Villa (2002). At the end a questionnaire on the basic
demographics was performed that also included two self-formulated questions for
each task. The questions asked (topic specific) if the participants have knowledge
in this specific topic (have seen or informed themselves on the current value) and
if they have experience in this specific topic (have a car or trade regularly)8. Both
questions are binary coded.
Therefore, the experiment procedure is as follows:
1. Assignment to the treatments.
2. Instructions for the forecasting tasks (treatment specific).
3. Forecasting task (3x; one time for each of the three topics).
• Initial estimation on the absolute value of the realization.
• Expectation poll or market to assess the probabilities for each interval
• Final estimation on the absolute value of the realization.
4. Primary process test.
5. Demographics questionnaire.
6. Debriefing.
Based on the considerations in Section 6.2, following three hypotheses were for-
mulated:
• H11: The value for partition dependence is lower in the lmsr treatments com-
pared to the poll treatment.
• H12: The portion of systematic processing measured by the primary process
test is higher in the lmsr treatments compared to the poll treatment.
5In the unlikely event that two or more participants would have entered the experiment at the same
time, participants would have seen each other trading. This, however, did not happen in current case.
6Participants were assigned to the treatments using round-robin according to the time of first entry
into the experiment. Due to a higher rate of drop-outs in the market treatments, the poll treatment was
closed and the rest of the participants were only distributed among the market groups.
7Implicit measurement of the current type of processing still very challenging (Samson and Voyer,
2012). Therefore, this experiment uses an explicit measures. The primary process test by Brakel,
Shevrin, and Villa (2002), though a measure of a personality trait, seemed promising.
8See Table A.3 for the complete list of items.
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TABLE 6.1: Three forecasting tasks of experiment 1 with partitions.
Question Partition
What will the price of one
liter Diesel (Aral,
Durlacher Allee) be at
12:00 am on Tuesday 20th
December 2016?
High <1.075 1.075 -
1.09
>1.09 e/l
Low <1.06 1.06 -
1.075
>1.075 e/l
What will the value of the
“Deutsche Bank” stock be
at the end of the trading
day Tuesday 20th
December 2016?
High 15.5 15.5 - 17 17 e
Low <14 14 - 15.5 15.5 e
What will the index of the
DAX-30 be at the end of
the trading day Tuesday
20th December 2016?
High <10850 10850 -
11000
>11000 Points
Low <10700 10700 -
10850
>10850 Points
• H13: High experience and knowledge lead to a lower value of partition depen-
dence.
Procedure
Students from a university group9, whose primary purpose is to talk and exchange
about stock markets, were invited to the survey and to forecast the realization of the
three economic figures at a the 20th December 2016. Based on their interest, knowl-
edge in the context of the three economic figures and trading in general can be as-
sumed. Roughly 300 students were invited, 60 responded (participation rate = 20%),
and 50 passed the selection criteria. Before the participants started with the forecast-
ing tasks, they had to read the full instructions and answer two control questions
to prove that they understood the task and, if applicable, how to trade reasonably.
Participants were excluded in particular when they did not provide all answers or
did not answer the control question correctly. The students were awarded the incen-
tive of three amazon vouchers assigned according to the forecast performance. The
chosen forecasting tasks and partitions for each question can be seen in Table 6.1.
In order to generate the intervals, one week before the experiment started, the
current value of the economic figures to predict were chosen as a “midpoint”. Based
on this, the intervals were set by an educated guess of a student in the field of eco-
nomics who regularly observed these prices. He was instructed to select the intervals
in such a way, the probability for the two inner intervals should be approximately
50%. The dimensions of the intervals were not crucial for the experimental setting,
as long as one interval would not receive almost 100% of the likelihood. Otherwise,
it would not be possible to measure partition dependence. By an educated guess the
width of the intervals should not be ill-sized in a dimension, where results should be
affected significantly. The participants could enter the experiment from the 9th until
the 19th December 2016.
The user interfaces are illustrated in Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5. In the poll treat-
ment, the intervals were presented as rows in a table in the first column. The second
column included input forms to insert the estimated probability for a realization of
9“Börsen Initiative Karlsruhe e.V.”
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FIGURE 6.4: User interface of the poll treatment in the first experiment
and the DAX-30 task.
FIGURE 6.5: User interface of the lmsr treatments in the first experi-
ment and the DAX-30 task. Lmsr1 and lmsr2 differ only in regard to
the shown starting price (here: “current price”).
the economic figure within this interval. In the lmsr treatments, the intervals were
also presented in the first column. The second column presented the current price,
and the third column the current stocks in the participant’s depot. In a fourth col-
umn the handles to buy and sell were provided. In addition, the trade of “bundles”
was possible with two more buttons below the table. A bundle is a package of one
stock of each interval that could be sold or bought for 1 MU (as the likelihood for
the realization of the economic figure in one of the disjunctive and together exhaus-
tive intervals equals 100%). A text below the table indicated the money currently
available to the user. Besides this the user interfaces looked similar.
After the forecasting tasks, the participants had to solve six “images” of the pri-
mary process test by Brakel, Shevrin, and Villa (2002), which were displayed one
after another. Finally the participants had to complete the demographics question-
naire and had the opportunity opt-in for the Amazon voucher lottery. They also
could opt-in to receive further background information on the experiment and its
findings.
The length of the online experiment depended on the setting. It took between
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roughly 4min and 30min (poll: in average 9.7 min, lmsr1 in average 14.4 min, lmsr2
in average 12.5, the difference between the poll and the lmsr treatments is significant,
the difference between the lmsr treatments is not significant). In addition, the time
it took to read the instructions was one of the main drivers for the length of the
experiment.
6.3.2 Results
50 (female: 7, no answer: 3) participants completed the survey. Due to some drop-outs
during the experiment, the distribution of participants over treatments is not com-
pletely equal (see Table 6.2). However, the distribution of gender, if applicable at
all, does not show a significant difference (test for equal proportions, p=.613). The
results for the partition dependence are reported in Table 6.2.
The overall forecasting error (deviation of average over all initial estimations and
the realization) was 0.034 in the poll treatment and 0.014 in the lmsr treatments (3.4%
and 1.4% of the absolute value). Therefore, it can be assumed that participants an-
swered reliably. The lmsr treatments showed a significantly lower overall forecasting
error (p=.031, Wilcoxon test, two-sided) than the poll treatment.
To test for H11, the partition dependence in the three treatments is compared. A
one-tailed10 Wilcoxon rank sum test was applied to evaluate whether the partition
dependence effect is significant. It has to be noted that current sample is missing
statistical power for the Wilcoxon rank sum test to robustly find significance due to
its small size and the presented reported p-values should be understood as trends.
A comparison of the partition dependence bias between the poll and the lmsr2 treat-
ment showed that the partition dependence was less in the lmsr2 treatment (ca. 0.01,
no partition dependence) compared to the poll treatment (ca. 0.15, weak partition
dependence). This finding supports hypothesis H11. Strong partition dependence
also occurred in the lmsr1 setting (ca. 0.23, strong partition dependence). This find-
ing would reject hypothesis H11 and is an unexpected outcome when contrasted to
lmsr2. This two contradicting results can be explained, when other disturbing fac-
tors are considered: It is presumed that this effect occurred due to the anchoring and
adjustment bias (Campbell, Sharpe, and Others, 2009). In the lmsr1 treatment, the
participants were shown an initial pricing of 33ct for each stock. This priming may
have been overloading the effect of the prior ignorance of partition dependence and,
subsequently, have led to the strong occurrence of the shift in the estimations. Son-
nemann et al. (2013) already warned of the occurrence of this effect. As in lmsr2 the
participants faced the estimation of their predecessor, this effect did not take place.
To test for H12, the results of the primary process test are compared over the
treatments. Based on the primary process test by Brakel, Shevrin, and Villa (2002), a
“score for systematic processing” (SP score) (= 1 - “score for heuristic processing”)12
could be calculated. According to this SP score, most participants were classified
into the systematic processing category. Participants seemed to choose pictures con-
sistently of either the heuristic or the systematic category. To test for H12 a simple
linear regression was calculated to predict the SP score based on the treatment. A not
significant regression equation was found (F(2,47)=0.82, p=.447), with R2 of 0.034. A
test for unequal distribution of heuristic and systematic processing also resulted in
10A one-tailed test was applied, as the theory behind partition dependence already induces the di-
rection of the effect.
11Significance codes for all analyses: 0.000 *** 0.005 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 n.s. 1
12“Rational” and “attributional thinking” in the wording of Brakel, Shevrin, and Villa (2002).
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TABLE 6.2: Values for partition dependence in experiment 1. Signifi-
cance11 of the partition dependence values is tested with a one-tailed
Wilcoxon test (sum of assessed probabilities of two neighboring in-
tervals is greater than the probability on the corresponding interval
in the other partition).
N Diesel price Deutsche Bank stock DAX-30
poll 21 0.12n.s. 0.18* 0.17.
lmsr1 15 0.25** 0.29*** 0.14***
lmsr2 13 0.06. -0.05n.s. 0.02n.s.
overall 50 0.14* 0.11* 0.15*
no significant unequal distribution (p=.213) between the poll and lmsr treatments.
Therefore, for now, H12 has to be rejected.
To test for H13, the self-reported scores for experience and knowledge are com-
pared over the treatments and tasks. Self-reported experience and knowledge for
the DAX-30 task was approximately double of the experience and knowledge re-
ported for the other tasks. The values for partition dependence for all treatments
are continuously lower in the DAX-30 task, which already suggests that H13 may be
confirmed. To evaluate this hypothesis, the participants for each task are split into
two groups according to their answers for experience and knowledge. In the expert
group participants reported both to be true, in the non-expert group participants
reported at least one to be false. In the DAX-30 tasks, experts occurred a weaker
partition dependence bias (0.10.) than the non-experts (0.19*). In the Diesel tasks,
experts occurred a stronger partition dependence bias (0.22**) than the non-experts
(0.11n.s.). In the Deutsche Bank tasks, experts occurred a weaker partition depen-
dence bias (0.14n.s.) than the non-experts (0.14.). Therefore, the results indicate
towards a confirmation of H13: Experts occur less partition dependence. However,
due to several limitations (small sample size, not equally sized groups of experts vs.
non-experts, questionable questions to query knowledge and experience) the results
should be understood as first promising insights. Therefore, H13 will be investigated
experiment 2 more in detail.
The results of experiment 1 should be considered under several limitations. First,
the sample size is yet not large enough to indicate more than trends. Second, it is
necessary to discuss for which reason theory and results diverge regarding the reject
of H12. It may be possible that a second type error occurred. Another explanation,
as already discussed above, is that the test of Brakel, Shevrin, and Villa (2002) actu-
ally is a measure for personality traits. Given these results, it may be possible that
the treatments could not take enough influence to induce an effect that would be
registered by this personality measure directly after the experiment. Therefore, it is
to conclude that the primary process test of Brakel, Shevrin, and Villa (2002) seems
not to be suitable to measure the effect of the treatments on the processing style at
the exact moment. Third, the results of the lmsr1 treatment may have been subject to
a strong anchoring and adjustment bias. Finally, a high rate of drop-outs in the lmsr
treatments was recorded, which may have led to a self-selection bias in the sample.
However, still it is possible to derive some meaningful conclusions and amendments
for the second experiment.
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6.4 Experiment 2
Based on the results of the preliminary experiment 1 and feedback that was received
from other researchers, the design of the first online experiment was reconsidered
and a second experiment was performed. Besides small changes in the forecasting
task, the focus is now also on further moderators of cognitive load (see moderators
in brackets in the research model in Figure 6.3) that seemed to have had an influence
in the first experiment. In addition, the sample of subjects was enlarged.
6.4.1 Method
Stimuli & Design
The design of the experiment consisted of two forecasting tasks. Following the
paradigm of experiment 1, in the first task the state space is partitioned two times
into three intervals, shifted by one interval (see Figure 6.2). The second forecast-
ing task did not implement a shift of the state space, but rather an extension of the
state space and is more comparable to the “fault-tree” setting in Experiment 5 of Fis-
chhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1978) (see Section 6.2 for further details). Therefore,
in the second task, the state space is partitioned one time into three intervals and one
time into four intervals. Here, the last two intervals of the more granular partition
equals the last interval of the less granular partition. In each task, all participants
had to estimate the probability of the outcome of an event (continuous variable in
the first forecasting task, discrete variable in the second forecasting task) falling into
the predefined intervals.
As in the first experiment, a poll treatment was conducted. In contrast to the
first experiment, only one lmsr treatment was conducted. The lmsr1 treatment from
experiment 1 was dropped, as it was not possible to distinguish between anchor-
ing and adjustment effect from the initial prices and effects induced by the partition
dependence bias. In addition, the lmsr2 treatment from experiment 1 was modi-
fied, resulting in a new lmsr3 treatment. In the new lmsr3 treatment, the participants
traded on a market against an “artificial” trader and not against “human” traders.
The initial prices were set to the uniform distribution (ignorance prior). After five
seconds, an artificial trader started trading. The underlying preferences of this trad-
ing equaled to the last inputs of a participant in the poll treatment. The artificial
trader traded the assets (intervals) in a random order and at random points of time
(bounded to 25 seconds at the latest). The introduction of other traders in the market
in the form of an artificial trader allowed the human participant to realize “profits”,
in case his estimation differs from the estimation of the artificial trader. The human
participant was informed in the instructions that there may be other traders in the
market. As the estimation of the artificial trader was taken from the last poll esti-
mation, it was ensured to be “reasonable” and “realistic” to some extent and, at the
same time, random. Thereby, it was ensured that the estimations in the lmsr3 set-
ting were more independent of each other13. This is important, as median splits on
the data based on diverse criteria will be performed for the evaluation. Participants
were randomly assigned to either the poll or the lmsr3 treatment.
Similar to Sonnemann et al. (2013), participants were asked for an initial esti-
mation of the absolute value before the forecasting task. The final estimation after
13In the lmsr2 treatment the estimation of a trader was influenced by the estimation of the previous
trader. This effect is reduced in the lmsr3 setting, as the first numbers shown to the trader always
equals the uniform distribution.
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each forecasting task was dropped, as participants in the first experiment reported
this as confusing. Before the forecasting tasks, participants answered a German ver-
sion14 of the Rational-Experience-Inventory Short-Version (10) (REI-1015)16 from Epstein
et al. (1996) and solved a conjunction fallacy problem from Tversky and Kahneman
(1983) (“Risky Choice”). It was intended to test their individual preference for ei-
ther heuristic or systematic processing. After every forecasting task, the participants
answered a questionnaire adopted from the questionnaire introduced by Trumbo
(2002), which measures the current (topic-specific) processing style. This question-
naire was adapted to each topic and translated into German17. Subsequently, a ques-
tionnaire regarding their topic-specific expertise was conducted. The items for the
construct expertise were self-formulated and as follows (translated from German)18:
• Could you tell someone a lot about this topic?
• Would you read a newspaper article on this topic?
• Do you think, a friend would ask you for help or advice regarding this topic?
• Did this topic already affect you?
Items were assessed on a seven point Likert-scale. Finally, participants received
a questionnaire regarding basic demographics and some further questions on expe-
rience with markets (self-formulated item), motivation (self-formulated item), and risk
(Dohmen et al., 2011).
Therefore, the experiment procedure is as follows:
1. Assignment to the treatments.
2. Rational-Experience-Inventory Short-Version (REI-10).
3. Conjunction Fallacy Problem (“Risky Choice”).
4. Instructions for the forecasting tasks (treatment specific).
5. Forecasting task (2x; one time for each of the two topics).
• Initial estimation on the absolute value of the realization.
• Expectation poll or market to assess the probabilities for each interval.
• Questionnaire to measure the topic-specific information processing style
(adapted from Trumbo (2002)).
• Questionnaire to measure the topic-specific expertise.
6. Demographics questionnaire (including questions on motivation and general
experience with markets, etc.).
7. Debriefing.
Based on the considerations in Section 6.2 and the results of the first experiment
(Section 6.3), the following hypotheses were formulated:
• H21: The value for partition dependence is lower in the lmsr3 treatment com-
pared to the poll treatment.
• H22: The portion of systematic processing is higher in the lmsr3 treatment com-
pared to the poll treatment.
• H23: High experience with markets leads to a lower value of partition depen-
dence.
14own translation
15The REI-10 measures the two reflective constructs “need for cognition” and “faith in intuition”
by five items on a 5 point Likert-scale from completely false to completely true. The five items were
selected from a longer version of the test (REI-42), selected by the highest factor loading each.
16See Table A.4 for the complete list of items.
17See Table A.5 for the complete list of items.
18See Table A.6 for the complete list of items.
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TABLE 6.3: Two forecasting tasks of experiment 2 with partitions.
(Union = U, SPD = S, Green Party = G, FDP = F)
Question Partition
What will be the price
of the next iPhone at its
introduction?
(translated from
German, in e)
High <950 950 -
1000
>1000
Low <900 900 -
950
>950
What will be the ruling
coalition after the next
Federal Election in
Germany? (translated
from German)
High U-S U-G U-F-G Others
Low U-S U-G Others
• H24: High motivation leads to a lower value of partition dependence.
• H25: High expertise leads to a lower value of partition dependence.
• H26: A high “systematic processing style” (low heuristic processing style) as a
personality trait leads to a lower (higher) value of partition dependence.
Procedure
The participants were asked to forecast the price of the next iPhone (2017) and the
members of the future ruling coalition19 after the next German Federal Election.
These topics were chosen according to the consideration that they might allow a
“relatively” clear distinguishing between knowledgeable participants (e.g., “Apple
user”) and not knowledgeable participants (e.g., “Android user”). The chosen fore-
casting tasks and partitions for each question are reported in Table 6.3.
The intervals/options were chosen by the educated guess of the experimenter
under considerations of the likelihood of the events. Therefore, the width of the in-
tervals should not be ill-sized in a dimension, where results should be affected sig-
nificantly. The task for the experiment was opened at the 21st June 2017 and closed
at the 7th July 2017. The experiment was conducted in the context of a research sem-
inar. Two students spread the invitation to the experiment that was hosted on local
servers. Participants were given the incentive of the chance to win one of ten vouch-
ers for a local ice-cream shop, popular among students, worth e55 in total. The
reach of the invitation could not be measured reliably, however, ca. 700 participants
opened the link in the invitation from which 109 person responded and 80 passed
the selection criteria. Participants were excluded when they did not provide all an-
swers, did not answer the control question correctly, or provided no or non-sense
values for most likely coalition, or the most likely price of the iPhone (lower e500
and larger e1500) during the initial estimation (free text answers), before the fore-
casting task. Before the participants started with the forecasting tasks, they had to
read the full instructions and answer two control questions to prove that they un-
derstood the task and, if applicable, how to trade reasonably.
In contrast to the first experiment the user interfaces and instructions for the
experiment were modified as follows:
19In the German election system usually no party is able to receive more than 50% of the votes.
Hence, several parties have to form coalitions in order to gain a majority in the parliament to be able
to govern.
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FIGURE 6.6: User interface of the poll treatment in the second experi-
ment and the iPhone task (in German).
• A grey placeholder text was added into the fields in the poll treatment of “1/num-
ber of options” (e.g., 33.3%), to ensure that both treatments face the same num-
ber at the first moment (see Figure 6.6).
• A small text at the bottom of the form was added in the poll treatment that sums
up the numbers provided in the fields, to ease the adding up (see Figure 6.6).
• The option to buy and sell bundles was dropped, as this option was only rarely
used in the first experiment. In addition, participants responded sometimes
that they did not quite understand the utility of these buttons. Finally, the ex-
planation of this functionality required a lot of space in the instructions, while
it provided only little added value.
• Participants were told and, therefore, aware of the fact that other participants
may see other intervals as suggested by Sonnemann et al. (2013) to lower the
effect of anchoring and adjustment.
The length of the online experiment depended on the setting. It took between
roughly 6min and 30min (poll: in average 12.2 min, lmsr3 in average 13.7 min, differ-
ence is not significant), potentially depending on how quick participants understood
the market.
6.4.2 Results
80 (female: 27) participants completed the survey. Due to some drop-outs, the num-
ber of participants over treatments is not completely equal (see Table 6.4). The gen-
der is equally distributed over the treatments20.
Due to the limited number of participants, the threshold for acceptable reliabil-
ity of the constructs was set to a Cronbach’s α of 0.7. For the REI-10 Cronbach’s α
was 0.86 (“faith in intuition” = heuristic processing) and 0.74 (“need for cognition”
= systematic processing). For the questionnaire of Trumbo (2002), Cronbach’s α was
0.79, 0.46, 0.82, and 0.74 (heuristic processing in iPhone tasks, heuristic processing in
coalitions task, systematic processing in iPhone task, systematic processing in coali-
tions task). Besides the construct “heuristic processing” in the coalitions task, that
did not exceed the threshold of 0.7, the results of these questionnaires can be used
in the evaluation. As all these constructs were pre-validated by other researchers it
is not clear why the necessary reliability could not be reached in one case. This case
will, therefore, be treated with caution in the discussion.
20A two-sample test for “equalitiy of proportions” (prop.test()) shows no significant inequality
(p=.250) regarding the gender.
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TABLE 6.4: Values for partition dependence in experiment 2. Signif-
icance of the partition dependence values is tested with a one-tailed
Wilcoxon test.
N iPhone coalitions
poll 45 0.16* 0.07n.s.
lmsr3 35 0.14n.s. 0.08n.s.
overall 80 0.15* 0.08*
The construct for expertise with self-formulated items received good reliability. In
the case of the iPhone task, the reliability of this construct was excellent (Cronbach’s
α=.92). In the case of the coalitions task, the reliability was still good (Cronbach’s
α=.85).
The values for partition dependence are reported in Table 6.4.
Both tasks showed a significant partition dependence bias that dissolves, when
the data is split according to the treatments. In the case of the iPhone task, the signif-
icance preserves for the poll treatment. In the case of the coalitions task, the signif-
icance dissolves in both treatments. The susceptibility of the significance indicator
to the split, indicates that for this kind of evaluation more data would be profitable.
Therefore, hypothesis H21 would be confirmed in the iPhone task, rejected for the
coalitions task. This discrepancy at this point is a strong indicator that the effect of
the partition dependence bias is not only moderated by complexity, but other mod-
erators that are addressed by the hypotheses H22-6.
In the coalition task, the measures for heuristic and systematic processing by
Trumbo (2002) between the poll and lmsr3 treatment did not differ significantly. In
the iPhone task, the measures for systematic processing by Trumbo (2002) between
the poll and lmsr3 treatment did not differ significantly. Heuristic processing was sig-
nificantly higher (p=.055). However, these results has to be treated with caution due
to the low Cronbach’s alpha (0.46). Nevertheless, these findings are consistent with
the partition dependence values that only differed in the iPhone task. Therefore,
both indicates towards a confirmation of hypothesis H22. Analogously to experi-
ment 1, the limitation has to be kept in mind that the measures of Trumbo (2002)
do measure the topic-specific degree of heuristic and systematic processing and not
necessarily the current state.
To test for the hypotheses H23-6, median splits on the overall data, not consider-
ing the treatments, are performed. However, it is necessary to discuss the limitations
of this procedure in advance in order to understand the results and their implica-
tions. Not considering the treatment would be legitimate if it can be assumed that
the treatment has no influence on the estimation. As shown in Table 6.4, this is only
the case for the coalitions task, but not the case for the iPhone task. Therefore, this
assumption cannot be finally verified. However, due to the fact that partition depen-
dence can only be measured by aggregating the estimations of a group, the control
for a treatment effect by using multivariate statistics (e.g. multiple linear regres-
sions) also disqualifies. This limits the implications derived of the data of the iPhone
task.
To test for H23, a median split on experience with markets, a 7 point Likert-scale
item collected within the demographics questionnaire (What is your experience with
markets: “low” to “high”), was performed. The participants were split by >4 (high)
and <=4 (low). Participants with high experience with markets showed no significant
partition dependence bias in both tasks. Participants with low experience with markets
showed weak significant partition dependence bias in both tasks (coalitions: p=.053;
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iPhone: p=.079). The reasoning behind this hypothesis argues that participants that
do not quite understand or do not feel comfortable with a market setting are more
likely to rely on heuristics. This hypothesis seems to be confirmed.
To test for H24, a median split on motivation, a 7 point Likert-scale item collected
within the demographics questionnaire (How did you perceive the survey: “both-
ersome” to “very interesting”), was performed. The participants were split by >4
(high) and <=4 (low). In the case of the coalitions task, a significant partition depen-
dence is found in the group with high motivation (p=.029), while no partition depen-
dence is found in the group with low motivation. In the case of the iPhone task, the
opposite pattern is found: No partition dependence in the group with high motiva-
tion and significant partition dependence in the group with low motivation (p=.005).
Therefore, the hypothesis is rejected.
To test for H25, a median split on the construct expertise was performed. The
participants were split by >4 (high) and <=4 (low). Participants with high expertise
showed no significant partition dependence bias in both tasks. Participants with
low expertise showed a (weak) significant partition dependence bias in both tasks
(coalitions: p=.015; iPhone: p=.088). These findings confirm hypothesis H25.
The results of the REI-10 showed, as expected, no significant differences between
the treatments. To test for H26, a median split (>=4 heuristic processing, >=4.125 sys-
tematic processing) on the REI-10 measures was performed. Participants with high
heuristic processing showed significant partition dependence in both tasks (iPhone:
0.19*, coalitions: 0.1.). Participants with low heuristic processing showed in both
tasks no significant partition dependence (iPhone: 0.10n.s., coalitions: 0.03n.s.). Ac-
cordingly, the partition dependence values for a median split for systematic pro-
cessing turn to be significant for the group with low systematic processing (iPhone:
.16*, coalitions: .12*) and insignificant for the group with high systematic processing
(iPhone: 0.12n.s., coalitions: 0.00n.s.). These results indicate that personality had a
much greater influence on the applied processing style of each individual partici-
pant than the different complexity of the treatments. Nevertheless, these findings
confirm hypothesis H26.
6.5 Discussion
The results of each experiment have been directly discussed in the corresponding
subsections of Sections 6.3 and 6.4. Persistently, in both consecutive experiments
the occurring of the partition dependence bias could be observed in the forecast-
ing tasks. The method of Sonnemann et al. (2013) to measure partition dependence
proved expedient. The new method to add an option, as suggested in the second
experiment, which was more leaned at the “fault trees” setting, showed less parti-
tion dependence. Yet, it cannot be estimated if this is due to the difference between
numerical intervals and discrete options, more expertise in this topic in general (Fox
and Clemen, 2005), or other factors. The new method is, therefore, suggested for
evaluation in further experiments.
Both experiments showed that complexity, as a suggested moderator of extrinsic
cognitive load, seems to moderate the occurrence of partition dependence according
to the Heuristic Systematic Model. The two experiments suggest that this hypoth-
esis is true, though the measurement and confirmation proved to be difficult. A
definitive confirmation would need an elaboration with more statistical power and
a more reliable measure for the current processing style. The presented experimen-
tal evaluations especially lacked of an implicit or valid explicit measure of current
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cognitive load (or type of processing) at the moment of the experiment. Therefore, a
laboratory experiment may be considered in future research, which allows to apply
physiological measures. Suggested measures are, e.g., the measurement of pupil di-
lation (Brünken, Plass, and Leutner, 2003). Jung and Dorner (2018) are applying the
measurement of arousal to distinguish between the processing styles in the context
of decision inertia, another cognitive bias in decision-making.
The results of the first experiment indicated that complexity was not capable to
fully explain the occurrence of partition dependence, for which reason the second
experiment design controlled for several more moderators. The resulting data sup-
ports the moderating effect of expertise: High knowledgeable individuals are less
susceptible to partition dependence. The results also support the hypothesis that a
high experience with markets leads to less partition dependence. This effect can be
attributed to cognitive depletion (Chen et al., 2017). Individuals without experience
with markets do not quite understand the strategy to realize (financial) profits by
trading according to an optimal strategy and fall back to the use of heuristics (and
heuristic processing). Motivation was also suggested as a moderator of partition
dependence (high motivation leads to low partition dependence) (e.g. Watts, 2015).
This could not be confirmed. However, it cannot be assured that the two treatments
provided sufficient diversity on the range of motivation. In the presented experi-
ment, motivation was measured by a single item self-assessment scale. In future
research this should be further broken down in order to differ between motivation
induced by the treatment and intrinsic motivation induced by the topic. Heuristic
and systematic processing as a personality trait proved to be a strong moderator
to the occurrence of partition dependence, potentially stronger than the processing
style induced by the implemented treatments. One can derive two conclusions from
this: First, the treatments should be designed even more different regarding “com-
plexity” in order to increase the influence on the processing style (e.g., using a CDA).
This, however, comes with the risk of triggering cognitive depletion. The strong oc-
currence of partition dependence in Sonnemann et al. (2011) and Sonnemann et al.
(2013) can be regarded as a hint towards this conclusion. Second, the complexity
of the task should only be regarded as one of many moderators on the processing
style and always be examined within the context of other moderators. With this ev-
idence, it may be suggested to detach the complexity from the market mechanism
towards the complexity induced by the “expression of probability estimations in
form of (real) money” (Levin, Chapman, and Johnson, 1988).
Finally, the Heuristic Systematic Model (as one representative of the Dual-Pro-
cess Theories) proved to be a valid framework to explain the occurrence of the parti-
tion dependence bias partly in forecasting tasks. Though it is not possible right now
to rank the moderators according to their share on the occurrence of partition depen-
dence, expertise and the personality trait towards a systematic processing style seem
to explain a significant portion of the effects. Such a ranking might be achieved by
future work and a dedicated experiment design towards this question. Nevertheless,
the presented experiments can be regarded as an exploratory study on the applica-
bility of the Dual-Process Theories to explain this phenomenon. Hereby, this chapter
shed first light on future pathways in this research field. There remains the need of
addressing each individual moderator more in detail. There remains also the need
to evaluate other cognitive biases in managerial decision-making, besides partition
dependence, from the Heuristic Systematic Model perspective.
Some limitation have already been addressed within the results of each exper-
iment. First, the modest sample sizes in both experiments put a strong limitation
to the measurement of the strength of the effects. Especially as the measurement of
Chapter 6. Improving Response Quality: Cognitive Factors 91
partition dependence is not possible on an individual’s level, a larger sample would
probably make the effects more consistent. Second, Brakel, Shevrin, and Villa (2002)
showed that heuristic and systematic processing as a personality trait are subject
to change during a lifetime. All participants in both experiments were students.
Therefore, it is not possible to exclude that some moderators do have different im-
pact in other samples (e.g., managers). Third, both attempts to measure the current
processing style (primary process test by Brakel, Shevrin, and Villa (2002) and the
self-reporting questionnaire by Trumbo (2002)), do not seem applicable to measure
the current processing style beyond doubt. Finally, the REI-10 and the measures by
Trumbo (2002) were translated into German in the second experiment to ensure that
the participants understood each question. It may be necessary to re-validate these
questionnaires in case that they will be used in the future again.
6.6 Conclusion on Cognitive Factors
In this chapter the occurrence of partition dependence in the context of forecasting
was demonstrated and additional evidence to the existence of this phenomenon is
contributed. The necessity to carry out more research to understand the occurrence,
as well as driving and moderating factors was underpinned. The presented exper-
iments and some other academic work demonstrated the persistence of partition
dependence in decision-making. However, only little research was done regarding
the negative effects of partition dependence on the outcomes of biased investment
decisions and forecasting, though the problem is undeniable (Bardolet, Fox, and Lo-
vallo, 2011). This study utilized the framework of the Heuristic Systematic Model to
explain and understand the occurrence of partition dependence. The results of the
two consecutive experiments demonstrated its applicability. It also contributed to
the current research on partition dependence by reproducing the findings of other
authors that expertise decreases the influence of partition dependence (e.g. Fox and
Clemen, 2005). Though it was not finally possible to demonstrate that complexity
induced by the mechanism of estimation submission influences the type of process-
ing and, thereby, partition dependence, the chapter still demonstrated the effect of
several other moderators (e.g., expertise, “need for cognition”, and experience with
markets). Especially an individual personality trait towards systematic processing
(or heuristic processing) lowers (raises) the probability to be susceptible to partition
dependence.
Here, a focus was laid on partition dependence, which is, however, not the only
cognitive bias that may be explained by approaching findings from the Dual-Pro-
cess Theories. By applying the Heuristic Systematic Model to explain the partition
dependence, this chapter also contributes first conceptual work towards a deeper
understanding of the cognitive biases in group decision-making and forecasting and
in the context of IS from a Dual-Process Theories’ perspective. The presented exper-
iments showed that there is not one main driver for the processing style. The effects
and moderators mentioned in the current study need to be evaluated in future re-
search more in detail to provide resilient and quantifiable evidence. There probably
won’t be a serum against cognitive biases in the near or far future, therefore, de-
cision makers, forecasters, prediction market traders, and so on should be advised
to be aware of potential irrational influences, such as the partition dependence bias.
Using markets for expectation elicitation or training decision makers regarding indi-
vidual expertise and personality may be some options to reduce its effect. However,
they do not moderate its existence completely.
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Chapter 7
Improving Response Quality:
Motivational Factors
You shall not steal; you shall not deal
falsely; you shall not lie to one another
Leviticus 19,11; ESV
7.1 Problem Formulation
Contents of this section are in part adopted from Kloker et al. (N.D.).
See Section A.1 for further details.
FIGURE 7.1: The presented research
project in this section addresses the
fourth source of errors according to
the JFIM: Motivational biases.
In Section 2.2 the wide adoption of predic-
tion markets in political and organizational de-
cision making was already emphasized. Com-
panies like HP, Deutsche Telekom, Google, Ya-
hoo, General Electrics, and numerous others
use prediction markets to support their idea
and innovation management, idea generation
and project monitoring (Bothos, Apostolou, and
Mentzas, 2009; Cowgill, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz,
2009; Graefe, Luckner, and Weinhardt, 2010; La-
Comb, Barnett, and Pan, 2007; Mangold et al.,
2005; Soukhoroukova, Spann, and Skiera, 2012;
Spears and LaComb, 2009; Rohrbeck, Thom, and
Arnold, 2015). In many of these cases large fi-
nancial resources are allocated, reputation and
sometimes even jobs are tied to these decisions.
However, when the stake is high, many stake-
holders are willing to exert influence wherever possible which leads to manipula-
tive and fraudulent attempts on the market. This also applies to prediction markets,
which have a high potential to influence decisions and even public opinion through
their forecasts (Rhode and Strumpf, 2008). The most advanced prediction markets
have a fraud (and manipulation) detection software component that runs continu-
ously on the market, scans every interaction and transaction, and looks for fraud-
ulent patterns (Kloker and Kranz, 2017; Schröder, 2009; George Mason University,
2015). Especially, but not only, in play-money prediction markets patterns that wear
out one account in favor of one or more other accounts are observed (Blume, Luck-
ner, and Weinhardt, 2010). The aforementioned algorithms detect such patterns, but
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are limited to the following aspects: They only find (1) known fraudulent patterns
and (2) cases of suspected violations of the rules of the prediction market.
The first limitation, the problem of limited creativity in fraudulent pattern recog-
nition of rule based algorithms is a problem that is regularly observed during the
operation of a prediction market. Fraud is a phenomenon that especially (but not
only) occurs in play-money prediction markets. In the FAZ.NET-Orakel, e.g., sev-
eral cases were observed, where a single participant created multiple accounts and
started to transfer money from one to another account by applying different trad-
ing patterns. Some of these fraudulent trading patterns are described in literature
(Blume, Luckner, and Weinhardt, 2010) and are usually already implemented in the
detection algorithms of current prediction markets. Anyway, a not known number
of further patterns is not and prediction market operators are regularly surprised by
the creativity of fraudulent participants.
This, however, is not the complete problem. The second limitation is even more
problematic and deals with trading behavior, which is obviously manipulative on
the one hand, but not punishable or demonstrable on the other. On a regular basis,
literature or anecdotal evidence from the FAZ.NET-Orakel provide reports of cases,
where a trader trades contracts of specific, often left- or right-wing political parties
as if their expectation for this party would be a vote-share of, e.g., 85%. As these
parties usually receive around 5%, reasonably it is to assume that the trader raised
the price of this contract for other purposes than behaving as a “homo economicus”,
e.g., promoting the party1. However, right now a prediction market provider has no
remedies against this obviously manipulative behavior that potentially harms the
accuracy of the forecast, as he cannot accuse participants for having certain opinions.
The trader can claim this in the event of a countermeasure by the market provider
and knit accusations of suppressing freedom of opinion. Such cases can be observed
in literature, but also in the current prediction market FAZ.NET-Orakel (Kranz et al.,
2014; Hansen, Schmidt, and Strobel, 2004; George Mason University, 2015).
The peril of manipulation is one of “the five open questions about prediction
markets” (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006a) and “[...] is recognised [!sic] as a potential
stumbling block to wide scale practitioner adaption” (Buckley and Doyle, 2017, p.
612). Problems from other contexts, with comparable properties are addressed in
literature, e.g., regarding fraud in elections or in crowd-work tasks (Hirth, Hoßfeld,
and Tran-Gia, 2011; Bader, 2013). These previous works suggest and utilize to crowd
to detect and address manipulative and fraudulent issues. As prediction markets are
a crowd-based tool as well, a crowd-based approach for manipulation and fraud de-
tection seems promising and feasible. However, how to design and operate such a
tool is an open question. In addition, there is no quantitative evaluation nor qualita-
tive experience of the general applicability in existence.
To tackle these problems, an IT artifact was implemented in the prediction mar-
ket FAZ.NET-Orakel and, therefore, subject to several constraints regarding the de-
sign, functionality, communication, and participants. To do justice to this specific
context, the ADR methodology by Sein et al. (2011) was applied. The ADR method-
ology addresses two challenges (Sein et al., 2011, p. 40): (1) addressing a problem
situation encountered in a specific organizational setting by intervening and eval-
uating; and (2) constructing and evaluating an IT artifact that addresses the class
of problems typified by the encountered situation. In addition, designing ensemble
artifacts, according to ADR involves dimensions beyond the technological, as they
are also the result of design efforts regarding the contextual factors throughout the
1See Section 7.2.1 for a discussion on other reasons.
Chapter 7. Improving Response Quality: Motivational Factors 94
FIGURE 7.2: ADR Method: Stages and Principles. Adapted from Sein
et al. (2011, p. 41).
design process. This meets both, the restrictions by the industry partner, and the
specific problem. As manipulative and fraudulent actions cannot be induced inten-
tionally within this context, controlled evaluation efforts are difficult to design and
conduct. ADR helps to address this important issue adequately at this point. Figure
7.2 illustrates the ADR method according to Sein et al. (2011). The phase of eval-
uation is not divided from the implementation, as the implementation is already
strongly driven by non-neutral interventions of the context of the subsequent eval-
uation. The phase of reflection and learning (3) is an ongoing process during the
problem formulation (1) and implementation (2).
ADR emphasizes not to address problems merely as software engineers, who de-
velop a program, nor merely as organizational consultants, who would only address
the social level, but the intersections and interactions (Sein et al., 2011). Therefore,
the current work does not only suggest a tool for detecting manipulation and fraud,
but also considers what is necessary to run such a tool successfully. The central
problem is classified into the class of monitoring in the context of ambiguous and rare
events.
In the sense of Sein et al. (2011) the problem is addressed of a socio-technical
perspective and three distinct, but interwoven research questions, are formulated
that should be addressed by the artifact:
• (I) How to enable the crowd to detect creative manipulative and fraudulent pat-
terns in contexts where (training) data is sparse and events cannot be induced
intentionally?
• (II) How to decide on ambiguous manipulative and fraudulent cases that are
not obviously against the rules.
• (III) How to ensure a continuous and reliable operation of such an artifact?
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The objective of the current research is to define DPs for this class of problems and
illustrate design considerations and implications, as well as consequences and ex-
periences from the designed artifact. The remainder of this chapter is structured
as follows: Section 7.2 references the current state-of-the-art in academic research
in manipulation and fraud in prediction markets and, thereof, derives the detailed
problem (problem formulation). In addition, it identifies and explains underlying
kernel theories and refers to approaches to similar problems in other contexts. Sec-
tion 7.3 then explains the considerations behind the suggested approach, as well as
the context (project partners and organization) and the course of events. Section 7.4
describes the Building, Intervention, and Evaluation (BIE) phase of the ADR project
and the IT artifact in detail. Section 7.5 then derives DPs based on the findings, states
limitations of the artifact development and evaluation, and draws up future research
possibilities.
Section 7.6.1 then switches the focus from detection to prevention and considers
the role of motivation and incentive engineering and puts a fourth research question:
• (IV) How to design prediction markets in order to prevent manipulation and
fraud?
Section 7.6.4 briefly introduces and summarizes the design adaption derived from
previous considerations on the FAZ.NET-Orakel to prevent manipulation and fraud.
7.2 Related Work
Contents of this section are in part adopted from Kloker and Kranz (2017) and
Kloker et al. (N.D.).
See Section A.1 for further details.
In the first part of this section, Principle 1 of the ADR methodology is fulfilled,
Practice-Inspired Research, as it starts by reviewing the current academic discussion
regarding manipulation (and fraud) in prediction markets2. First, the discussion
regarding short- or long-lived effects of manipulation on forecasting accuracy is
emphasized and summarized, where it is concluded that long-lived effects on the
forecasting performance are not common but possible and, therefore, may cause
problems for the innovation processes in companies, political judgment, or organi-
zational decision-making in some cases where the stakes are high. Thereafter, cases
of manipulation and fraud are summarized in order to give the reader an impres-
sion on the dimensions of this phenomenon. Third, the cases in the FAZ.NET-Orakel
are described. Finally, current fraud detection strategies are briefly discussed and a
need for other approaches is derived, which results in the problem formulation.
In the second and third part of the current section, Principle 2 of ADR is fulfilled,
Theory-Ingrained Artifact, as generalizable theories are identified from previous work
in IS regarding crowd-sourcing, decomposition of complex problems and creativity,
especially Type V theories (Design and Action) (Gregor, 2006). Where necessary, the
search for kernel theories also falls back on kernel theories from social psychology
regarding motivation. In addition, literature on manipulation and fraud detection
in other contexts is summarized.
2Literature that solely focuses on manipulation of the outcome as observed by Ottaviani and
Sørensen (2007) and described in addition by Kloker and Kranz (2017) is explicitly excluded, as this is
not fraud within the bounds of prediction markets, though it may be motivated by them.
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7.2.1 The Problem of Manipulation and Fraud in Prediction Markets
Distinguishing Fraud and Manipulation
In line with Schröder (2009) this dissertation distinguishes manipulation from fraud
in prediction markets: Manipulation is a “[...] speculative attack that achieves its ob-
jective of changing prices” (Rhode and Strumpf, 2008) and at that, playing according
to the rules3. Fraud is a speculative attack by using measures that are not accord-
ing to the rules. The objective of fraud may comprise several more objectives than
changing prices.
Manipulation is an inherent challenge for prediction markets for several reasons.
“Investors” can distort the predictions (prices) away from the fundamentals, e.g.,
only in order to influence the expectations and actions of others (Rhode and Strumpf,
2008). According to Rhode and Strumpf (2008, p. 1f), “[...] the potential reward from
a successful manipulation can far exceed the financial resources needed to imple-
ment it.” Let us consider the case of PSMs4: The current prices are often regarded
as the true odds and therefore can influence the decisions of voters that are unwill-
ing to support a politician that is not likely to have a real chance. Changes in the
prices that make the politician appear to be in a competitive position, according to
the predictions, “[...] require relatively small stakes [...] but can shape a very large
outcome [...]” Rhode and Strumpf (2008, p. 1f). To put it in other words, in PSMs,
manipulators want to influence the choice of undecided voters (Rhode and Strumpf,
2008; Hansen, Schmidt, and Strobel, 2004). Higher visibility raises the likelihood to
be subject to manipulation (Rhode and Strumpf, 2008). In addition, prediction mar-
kets often do not prohibit trading by insiders (Rhode and Strumpf, 2008) that are
capable to generate large profits from distorted prices. However, there is consen-
sus that in most prediction markets usually manipulation does not intend financial
gains for the time being, but is interested in the feedback effect of the prices (Rhode
and Strumpf, 2008).
Does Manipulation harm Accuracy?
Especially regarding the effect of manipulation on prediction market prices some
research was done and is still ongoing, with a preliminary slight consent that ma-
nipulation has no long-lived effects (Buckley and Doyle, 2017) on the accuracy of the
predictions, though this cannot be finally concluded.
Based on the observation of real-world data from the TradeSports prediction
market, Rhode and Strumpf (2008) “[...] find little evidence that political stock mar-
kets can be systematically manipulated beyond short time periods.” This, however,
is the prevailing opinion in literature (among others shared by Wolfers and Zitzewitz
(2004) and Camerer (1998)). Oprea et al. (2008) studied the accuracy of forecasts by
a third party based on information from manipulated markets. They concluded that
the forecasts of the third party were not affected, though even half of all traders were
given an incentive to change the third parties forecast. Hanson, Oprea, and Porter
(2006) showed in an experiment that manipulation has no long-lived effects on mar-
ket prices, if non-manipulative traders suspect manipulators to be active and are
aware of their incentive and the direction of their actions. Hanson and Oprea (2009)
3“A successful manipulation is usually not possible unless the trades influence the beliefs of other
market participants (An investor’s beliefs are defined with respect to the fundamentals, as well as the
future actions and beliefs of other investors).” (Rhode and Strumpf, 2008, p. 6)
4Political Stock Market
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developed a theoretical model of incentives and manipulation and even highlight
the liquidity-providing effect of manipulation5.
In contrast to this tenor, Deck, Lin, and Porter (2013) argued that previous find-
ings were all based on market settings, where manipulators suffered financial losses
associated with their trading. Consequently, Deck, Lin, and Porter (2013) demon-
strated in the same setting as Oprea et al. (2008) that well-equipped manipulators
with high incentives can distort market prices to a level that (third party) forecast-
ers are misled to predictions that are no better than random guessing — provided
that inexperienced traders exist in the market. In this setting, Deck, Lin, and Porter
(2013) observed two further interesting findings: First, the manipulative traders of-
ten ended up with positive trading profits (which is quite counter-intuitive and con-
cerning) and, second, primarily the bids were influenced, while the asks remained
informative.
Recent studies on manipulation in prediction markets focus on markets featur-
ing a market scoring rule6. In this context Buckley and Doyle (2017) conclude in line
with literature in traditional market settings that manipulation has no lasting im-
pact on market prices. They demonstrated these findings in a field-experiment with
67 undergraduate students and 16 manipulative accounts. An earlier study with
markets based on market scoring rules was performed by Jian and Sami (2012). In
a two-participant market setting it was demonstrated that manipulative strategies,
such as “bluffing” or “delaying” lead to a slower convergence of the market price but
no further differences. However, Chen et al. (2015) demonstrated a successful ma-
nipulation in a market featuring a LMSR. Their setting included, exogenous instead
of endogenous7 incentives and similar to Jian and Sami (2012) only two traders. This
was already suggested by Chen et al. (2007) in theoretical considerations for dynamic
parimutuel markets and markets featuring a LMSR.
Summing up, it can be concluded that prediction markets can be manipulated to
(at least) some extent and that this is potentially dependent on several properties of
the individual context, such as the incentives.
(Further) Cases of Manipulation
In this section some cases of manipulation and or fraud that are reported in literature
are summarized in order to gain an understanding of relevant factors and facets. A
further collection of the numerous cases is provided in Table 7.1.
Rothschild and Sethi (2016) found suggestive evidence in the 2012 U.S. Presiden-
tial Elections in favor of Romney (against Obama) on the prediction market Intrade.
A manipulator opened orders with a volume exceeding the rest of the order book
on the election day. Prices did not return to the previous level within the next few
hours. Though the manipulator invested a lot of money, it was still less than one
would pay for a prime time commercial.
Rhode and Strumpf (2008) and Luskin (2004) report a similar case in the 2004 U.S.
Presidential Elections in favor of Kerry (against Bush). A manipulator spent $20.000
on the TradeSports prediction market to manipulate the price in the night of the
first debate, knowing that the market has a huge impact on the public opinion. The
contract for Bush was dropped from 54 to 10 percent. However, the price returned
to 54 within 6 minutes. Two of this patterns happened directly after the second and
5This is also suggested by the results of Deck, Lin, and Porter (2013).
6See Section 2.2.5 for an explanation of market scoring rules.
7Endogenous incentives are provided by the markets, e.g. profits. Exogenous incentives are pro-
vided from outside the market, e.g. decisions (Hall, 2010).
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third presidential debates, possibly “[...] to create the false impression of winning
momentum for John Kerry” (Luskin, 2004, p. 1). Hardford (2007) and Wolfers (2007)
suspect a case in the 2007/2008 U.S. Preliminaries in favor of Clinton. The last case
was such a controversial one, that Koleman Strumpf, a well-known researcher on
prediction markets, was not even sure, if this was really manipulation (Wolfers, 2007;
Newman, 2010).
What many of these cases teach us and Rhode and Strumpf (2008) outline, is,
that a manipulative attack may not only be successful if the prices were changed. If
the intention was to generate media coverage or drive the momentum for a certain
candidate, they may have been successful.
A very controversial discussion on manipulation was initiated by the proposed
introduction of the Policy Analysis Market in 2003 that is described, among other, in
Hanson, Oprea, and Porter (2006). The market was intended to forecast geopolitical
events, such as the occurrence of terror strikes. Several authors indicated the hazards
that may be caused by manipulation in this market.
TABLE 7.1: List of reported cases of manipulation/fraud in prediction
markets.
Reference(s) Description & Findings
Manipulation
Rhode and Strumpf
(2008) and Rhode and
Strumpf (2004)
Analysis: Manipulation in the historical political mar-
kets in New York City between 1880 and 1944 in
a comparison from betting odds and market prices.
Though manipulative attempts can be supposed, they
were not associated with large permanent effects in
the prices.
Camerer (1998) Experiment: Studied manipulation in horse-racing.
Observed effects that very fast tended to a net effect
close to zero.
Rhode and Strumpf
(2008)
Experiment: Placed random bets on IEM (real money)
in advance to the 2000 U.S. Presidential Elections that
intended to mimic “insider” information. In total, it is
suggested, that long-term market dynamics were not
influenced.
Newman (2010) Analysis: Prediction market IEM for the 2000 U.S.
Presidential Elections. A group of trader raised the
price for Buchanan.
Hanson, Oprea, and
Porter (2006) and Wolfers
and Zitzewitz (2004)
Discussion: A prediction market to forecast geo-polit-
ical events, such as terror strikes, was supposed, but
the project was canceled before its start due to several
critics.
Rhode and Strumpf
(2008), Luskin (2004),
and Newman (2010)
Analysis: Manipulation by few large investors causes
price drops in the Bush contract in TradeSports (real
money) for the 2004 U.S. Presidential Elections. How-
ever, prices quickly (6 minutes) returned to their prior
level and the trades were not profitable for the manip-
ulators.
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TABLE 7.1: List of reported cases of manipulation/fraud in prediction
markets.
Reference(s) Description & Findings
Wolfers and Leigh (2002) Discussion: In the 2001 Australian Federal Election
candidates bet on themselves at long odds in order
to create buzz. No long-lived effects were observed
(Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004, p. 119).(Note: A check in
the original source was conducted, but it was not successful
to find the report in Wolfers and Leigh (2002))
Hanson, Oprea, and
Porter (2006)
Lab Experiment: Manipulators and normal traders
forecast some figures, while all participants are aware
of the incentives of the manipulators and the direction
of action. In this setting, there were no effects on the
market price.
Schröder (2009) Analysis: Prediction market from Neue Zuercher
Zeitung Online for the 2007 Switzerland National
Elections. Media partners reported that the market
was manipulated and that these participants were
blocked. However, at least one trader still influenced
the price of the Green Liberal party (consistently).
Hardford (2007), Wolfers
(2007), and Newman
(2010)
Analysis: Manipulation in favor of Clinton in the U.S.
Preliminaries 2007/2008. This case was controversial,
regarding if this was real manipulation.
Newman (2010) Analysis: Prediction market Intrade for the 2008 U.S.
Presidential Elections. Price of McCain contract was
raised by 10 points by a “single large investor”.
Obama contract fall at the same time significantly.
This also opened arbitrage profits when coupled to
BetFair.
Cowgill (2006) from
Rhode and Strumpf
(2008)
Discussion: An employee admitted to attempting to
manipulate Google’s internal prediction market. With
no effects.
Oprea et al. (2008) Lab Experiment: Manipulated markets does not lead
to worse forecasts by third parties.
Hanson and Oprea
(2009)
Theoretical model: Manipulation has no long-lived ef-
fects on prices and even raise market efficiency due to
its liquidity providing effect.
Veiga and Vorsatz (2010) Lab Experiment: In few cases the presence of an un-
informed robo trader helps a manipulator to success-
fully raise prices. In most cases there is no effect.
Deck, Lin, and Porter
(2013)
Lab Experiment: Manipulated markets do lead to
worse forecasts by third parties (same setting than
Oprea et al. (2008), well-equipped manipulators with
high incentives)
Jian and Sami (2012) Lab Experiment: Several markets with two partici-
pants were tested. Manipulative strategies such as
“bluffing” and “delaying” lead to slower price con-
vergence, but no further differences.
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TABLE 7.1: List of reported cases of manipulation/fraud in prediction
markets.
Reference(s) Description & Findings
Chen et al. (2015) Lab Experiment: Markets with two participants were
performed. If there are strong outside incentives it
may lead to situations where manipulation is possi-
ble.
Buckley and Doyle
(2017)
Field Experiment: 67 undergraduate students traded
on a LMSR prediction markets (play money). The re-
searchers used 16 manipulative accounts (4 per mar-
ket) to drop the price. The effects were short-lived.
Huang and Shoham
(2014)
Simulation: A prediction market with a market scor-
ing rule is simulated. Agents know about the ex-
istence and direction of manipulation with various
probability. If they are not aware of manipulators, the
price may be influenced.
Rothschild and Sethi
(2016)
Analysis: Manipulation by two large investors causes
drops in the Obama contract in Intrade (real money)
for the 2012 U.S. Presidential Elections in the night at
the election day. Prices did not fully return to the pre-
vious level within the given time frame in which no
new information were available. The cost for the at-
tack was lower than that of a prime time commercial.
Fraud
Bohm and Sonnegard
(1999)
Analysis: Prediction market SEUPSM for the Swedish
EU Referendum 1994. In a one-month competition
shortly before the end fairly high monetary prizes
were offered. Two coalitions formed in order to win
the money (both won the prizes). “Shallow” markets
were used for shifting money. No long-lived effects
on accuracy.
Hansen, Schmidt, and
Strobel (2004) and New-
man (2010)
Analysis: Prediction markets Wahl$treet and
Wahlboerse for 1999 Berlin State Election. The
forecasts were published by local newspapers. A
party animated their members to raise the forecast
for their vote-share to influence public opinion.
The attack was only successful in Wahl$treet, as in
Wahlboerse there was a delay in account activation.
Blume, Luckner, and
Weinhardt (2010) and
Blume (2012)
Analysis: Prediction market STOCCER for the FIFA
World Cup 2006. Several accounts were observed
transferring money from a sacrificing account to a
beneficiary. Assume temporary influences on market
prices.
Schröder (2009) and
Franke, Hoser, and
Schröder (2008)
Analysis: Prediction Market PSM for the 2006
Baden-Wuerttemberg State Election. Two coalitions
were observed.
George Mason Univer-
sity (2015)
Analysis: Prediction market SciCast to predict global
developments 2012-2015. 14 fraudulent accounts
were identified that intended to win the prizes. In ad-
dition bots are discussed to prevent cheating.
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TABLE 7.1: List of reported cases of manipulation/fraud in prediction
markets.
Reference(s) Description & Findings
Kloker and Kranz (2017) Analysis: Prediction market Kurspiloten to predict
economic figures in 2011. Several fraudulent accounts
were identified that intended to win the prizes.
Cases of Fraud
The probably best known case of fraud in prediction markets happened during the
Berlin State Election 1999, reported by Hansen, Schmidt, and Strobel (2004). Two
prediction markets were running (Wahl$treet and Wahlboerse) of which the results
were published by local newspapers. The FDP, an economic liberal German political
party, likely to fail the 5% hurdle in this specific election, animated their members
to enter these markets in order to raise the forecast for their vote-share to influence
public opinion. Though it may also be argued that this is just a further case of manip-
ulation, all accounts/members were somehow controlled by the FDP headquarters
and therefore can also be regarded as sibyls8, which would be against the rules of the
prediction markets. The attack was only successful in Wahl$treet, as in Wahlboerse
there was a delay in account activation and, therefore, the attackers were not able to
trade soon enough.
Real coalition building in order to win monetary prizes and with no interest in
the accuracy or the result of the prediction is reported by Bohm and Sonnegard
(1999). Bohm and Sonnegard (1999) operated the prediction market SEUPSM for
the Swedish EU Referendum 1994. In a one-month competition, shortly before the
end, fairly high monetary prizes were offered. Two coalitions formed in order to
win the money of which both succeeded and won the first two prizes with a clear
distance to the third place. Bohm and Sonnegard (1999) noted, that especially the
shallow “BLANK” market was used for shifting money. A pattern for coalition trad-
ing is explained. The fraudulent attack had no long-lived effects on accuracy, though
Bohm and Sonnegard (1999) emphasize that the rise of public interest in prediction
markets makes them more prone to the influence of certain interest groups and that
this may cause a real hazard to the accuracy of future prediction markets.
Blume, Luckner, and Weinhardt (2010) and Blume (2012) observed fraud in the
prediction Market STOCCER for the FIFA World Cup 2006. Several (sibyl) accounts
or coalitions were identified. All intended to win the prizes and had no interest in the
market forecast. Irregular coalitions were also reported for the 2006 Baden-Wuert-
temberg State Election by Schröder (2009) and Franke, Hoser, and Schröder (2008).
The George Mason University (2015) describes in their technology report in de-
tail how 14 fraudulent accounts were detected in the SciCast prediction market. The
SciCast prediction market is a combinatorial prediction market in which each ques-
tion is represented by a LMSR market. The markets are connected in a Bayesian
network and can therefore be answered conditioned by the outcomes of other mar-
kets. Several properties and features are described that may be used for a fraud
detection algorithm, though such an algorithm was never implemented in SciCast.
Instead, a visual collusion matrix was used as a starting point for manual fraud de-
tection. The George Mason University (2015) emphasizes, as many other authors,
8Sibyls are defined in detail in Section 7.2.3.
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that high monetary incentives are a major cause of fraud. In addition, it is suggested
that the community of honest trader may be mobilized to observe and monitor right-
ful behavior. It is also noted that the publishing of blocked users immediately led to
virtually no further fraud. Finally, the “intentionally losing” account is also charac-
terized as a manipulative or fraudulent pattern.
Kloker and Kranz (2017) introduced the Fraud Cube to characterize manipula-
tive and fraudulent attacks in order to help prediction market operators to get a bet-
ter understanding of underlying motivations and common patterns. A rule based
detection algorithm is suggested and demonstrated on historical data of the Kurspi-
loten prediction market. The Fraud Cube is explained in detail in Section 7.6.1.
Manipulation and Fraud in the FAZ.NET-Orakel
In the recent example of the FAZ.NET-Orakel, both was observed: Manipulation
and fraud. Fraud was virtually existent in markets in all categories. After identify-
ing and locking fraudulent and manipulative accounts, attempts were undertaken
to contact the fraudulent traders in order to gain a better understanding of their
thoughts. Some revealed interesting insights yet not described in literature. In one
case, the operator was able to contact one fraudulent trader (multiple accounts) for a
semi-structured phone interview (this case will be picked-up in Section 7.6.4). When
asking for his motivation, the fraudulent trader stated that he perceived himself as a
knowledgeable trader in the context of economics. However, due to the broad top-
ical spectrum, he did not see his knowledge reflected in the ranking and therefore
cheated in markets other than economic figures. Some other fraudulent accounts
(though overall the minority) responded in an e-mail. One trader mentioned the
fact, that he enjoyed seeing the figures and forecasts represent his expectations. Just
for this reason he performed some trades to influence the displayed forecasts, even
if they may have been obviously loosing.
Manipulation was observed for the 2017 German Federal Election only rarely
until the last weeks, where suddenly a small group of participants started to raise
the price (or prediction) of the AfD9 in four large attempts. Three of the four attempts
happened in the last week before the election, one large within the last eight hours
(see Figure 7.3). The strategy was comparable in all four cases: A small group of
traders started to buy everything on the sell side of the order book according to
their purchasing power in the corresponding market and set high block-orders on
the buy side at the same time. The last manipulative attempt was finally prevented
by some truthful users that blocked the sell side with several large orders. As stated
above, literature provides and explanation for this behavior: Manipulators want to
present their preferred party as an “electable option” (Hansen, Schmidt, and Strobel,
2004; Rhode and Strumpf, 2008). They rely hereby on the idea that many people
do not interpret the market predictions as what they are, but as results of election
polls (Hansen, Schmidt, and Strobel, 2004). After a confrontation of these accounts
by email, the manipulative accounts denied these accusations. However, a simple
internet search of their user names quickly allowed to link at least two accounts
directly to members of the aforementioned political party.
In theory manipulative attempts are short-lived. However, this does not justify
a position that no countermeasures are necessary. Even temporary and short-lived
changes in the prediction accuracy can lead to changes in beliefs of participants and
(mis)reports of these false predictions in other media such as newspapers and social
9Alternative für Deutschland, German right-wing, conservative, anti-European political party.
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FIGURE 7.3: Manipulative attacks on the AfD stock on the FAZ.NET-
Orakel. On the left side in a time span of the last four weeks, on the
right side in a time span of the last eight hours.
media, which can influence voters and predictions10. In addition, some publications,
demonstrated that given strong exogenous incentives, manipulation may even be
finally successful (Deck, Lin, and Porter, 2013; Chen et al., 2015). In addition, fraud-
ulent attempts, at least if they are perceived by the rightful traders, lead to a strong
discouragement and frustration of other traders.
Current Detection Mechanisms
So far, only two implemented approaches of detection mechanisms are described in
detail in literature, though there are reports on many others. Blume, Luckner, and
Weinhardt (2010) identify two patterns that indicate fraud: The “ping-pong heuris-
tic” and the “prominent edge heuristic”. Blume, Luckner, and Weinhardt (2010)
further developed an algorithm and figures to detect and quantify occurrences of
those patterns. In a later publication, same researcher introduced a graph based im-
plementation of these algorithms to enable prediction market operators to find fraud
faster (Blume, 2012). In this implementation, Blume (2012) represented participants
as nodes and transactions as edges. A more sophisticated approach was presented
by Schröder (2009) and Franke, Hoser, and Schröder (2008). Schröder (2009) creates
“Hermitian Matrices” and calculates “Eigenvectoren” and “Eigenspaces” in which
anomalies and especially predefined patterns can be identified. Kloker and Kranz
(2017) and the George Mason University (2015) advocate also to include account
properties, such as IP-addresses or creation dates, into algorithms for manipulation
and fraud detection.
Problem Formulation
To conclude the academic research, there is an urgent need of further detection and
prevention mechanisms. Rule-based algorithms fail due to a lack of creativity and
machine learning is not applicable due to sparse data. Especially regarding manip-
ulation and controversial cases prediction market providers lack applicable instru-
ments to deal with. There is also a lack of research regarding which design features
hinder or promote fraud and manipulation (Rhode and Strumpf, 2008, p. 37), be-
sides some papers that suggest the existence of strong outside incentives to promote
manipulation.
The ADR paradigm starts by the problem formulation (Sein et al., 2011). To the
best of author’s knowledge the nature of the current problem, however, was yet
not captured within an existing class of problems. The understanding of Dresch,
10This happened in the current case as well: http://www.faz.net/-gv6-922fq
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Lacerda, and Antunes (2015) is applied with regard to what is considered “class of
problems”. The current problem has several properties: i) Manipulative and fraudu-
lent traders always find new and creative strategies or generate a large understand-
ing of the detection software to bypass detection. ii) There is not enough labeled
data to train machine learning approaches. iii) There is an undesired behavior that
is, however, not arguably or obviously against “the rules”. iv) There is no “ground
truth” available, as there may be cases of fraud or manipulation that were not de-
tected yet or controversial regarding their (true) nature. Regarding some properties,
the problem is actually very similar to those of sibyl detection in social networks
or task approving in crowd-sourcing. Therefore, an appropriate class of problems
would be monitoring and an appropriate subclass monitoring in the context ambiguous
and rare events.
7.2.2 Kernel and Design Theories
Garcia-Molina et al. (2016) summarize different design elements that were frequently
used in the field of Data Crowdsourcing. Data Crowdsourcing and the current prob-
lem (monitoring in the context ambiguous and rare events) are to some extent very sim-
ilar, for which reason the collection of Garcia-Molina et al. (2016) can be considered
a basic design theory for the current research project. Though several dimensions
for classification are introduced and explained, some limitations regarding porta-
bility have to be considered. A clear distinction between the current problem and
those addressed by Garcia-Molina et al. (2016) is the degree of creativity needed,
the granularity of the tasks, and the incentives. Garcia-Molina et al. (2016) have a
slight focus on labeling tasks, previously decomposed problems, and monetary in-
centives11. Within the class of data processing tasks, filtering problems are defined as
one type of typical crowd-sourcing tasks. In general, according to Garcia-Molina et
al. (2016) a data crowd-sourcing application has to fulfill four steps: (1) Prepare and
initialize the data for the worker (define the tasks), (2) decompose and aggregate the
data, (3) manage the worker (boredom, experience, etc.) and (4) optimize the task
fulfillment or assignment with prior or external information. Design implications
from the first step are to define an interface that supports the user in solving the
problem and also in providing the solution. Design implications from the second
step are to design an application that provides sufficient information or even trains
the user for the task. Design implications from the fourth step are to include access to
existent information from computed sources (e.g., the implemented fraud detection
algorithm in the FAZ.NET-Orakel) or other users12. However, the current problem is
different with regard to step two as it is not possible to identify a single transaction
as fraudulent without its context of other transactions. Therefore, it is not possible
to previously decompose the problem and offer the participants one transaction af-
ter each other, but to allow the participants to decompose and navigate through the
problem by themselves at the granularity they need. In addition, in the understand-
ing of Garcia-Molina et al. (2016, p. 903), all problems could “[...] in principle be
solved by a single worker”. In the current problem of fraud and manipulation, it
was argued that the crowd is explicitly needed for the reason as it is assumed that
a single worker does not have enough creativity to recognize all possible fraudulent
11Their focus is on data augmenting and data processing tasks in which the coordinator is a com-
puter, workers are human, and the output is labeled data (training sets).
12Though, it has to be mentioned that crowd-sourcing settings are also subject to the bandwagon
effect (Eickhoff, 2018).
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and manipulative patterns. Therefore, fostering creativity is also a key challenge of
the suggested tool.
Voigt, Niehaves, and Becker (2012) summarizes different design theories for Crea-
tivity Support Systems (CSS). The focus of these CSS is on information systems that
support the creative process (e.g. idea creation). As the current problem also in-
volves a certain degree of creativity, some of the facets or the kernel theories may
add value for the design of the suggested artifact. Norman (1998) (The Design of
Everyday Things) emphasizes that in order to foster creativity it is important to un-
derstand the user’s task and its proceeding in solving it and to design the task/in-
terface in such a way that the task is enjoyable. Design implications from this are the
necessity of an understanding of the task, but even more, in order to foster creativity,
to design the tool as enjoyable as possible, potentially “playful”. Playfulness is also
mentioned in the “Unified Design Theory for CSS” by Voigt, Niehaves, and Becker
(2012)13. Further, CSS have to ensure comprehensibility (a rapid and clear under-
standing) and specialization (support the special purpose). Both confirm the design
implications from step one, two and four of Garcia-Molina et al. (2016): The interface
has to be created as simple as possible to ensure rapid understanding and task com-
pletion, add informative or training material and, add computed information where
possible.
Candy (1998) identifies “[...] working with visual data such as images, drawings,
sketches, diagrams, charts, graphs, [...]” as one important design feature for CSS.
Further she mentions collaboration as important for creative work. Voigt, Niehaves,
and Becker (2012, p. 170) derive from Candy and Edmonds (1995) three explicit de-
sign principles, one of relevance for us: “Exploration & Evaluation Support reflected
in the activities of [...] examine data, which is supported by providing holistic views,
multiple representations of data, visual data annotation, and concurrent processes
[...]”. The design implication of this DP in CSS is that the suggested tool has to en-
able its users to freely navigate and explore the data in order to promote creativity.
At best, using a visualization that results in a “natural graphical interaction” (Voigt,
Niehaves, and Becker, 2012, p. 170). The self-selected granularity, though this ef-
fect is not expected to be to large, in addition, may result in a balancing of skill and
challenge level with respect to the Flow Theory (Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi,
2014) and therefore foster performance and motivation. This effect is for example
observed in online games (Hsu and Lu, 2004).
Regarding the continuous operation of such a tool one has to consider the incen-
tives. Garcia-Molina et al. (2016) focus on monetary incentives, but also define the
other options on the incentives dimension: Entertainment, learning, philanthropy,
and “hidden”. There exist plenty of kernel theories regarding monetary incentives
and task performance or monetary incentives and creativity. And, associated, a
lively discussion. Erat and Gneezy (2016) find that monetary incentives are more
likely to reduce creativity. The Motivation Crowding Theory (Frey and Jegen, 2001)
also suggests that monetary (extrinsic) incentives are “crowding-out” intrinsic moti-
vation. Though learning or philanthropy cannot be expected and the operator does
not have the financial power to subsidize the tool in the long run, it has to be fully
relied on entertainment14. Further sources of motivation may be social components
(Online Community Building, Kim (2000)) or, in current special case, the “hunger
13“Playfulness is the property of a tool to encourage unfettered trialability in design, helping the
user to push intermediate solutions to final results iteratively.” (Voigt, Niehaves, and Becker, 2012, p.
159)
14“Hidden” is not defined further in Garcia-Molina et al. (2016) and the it is not finally clear, what
exactly is meant by it.
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for justice”. Experience showed that many participants wrote e-mails to the admin-
istrator, when they perceived that other participants cheated. In Section 5, it was
summarized how social elements can increase motivation (and retention). Although
the remarks there were made in the context of Real-time Delphi, many of the under-
lying kernel theories may be true here as well. In addition, it is also perceived to
be relevant to ensure anonymity among the participants in this context to suppress
hostilities. The design implication thereof is to implement spaces for discussions
and add labeling (e.g. likes and dislikes) in the suggested tool.
7.2.3 Crowd-sourced Fraud Detection in other Contexts
Most research on fraud detection in the context of crowd sourcing and utilizing the
crowd was done regarding how to validate submitted work from crowd workers,
such as in Amazon Mechanical Turk or comparable platforms (Xintong et al., 2014).
As one of the earliest approaches, Hirth, Hoßfeld, and Tran-Gia (2013) suggested
two models to perform this task by the crowd, of which only the second approach
is somehow related to current problem statement. A task, after submitted is split
into parts and each part is forwarded to other crowd workers to rate the submitted
work (to given criteria). The main task is accepted, if the majority of rates have
been positive. This approach, however, does not require any creativity in finding
fraudulent patterns, as they only rate according to given criteria and there is no
need to consider sequential actions. Many other approaches to detect invalid work
or invalid tasks followed (Baba et al., 2013; Kittur et al., 2013).
Almendra and Schwabe (2009) was one of the first to implement a pilot study
where the crowd (non-specialized people) was used to detect fraudulent accounts in
an online auction context. They were shown different seller profiles as they may be
on an online auction platform and had to decide which profiles may be fraudsters.
Here the task for the crowd workers included much more creativity and required
them to consider different attributes simultaneously. While human computation de-
livered very good results in simple tasks, it is stated that fraud detection “[...] is
certainly more difficult than giving descriptive labels for images” (Almendra and
Schwabe, 2009, p. 302). In regard to their first question, whether this task is feasible
at all for the crowd, the results were very promising, though not yet generalizable.
The second question put by Almendra and Schwabe (2009), whether the cost of this
method (reward for the crowd) is below the potential savings, is, however, subject
to further research.
In the context of “citizen sensing” crowd-sourced fraud detection was used, e.g.,
during elections. In Bader (2013), the crowd was used to collect information about
fraud during the 2011-2012 Russian Election. The Russian people were asked to
report all kind of fraudulent actions they observed during the election and to collect
them on an online portal called “Karta Narusheniy”. There, the reported cases were
categorized and visualized. Shayo and Kersting (2017) applied a similar method in
the 2015 Tanzanian Election.
Another stream of research in this context deals with the identification of web
threads. In an experiment, Moore and Clayton (2008) evaluated the wisdom of
crowds regarding the detection of phishing websites. Sharifi, Fink, and Carbonell
(2011) implemented the idea in a browser plugin. Besides phishing websites the
plugin also means to detect all kind of web threats. Besides the votes and com-
ments of the crowd, this data is combined with machine learning approaches and
natural-language processing. The plugin featured a bookmarking system with ques-
tion-answering functionality to promote wider user participation.
Chapter 7. Improving Response Quality: Motivational Factors 107
Frequently the idea to use the crowd to detect misconducting behavior is dis-
cussed in the context of online social networks. Ghosh, Kale, and McAfee (2011), e.g.,
are discussing this issue and corresponding problems. The work also mentions the
problem when not all raters of the crowd are trustworthy and suggests an algorithm
to solve this problem. This problem is indeed universal to many crowd-sourced de-
tection tasks. While Ghosh, Kale, and McAfee (2011) is focusing on abusive content
in online social networks, Wang et al. (2013) apply a method to use crowd-sourcing
to detect sibyl accounts. Sibyls are fake accounts in online (social) networks and
regularly used to spread spam, malware, (false) information, or to push topics. In
recent years, sibyl accounts became more and more professional. In this context, the
study of Wang et al. (2013) compared the detection quality of the crowd (Amazon
Mechanical Turk) compared to experts. Though the result of the crowd was vary-
ing but good, experts produced near-optimal results. Wang et al. (2013), therefore,
showed that the crowd is capable to evaluate fraudulent behavior that includes a
certain degree of creativity on the fraudsters’ side and without a “clear schema” to
check the object of interest. However, a combined approach with the crowd and
experts would yield superior performance, which, subsequently, is introduced by
Wang et al. (2013).
There is some literature, how the crowd is utilized to create fake reviews for
products. Only few papers deal with the use of the crowd to detect such reviews15.
Harris (2012) compared a crowd-based approach versus machine-based approaches
and found that “[...] the combination of human-based assessment methods with
easily-obtained statistical information generated from the review text outperforms
detection methods using human assessors alone” (Harris, 2012, p. 87).
If the focus is only put on contexts, where financial transactions have to be mon-
itored, there have also been several applications of crowd-sourced fraud detection.
Theodoulidis and Diaz (2012) advocates “crowd monitoring” to ensure compli-
ance in high frequency markets. Though the method itself is not described in de-
tail (and not validated), the work mentions some interesting assumed advantages,
among others: “Consequently such crowd-monitoring agents will be capable to ana-
lyze more complex scenarios, including possible new HFT [(high frequency trading)]
based manipulations, and or cross-border and cross-asset ones” (Theodoulidis and
Diaz, 2012, p. 11).
Matti, Zhu, and Xu (2014) developed a tool that identifies potential fraudulent
persons via twitter by checking all new tweets matching a list of words (e.g., bank-
ruptcy, fraud, etc.) and rechecks these persons in transaction databases of, e.g., credit
card institutions. The Guardian, a British online magazine, created a public database
of more than 700,000 expense claims of the members of the UK parliament to search
for the public (Kramer Mayer and Hinton, 2010). Some 20,000 participants joined
the search and fueled a national scandal.
Noteworthy is also the patent by Anderson and Ross (2014). A tool for “Collab-
orative Fraud Determination and Prevention” in the context of financial transaction
is suggested. Several “reviewing entities” (e.g., merchants) can pool and share cus-
tomer and transaction data to a central database/platform. They share their data
already labelled in fraudulent and non-fraudulent transactions that is joined accord-
ing to the customer with the provided data of other reviewing entities. Future trans-
actions can be validated based on all data using a “fraud determination query” that
takes the information of all merchants into account. An interesting feature is that the
reviewing entities can be rated by other reviewing entities along several dimensions,
15Though the companies such as Amazon are very likely to employ humans for such tasks.
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FIGURE 7.4: Schema for IT-Dominant BIE for current ADR research
project. Adapted from Sein et al. (2011, p. 42).
among others reliability and trustworthiness. So, in this case the data and the task
of quality control over the participants is crowd-sourced – not the “fraud determi-
nation” itself. However, the platform also contains some functionality to generate
some reports automatically.
7.3 Method
Contents of this section are in part adopted from Kloker et al. (N.D.).
See Section A.1 for further details.
Based on the considerations in the preceding Section 7.2, an artifact for crowd-ba-
sed detection of manipulation and fraud was developed following the ADR method-
ology.
In this section the course of events for the BIE (Building, Intervention, and Eval-
uation) phase is presented. In addition, the context (partners and organizations) of
current research project and relevant methodical considerations will be defined and
explained. The implementation details of the artifact will be addressed in Section
7.4.
The IT-dominant schema was applied for the current project, as the end-users of
the tool are not within the researchers, nor the partner’s organization (IISM, FAZ-
.NET), but customers at the same time. Following the suggestion of the IT-dominant
schema, two cycles were performed. The adapted BIE process is illustrated in Figure
7.4.
The FAZ.NET-Orakel is described thoroughly in Section 3.2, for which reason
this section will only briefly repeat the most important points. The prediction market
FAZ.NET-Orakel features predictions regarding politics, economic figures, sports,
and other current events of interest. The FAZ.NET-Orakel is online since March
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2017 and more than 1600 users traded at least one time. The FAZ.NET-Orakel re-
ceives high public visibility, as the FAZ.NET regularly publishes articles on the cur-
rent forecasting competitions and results. This is especially true for articles on elec-
tions. If one searches the internet regarding the 2017 German Federal Election and
the FAZ.NET-Orakel one finds both, announcements from people to manipulate the
prices of the AfD stock16 or calls to prevent predictions to come true17. The predic-
tion market is publicly available to all readers of the FAZ.NET and beyond, though
trading is tied to a FAZ.NET account that can be created free by any holder of an
e-mail address. The registration and verification process is performed by a subcon-
tractor of FAZ.NET, for which reason the market operator does not have any in-
fluence on the technical implementation and process. This subcontractor, however,
does not filter spam- or trash-mail addresses or verify anything beyond the e-mail
address18. As the prediction market is operated within the brand FAZ.NET, the de-
sign is adapted to the corporate design. In addition, a high importance is given to an
intuitive usage and simple market design. The ranking features an algorithm that
allows participants to enter the competition to a later point of time and still have rea-
sonable chances to end up in a high rank (if he performs very good). As described
in Section 5 the market also features Delphi-studies.
The FAZ.NET-Orakel features a state-of-the-art fraud detection algorithm de-
rived from Blume, Luckner, and Weinhardt (2010) that monitors every transaction
for the “Ping-pong” pattern and therefore identifies obviously loosing transactions.
The algorithm distributes “suspicious points” to accounts for suspicious transac-
tions (as suggested by Kloker and Kranz (2017)). If an account receives more than
three points within 24 hours, it is displayed a warning message, saying that the ac-
count shows irregular trading behavior and encouraging the holder to reconsider
his transactions (see Section 7.6.4 for more details). If an account receives more than
five suspicious points, it is immediately locked. In addition, the market operator
checks once a week if different accounts used same IP-addresses.
The ADR team consists in the inner circle of the ADR researcher, developer and
operator of the FAZ.NET-Orakel (affiliated with a research institute, IISM) and a
responsible editor/journalist (affiliated with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
FAZ.NET). The researcher is regularly in exchange with some super-users of the
FAZ.NET-Orakel, who can be regarded as “the practitioners”, as they are both highly
knowledgeable in the matter and directly report to the researcher. All other par-
ticipants are referred to as the end-users or the crowd (though the super-users are
actually also part of the crowd).
These super-users are the “initial knowledge-creation targets”. In several e-mails
and phone calls, the super-users complained about unusual activities on the predic-
tion market. Some of these cases were detected by the existing algorithm, but many
not. For this reason, the practitioners offered to support the search for manipulative
and fraudulent patterns, if they get access to the underlying data. This communica-
tion at the interface between the researchers and practitioners was the initiation of
the project.
The following section describes the design process of guided emergence of the sug-
gested IT artifact (Sein et al., 2011).
16https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9xxfetB0Yac, start from 2:25 min
17https://www.myheimat.de/uelzen/politik/faznet-orakel-afd-bei-mehr-als-13-prozent-
d2833112.html
18This is important, as many suggested to the operator, to filter for such trash-mails or to verify
natural persons. Indeed, some fraudulent cases were performed by such accounts. However, several
these often used very basic strategies.
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7.4 Building, Intervention and Evaluation
Contents of this section are in part adopted from Kloker et al. (N.D.).
See Section A.1 for further details.
7.4.1 Alpha Cycle: Implementation of the detection component
Initiated by the communication between super-users and the researcher regarding
still prevalent cases of fraud and their suggestion to support search, a first version of
the artifact for crowd-based manipulation and fraud detection was developed. This
artifact featured basic functionality for decomposition, exploration, detection, and
reporting of fraudulent cases. The artifact was presented to selected super-users in
the context of a small pretest (limited scope, only one market). As the prediction
market is accessible by all readers of the FAZ.NET online magazine, it is of utmost
importance to publish artifacts for a broad audience only in a finished state.
Building
In order to enable the crowd to find fraudulent acts, it is necessary to present the cur-
rent transactions of the market in such a way that they are able to understand and
break down (decompose) the problem of the search for manipulation and fraud. As
a reference point to start designing the artifact, the representation of the trading be-
havior from Blume (2012) was applied. In Blume (2012) a graph based visualization
of the trading activity is introduced. Each trader is represented by a node. Trans-
actions between two traders are represented by directed edges between the nodes.
Edges between the same nodes and with identical directions are aggregated. The
strength of the edge indicates the volume of the transactions (a strong edge indicates
high volume transfer, a thin edge indicates low volume transfer). The suggested ar-
tifact also utilizes this representation. It goes, however, without the directed edges
and aggregates all transactions, independent of direction, between two nodes. To
keep the graph simple, it only shows the labels when the mouse is moved over a
node. For an easier reference of the nodes in the graph, each node is displayed in
a unique color. Nodes can be moved by dragging while the other nodes and edges
move simultaneously to ensure that all nodes remain visible and are arranged in a
reasonable way. In detail, the arrangement of the graph is determined by three com-
peting forces that strive for equilibrium: (1) All nodes are drawn to the center of the
graph, (2) all nodes repel each other, and (3) each edge tries to minimize its length.
The nodes move (not only hide or appear) and have a kind of elastic behavior, so that
moving the nodes results in a kind of playful behavior (to foster creativity according
to the kernel theories on creativity).
In addition to the graph, each transaction is displayed in a table below that con-
tains the following information: (1) The market in which the transaction took place,
(2) the date and time of the transaction, (3) the buyer’s name (uniquely colored)
and the corresponding order, (4) the seller’s name (uniquely colored) and the cor-
responding order, (5) the execution price of the transaction, (6) the volume trans-
ferred, and (7) a flag and a number indicating how often the transaction has already
been identified as potentially fraudulent or manipulative. The account names are
displayed in the same unique color that is used in the graph, so an easy cross-refer-
encing is allowed. The table does also show bundle trades of single accounts.
The account or node names are assembled by the prefix “Acc” and an ascending
number, e.g. “Acc293”. The ascending number indicates the order of the accounts
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FIGURE 7.5: Tool for crowd-based manipulation and fraud detection.
The transaction overview on the left-hand side. An excerpt from
the transaction history on the right-hand side. Each node identifies
a trader, each edge indicates transactions between two traders. The
strength of these edges indicates the quantity. Each trader has its own
color. The map shows a suspicious case (at the right-hand side of the
large point cloud) where some nodes traded very high volume exclu-
sively with only one other node.
in which they entered the market (first transaction). This naming ensures account
privacy (as the first 48 hours of trading are never displayed as long as the market is
running). Suspicious transactions (not suspicious accounts) are reported by a small
button next to the transaction in the table. Reporting a transaction always includes
to provide a short comment on what is perceived as “suspicious”.
The tool allows the subset of the complete graph based on any combination of
markets, accounts and dates19. At the selection of accounts it can be distinguished
between a mode where all transactions with selected accounts are displayed and a
mode where only transactions between selected accounts are displayed. For a closed
market the tool shows the complete transaction history. For a running market the
tool shows only the last 24 hours20 of trading and nothing within the first 48 hours af-
ter the opening. The reason therefore is to prevent the possibility to track single real
accounts by combining information of the ranking and the transactions. This, how-
ever, induces the risk that manipulative and fraudulent transactions within the first
at least 24 hours are not discovered before the closing of the market. Accounts that
were previously identified as manipulators or fraudsters are indicated by a small
icon next to the pseudonym of the account.
Exemplary user interfaces of the tool are illustrated in Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6.
19The selection of the specific dates was implemented after the first 48 hours of publishing as the
result of feedback of the super-users.
20Within the first 48 hours of the evaluation of the alpha cycle. Later, this figure was set to one week
and only adapted after feedback of the super-users.
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FIGURE 7.6: Tool for crowd-based manipulation and fraud detection.
The tool allowed to subset the transactions based on any combination
of markets, accounts and dates. It was also possible to decide if the
graph should display all edges regarding selected accounts or only
between the selected accounts.
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A link to the tool was showed below every market, leading directly to the con-
figured tool for this market. The tool is only accessible to registered and logged-in
users.
Intervention
The implemented alpha version artifact was published on the 27th September 2017,
11:00 am on the prediction market.
To validate the general usability and expediency a study was performed within
the first 48 hours after the go-live of the tool. The super-users were informed by a
short note in the thread of the internal forum, where current cases of manipulation
were discussed previously and on the news channel of the FAZ.NET-Orakel. No
concrete work order was provided. No incentives were offered. So, the interaction
of the traders with the tool was solely motivated by themselves.
The tool provided the full functionality, besides the indication of already detected
and locked fraudulent or manipulative accounts and the selection of the time span.
The traders had the chance to communicate with each other in the internal forum
in the thread where the tool was announced. In addition, they had the opportunity
to communicate to the administrator by e-mail. During the 48 hours the traders
were provided with feedback on a regular basis, if their suspected and reported
certain accounts were a hit or not. After the 48 hours the study was closed and all
manipulative and fraudulent accounts detected by the crowd, as well as those that
remained undetected but were known to the operator, became indicated.
Several kernel theories emphasized the importance of an intuitive and easy usage
of the tool, for which reason no support was provided to the user at this time (e.g.,
in form of a manual), in order to see if they understand, how to use it.
Evaluation
The evaluation of an instrument for manipulation and fraud detection and moni-
toring is especially difficult, as it is not possible to intentionally induce and observe
the phenomenon realistically in live data (with the creativity of real manipulators)
and there is no “ground truth” of all manipulative actions in real-world (historical)
data. At the time of publishing more than approx. 55,000 historical transactions
were carried out on the FAZ.NET-Orakel, within the previous six months, and could
be accessed and explored with the tool.
It was decided to evaluate the expediency of the tool on the historical transac-
tions. That is why the tool was introduced in the first 48 hours without indicating
the accounts that are already known for fraud or manipulation. The crowd was un-
aware of this move and they were not provided any incentive to look for fraud. All
accesses on the tool, reported cases, and comments regarding the tool were tracked.
As a benchmark to assess the detection quality of the crowd in the first 48 hours, the
list of known cases of fraud and manipulation by the operator was utilized. This list
consisted of all accounts detected by the operator using the detection algorithm and
also other tools (see Section 7.3).
The results of the first 48 hours are reported in Table 7.2. The results show that
the crowd was enabled to explore the large data set within a very short time and
find more than two third of all previously identified cases very fast. Even more
encouraging is the fact that two yet unknown cases were identified.
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TABLE 7.2: Summary first 48 hours
Previously identified fraudulent accounts 44
Accounts reported (of known) 30
Accounts reported (of unknown) 2
Comments 14
Flags 8
Active users 15
Accesses of the tool 146
After the introduction of the indicators for banned accounts, another yet un-
known fraudulent account, four suspicious accounts and ten accounts that showed
at least strange behavior were reported in the historical data21.
The results also show the users did not really use the flags, but the forum to
report the cases. The participants were encouraged to give feedback via the forum
or give suggestions if they miss features. The feedback was continuously positive.
Reflection and Learning
To begin with, it can be summarized that the tool itself fulfilled its basic need, to en-
able the crowd to explore and decompose the transactions in order to find fraudulent
patterns. Also new and unknown cases were identified. Thereof, it can be derived
that the representation in form of graphs and tables was applicable. The fact that
almost no flags were used, but all cases were directly reported in the forum, showed
that users have a need to communicate and exchange on the cases. Though it can-
not be concluded at this point if this is due to the need for information exchange or
social exchange (to receive social reputation), or both. It also seemed that the users
had problems in referencing and describing single cases in order to enable others to
retrace and find them. The flags seemed not to fulfill these needs. Feedback of the
super-users stated that the time span at the opening of a market in which data was
hidden is too long and that a selection criteria for a time span was missing.
7.4.2 Beta Cycle: Reshaping of the reporting and adding of motivational
features
Within the first six weeks, usage figures were falling. This was not surprising, as it
was to assume that participants were finished with the historical data and thereafter
they only focused on new transactions, which, however, needed much less time and
accesses. For the operator it is only important that the tool is continuously used and
so the prediction market is continuously monitored. For this reason the tool was
reshaped in a beta cycle according to the learning from the alpha cycle. In addition,
further features were added to ensure (and further understand) long-term motiva-
tion derived from kernel theories in Section 7.2.
Building
First, the reporting component was revised. If a case is reported using the flag but-
ton a thread is automatically created in a dedicated forum for cases of manipulation
and fraud. This thread includes a direct reference that jumps on a click to the case in
21The missing 14 of 44 previously identified accounts were not reported anymore, as they were then
indicated and there was therefore no more reason to report these cases
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the tool and pre-selects the suspicious transaction. Like this it is intended to facilitate
the retracing of a single case that the users previously tried to explain in words in the
alpha cycle. The forum featured basic features, such as likes and dislikes. The user
names of the reporting accounts was not shown to the public to prevent revenge ac-
tions. However, each name of the commentators were shown. The dedicated forum
that was later extended by a voting mechanism (see the gamma cycle) is illustrated
in Figure 7.8.
Second, the “Sheriff”-badge was introduced. Participants that reported a suspi-
cious case received a “Sheriff”-badge for two weeks. The badge was displayed in the
form of a little star directly behind the users name throughout the prediction market
and forums. A tool-tip text explained the meaning of the star/badge. The feature
enables users to build up reputation within the system. This was already suggested
to raise long-term motivation in other contexts (e.g., see Section 5).
Third, a wiki was introduced in order to capture known strategies and to main-
tain a manual for new users how fraud can be identified. The wiki started with
one exemplary entry on the “ping-pong” strategy. Participants were encouraged to
provide articles on further patterns.
Intervention
Before the second intervention, several further small improvements were imple-
mented, especially regarding the speed and navigation through the data.
The update of the tool with the new features of the beta cycle (described in the
subsection above), then took place on the 15th December 2017. The new features
were not announced specifically.
Evaluation
To derive statements on the success of the tool and intervention, the time from the
introduction of the tool (27th September 2017) until 12th February 2018 is evaluated.
Figure 7.7 shows the overall usage and already suggests that the tool usage is mainly
driven by a single super-user (“SuperUser1”). At all, 39 users used the tool. This fig-
ure includes 18 power users (continuously active trader on the prediction market22)
and 21 casual users of the prediction market. The tool was used 1762 times (op-
posed to 37.012 trades of the corresponding users in the corresponding markets)23.
As mentioned above, the decrease of usage in the first weeks can be explained by the
fact that the historical transactions were finished. In addition, it has to be considered
that the overall usage of the prediction market recorded a decrease in interest after
the 2017 German Federal Election.
In this light, it is evaluated what motivates users to use the tool.
First, a significant, moderate, positive correlation (r=.526***)24 between the in-
dividual interest in a market (measured by trades) and the engagement in the tool
(measured by accesses to the tool) is found. This basically means that users that are
interested in a specific market/topic are also more likely to engage in manipulation
monitoring and detection in this market.
A very strong interest at the beginning is observed, which may be also attributed
to the novelty effect. Second, it is found that many periods of “high usage” can be
22More than 1000 orders.
23All this figures include the administrator’s accesses, as he also used the tool for fraud detection.
The administrator is referred to as a power user, though he did not trade. 154 accesses were issued by
the administrator.
24Significance codes: ***: p < 0.001, **: p < 0.01, *: p < 0.05
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FIGURE 7.7: Comparison usages by the user “SuperUser1” and all
other users.
directly related to the approaching closing of popular markets25. This suggests that
the users monitor for manipulation, when they want to ensure that the markets will
close correctly and the prices are distributed in a just manner.
The period of low usage at the beginning of February may be explained by the
fact that almost no markets of public interest closed during this period.
Reflection and Learning
The first learning from the beta cycle is that the number of active users maintained at
a low level. Many participants seemed not to be interested in engaging in monitoring
efforts (that are not linked to any incentives). Nevertheless, the monitoring was done
reliably by the few users. The active users reported six further suspicious cases (all
of them not reported by the algorithm) after the introduction of the new reporting
features (beta cycle) and, thereby, used the new functionality. Therefore, it is to
assume that the reporting and referencing component of the artifact now fulfilled
their needs, though the figure may yet not be statistically significant. However, all
six reported cases remained suspicious due to a lack of evidence. As far as this
can be assessed by the operator, there was no further fraudulent or manipulative
approach on the platform within the evaluated time frame. It is not known if this
is caused by a discouraging effect of the tool, low interest, or for the reason that
at the moment no competitions with “high stakes” were active. It also has to be
considered that the usages of the tool may be driven by the current overall interest in
the prediction market or single competitions and the overall impression by the users
that this market is manipulated or cheated. If this impression is not given for the
moment, no high activity in the tool has to be expected. In addition, no feedback on
the badges was received and no further articles were proposed for the wiki. At least
for the latter, therefore, it can be assumed that users did not rely on this information
or did not want to share this knowledge.
Only one user was active throughout the evaluated time period and functioned
as a kind of continuous monitor. In a personal interview, however, he stated that
25Mid of October: Niedersachsen State election, mid of December: Bundesliga winter championship,
end of December: Vierschanzentournee, end of January: Grammy Awards
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FIGURE 7.8: Voting tool to decide on ambiguous cases. The user in-
terface shows two reported cases, of which the second is commented.
The red link next to the subject of each reported case triggers a jump
to the transaction in the transaction table in the tool. On the right-
hand side of each reported case, users can vote to lock the traders
involved in the reported transactions. Four users voted that the first
reported case is fraud or manipulation, while the second is not per-
ceived to be fraudulent.
he had used the tool besides of manipulation detection for other purposes. These
were, e.g., to get an understanding of the strategies of several suspicious accounts
that he perceived to be harmful to the market (e.g., overbid respectively underbid
both sides of the order book in order to gain windfall profits). The user used this
knowledge in addition to develop preventive trading strategies.
As the monitoring efforts seemed to increase right before the closing dates of the
market, the number of visible days was set to the maximum number (current active
time minus the first 24 hours). This was done to ensure that the habit of only looking
right before closing does not harm detection in the early phase of a market.
7.4.3 Suggestion for Gamma Cycle: Voting Mechanism on Manipulative
and Fraudulent Cases
A third ADR cycle was just initiated to address the second research question put in
Section 7.1 ((II) How to decide on ambiguous manipulative and fraudulent cases that
are not obviously against the rules.), although this cycle was not performed in the
scope of the original ADR project anymore. To address the problem of ambiguous
cases a further feature is suggested that allows to vote on reported cases. A voting
tool was implemented that accompanied each thread in the dedicated forum, which
was previously introduced in the beta cycle. The implementation is illustrated in
Figure 7.8.
The voting tool was introduced on the 20th February 2018 and announced in the
news feed of the FAZ.NET-Orakel. Since then the tool was used to decide on six
new reported cases. It was defined that five users have to assess a reported case as
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manipulative or fraudulent in order to block the related accounts. None of these
cases were finally assessed as intentionally problematic. The operator also assessed
none of these cases as manipulation or fraud. Though the usage figures are still low
due to the small time horizon, it can already be concluded that the tool has been
used to vote and also encouraged a discussion on the reported cases.
A detailed and quantitative evaluation is part of future work.
7.5 Discussion and Conclusion on the Crowd-based Detec-
tion
Stage 4 of ADR defines the steps from the results to formalization and learning with
regard to the class of problems. The class of problems “monitoring in the context of am-
biguous and rare events”, defined in Section 7.2, was addressed. With the crowd-based
detection tool, it was demonstrated that a crowd is capable to perform such a mon-
itoring task in general in the context of the presented prediction market. In the in-
troduced case of the FAZ.NET-Orakel, the crowd was able to decompose a relatively
large problem and detect even complex and unknown fraudulent and manipulative
strategies.
Several design implications were derived from related literature, their applica-
bility demonstrated in the current project, and evaluated in the implemented arti-
fact. After evaluation and reflection of each design element and the acquired experi-
ence, it is now possible to formulate following DPs as potentially beneficial for other
projects that address the same class of problem:
Design Principle 1: Help the crowd in order to freely decompose the problem.
A key feature of such a tool is the decomposition of the problem and the free navi-
gation through the data. This may include natural navigation using visual graphs,
but also universal color codes to identify single accounts/entities etc. throughout
the application.
Design Principle 2: Enable exploration to enable your crowd to think besides known
patterns.
To find creative patterns and strategies, it is important not to enforce basic schemes
of data subsets, but to allow users to select and reselect subsets according to their
own ideas.
Design Principle 3: Enable references on and exchange of detected cases.
Detected cases have to be made accessible to all participants. Software should sup-
port the reference and resubmission of suspicious cases. Other users need to be able
to retrace and discuss each case within the community.
Design Principle 4: Create value for your crowd by the artifact.
It is important to understand what encourages your crowd. In current case it was
the frustration regarding the in-transparency of the prediction market and its trans-
actions and the perceived manipulation. Interviews with the users shed light that
though the artifact was playful and well-designed, the users only used it to create
justice and find other users guilty, if they perceived harmful behavior.
Following these DPs it was possible to implement an IT artifact that enabled the
crowd to monitor the prediction market successfully for fraud and manipulation.
Even complex patterns were found and reported, which is clearly dominant to ex-
isting algorithmic approaches in the context of prediction markets.
However, several limitations have to be mentioned. First, prediction markets are
a traditional crowd-based approach for which reason it was to expect that there is
a crowd which is potentially willing to engage. It is yet not finally clear, how the
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design elements of the prediction market influence the usage of the tool and vice
versa. Second, the current case showed a high dependency of the success of the tool
on one single user. It is not surprising that out of about 20 active users only one
contributes the most of the content, as this is the case in most other online communi-
ties (Nielsen, 2006). In addition, the regular accesses of other users, especially when
crowd monitoring becomes relevant (closing of markets), indicated that other users
would have been ready to participate if there was a need. However, it cannot finally
be said what would have happened without this single user. Third, only a period
of about five months was observed and within there was only one event of greater
public interest. It was possible to demonstrate that fraudulent cases were found in
the last elections on historical data, but the “monitoring” effect was only showed
within the last periods of the 2017 Niedersachsen State Election, which is arguably
important, but much less polarizing than the 2017 German Federal Election. The
concept will need to prove itself in other polarizing events, such as the upcoming
Federal Elections. Finally, the problem of a missing ground truth is still prevalent.
The operators list of known cases was applied as a benchmark, but already the first
48 hours yielded further, yet unknown, cases. There was no case since the introduc-
tion of the tool that was detected by the algorithm and not by the crowd - and many
cases detected by the crowd and not by the algorithm - but even still one cannot
finally be sure, how many more fraudulent and manipulative cases there may be in
the data. Some cases could not finally be concluded, e.g., when suspicious traders
claimed to have traded “inexperienced”.
The next step, which was already briefly discussed in the suggestion for a gamma
cycle, will be to introduce a voting mechanism. This enables the crowd to decide
whether the reported suspicious cases are actually fraud/manipulation or normal
behavior – especially for these cases in which the market operator has no valid ev-
idence or manipulative behavior is obvious but not punishable. It is also necessary
to assess to which extent such an instrument is also a preventive measure, since its
existence deters potential fraudsters. This is addressed in the following Section 7.6.
It is also subject to further research, how the tool may be misused. This may be, e.g.,
to create wrong accusations, create spam reports, or to derive information on other
users strategies in order to gain more profits. After all, such a tool can only work if
the crowd engages in the tool in the long-term, which cannot be finally concluded
yet.
The current work contributes to the academic research at several points. It pro-
vided an insightful case, in which the applicability of a crowd-based fraud and ma-
nipulation detection approach could be demonstrated. The theoretical derivation of
the DPs and the firsthand experience contribute to the current academic research and
practice by demonstrating a crowd-based approach to detect rare and ambiguous
fraudulent and manipulative events in prediction markets. This theoretical deriva-
tion contained, in addition, the first (as far as known) collection of reported manip-
ulative and fraudulent events and experiments in this area that summarizes the per-
ceived effects on the market price. To conclude, a crowd-based approach to detect
manipulative and fraudulent behavior is very promising for multiple applications
in public and enterprise prediction markets.
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FIGURE 7.9: The Fraud Cube: Framework to understand and uncover
where a prediction market may be manipulated or cheated.
7.6 From Detection to Prevention
7.6.1 The Fraud Cube: A motivational perspective on Manipulation and
Fraud
Contents of this section are in part adopted from Kloker and Kranz (2017).
See Section A.1 for further details.
To prevent manipulative behavior and fraud, it is important to understand, what
and how fraudsters think, what they want, and what finally convinces them to ma-
nipulate and or break the prediction markets rules. Wolfe and Hermanson (2004)
describe a fraudsters thought process in the “fraud diamond”, which is an extension
of the “fraud triangle” (Cressey, 1953; Lou and Wang, 2011). The fraud diamond
states four necessary preconditions for fraud to occur: (1) the right person (capabil-
ity) must realize (2) an opportunity (weakness in the system) and be (3) planning
to do so (want or have to commit); finally this person has to be (4) convinced (ra-
tionalization) that the potential gains are worth the risk. In a prediction market, a
willing person’s intention can be described in three dimensions: (i) Desire/objective
(whether to disrupt the market or to enrich itself), (ii) temporal horizon (immedi-
ately or in the long-run), and (iii) source of incentive (the issuing incentive is caused
by an inner incentive scheme outside the market). To understand and organize mo-
tivational factors as well as attacking strategies better, the Fraud Cube (see Figure
7.9) organizes fraudulent patterns on three dimensions (i-iii). These are described in
the following.
The desire of a fraudster (i) can be (self-) enrichment, destructive behavior, or
both. In the case of (self-) enrichment the traders want to improve their own re-
sults (Bohm and Sonnegard, 1999) and realize that it is possible by playing against
the rules. For “destructive behavior”, there are mainly two reasons known, though
there may be several others. On the one hand, according to Brüggelambert (1999),
destructive participants take a delight in nonsensical decisions or are glad about
sabotaging. On the other hand, they may have incentives for bad predictions. Such
incentives may not only be monetary and may lay outside the market, such as in the
1999 Berlin State Election example mentioned earlier.
The temporal horizon of fraudulent behavior (ii) can be short- or long-run. Short-
-run attacking usually intends to realize quick profits or to destroy market prediction
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TABLE 7.3: Using the Fraud Cube, illustrated at the DARPA Terror-
ism Futures example
Vector Motivation & Attack
[Enrichment & Long-run &
Outside]
A company/organization, selling
products for security or earning
money with the fear of an attack,
may be given an incentive to write
threatening letters to the government
that claim that a terror strike will
occur soon (Hanson, 2006a).
[Enrichment & Long-run &
Inside]
If the prizes are very high (the in-
ner incentive scheme is very strong),
a trader may be incited to conduct a
terror strike to make the “prediction”
come true.
[Destruction & Long-run &
Outside]
Terrorists may be encouraged to join
the market and trade prices artificially
down, in order to create a false sense
for security. Or they may, at least,
observe the prices to select a “good”
date for their plan.
for only a short period. There is no distinct threshold which time period is needed
for an attack to be considered short- or long-run. However, long-run fraudulent
behavior takes a greater interest in the outcome of the event. They want to either
manipulate the outcome or the information (and decisions) that are derived from
the market prediction.
Finally, the incentive (iii) to cheat and manipulate may have two manifestations:
It may come from inside or outside the markets. The examples mentioned earlier
show both cases: While the manipulation of the election forecasts, e.g. 1999 Berlin
State Election, have been incited from outside, the fraud that occurred in the FIFA
World Cup example was incited from the incentive scheme of the market itself.
At this point, it needs to be mentioned that it is of great importance, thinking
trough the different parts of the cube, to consider both: attacks from inside (trading)
or outside (manipulate the information or outcome).
The DARPA Policy Analysis Market provides a good example, how to elaborate
risks of fraud and manipulation in prediction markets by using the Fraud Cube,
which is reported by Hanson (2006b) and Hanson (2006a). The market was dis-
cussed on July 2003, but quickly dropped for the reason of unpredictable risks. The
project intended to create a prediction market to forecast assassinations and terror
strikes. Comprehensibly, such a market has, besides of the regular inside incentive
to perform well, strong outside incentives to be manipulated. Moving through the
Fraud Cube, several attacking points can be identified, illustrated in Table 7.3:
Hanson (2006b) states that attacks from outside are easily forgotten when think-
ing about threats to the sustainable and correct operation of the market. The frame-
work of the Fraud Cube helps market engineers to uncover attacking points by sys-
tematically thinking through the dimensions of fraud. However, due to the manifold
expressions of attacking points and the fact that they are often not under the reach
of a market engineer, it is hard to protect against them (Hanson, 2006b). Incentives
may play a key role (Schröder, 2009), which will be discussed in Section 7.6.3.
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7.6.2 How Fraud in Prediction Markets occurs
Contents of this section are in part adopted from Kloker and Kranz (2017).
See Section A.1 for further details.
To classify the attacks and manipulation strategies more in detail, categories
from Allen and Gale (1992) are utilized, which originated in stock markets: (i) Ac-
tion-based manipulation, (ii) information-based manipulation, and (iii) trade-based
manipulation.
Action-based manipulation and information-based manipulation are not always
easy to differentiate. In general, action-based manipulation is a manipulation of the
value of the contract. Allen and Gale (1992) are drawing near the example of the
American Steel and Wire Company from 1901. The managers of the company short-
ened their stock positions and then closed the steel mills. The price fall from $60
to $40. The managers covered their short positions and reopened the mills, which
led to a price rise and to a large profit of the managers. Bagnoli and Lipman (1996)
developed another model of action-based manipulations. Here a participant in the
market pools with an external partner who is giving a takeover bid for the company
the manipulator is holding stocks. After the manipulator has realized his profits, the
partner unwinds his takeover bid. A similar model was presented by Vila (1989) be-
sides that the roles are switched, so that the initiator is the giver of the takeover bid.
Prediction markets are a common instrument to predict project milestones or prod-
uct release dates. Hanson (2006b) states here the problem that employees, trading
on the market, may take influence on the outcome. Ottaviani and Sørensen (2007)
showed in an experiment that employees had indeed taken the opportunity, if given
so, to manipulate the outcome in such a context. Chakraborty and Das (2016) in-
vestigate this problem from a game-theoretic perspective and conclude also that the
opportunity lead to manipulation or fraud.
Information-based manipulation is related to the spreading of false information
or of deceptive rumors. Examples for this kind of manipulation are the “trading
pools” that emerged in 1920 in the US, the Enron, and the WorldCom frauds in 2001
(Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2004). According to Benabou and Laroque (1992) an op-
portunistic trader with privileged information could profitably manipulate markets
by making misleading announcements in case he seems credible to other investors.
Recently, Casas, Fawaz, and Trindade (2016) demonstrated this effect in prediction
markets in the context of elections.
Trade-based manipulation is manipulation playing within the rules. This is es-
pecially researched in stock markets (Allen and Gale, 1992). The basic consent is that
trade-based manipulation is possible given some preconditions (usually true in pre-
diction markets: low liquidity, non-linear demand functions). However, profits are
low and if such behavior in play-money prediction markets lead to higher engage-
ment it is often not considered as fraudulent behavior or harmful (e.g. Hanson and
Oprea, 2009).
In the context of play-money prediction markets, these three types of manipula-
tion and fraud have to be extended by one more type: (iv) Multiple accounts and
coalitions. Blume, Luckner, and Weinhardt (2010) and Blume (2012) presented sev-
eral strategies that are used by participants which have created (or hacked) multiple
accounts. This is usually done in order to trade between these accounts and transfer
money from one to the other (Schröder, 2009). Similar problems can arise if par-
ticipants start to form coalitions. This may be the case if participants are given the
incentive of prizes for the top ranks. If the prizes can be shared among the coali-
tion partners, they are able to increase the probability over the average probability
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of winning the price, if they transfer money (or stocks) to one account. This is pos-
sible, if the spread is greater or equal to 0.03 MU. This strategy to transfer money is
called “ping-pong” or circular trading, which is also described in Hansen, Schmidt,
and Strobel (2004) and even in real stock markets (Reuters, 2010). The strategy is
more successful, the higher the spread is, so sometimes the spread is aggressively
widened before the circle trading (Blume, Luckner, and Weinhardt, 2010).
7.6.3 Prevention and the Role of Incentives
Contents of this section are in part adopted from Kloker and Kranz (2017).
See Section A.1 for further details.
The Fraud Cube, introduced in Section 7.6.1, already shows that it is not enough
to only detect fraudulent actions by searching for fraudulent patterns in the trading.
Fraud prevention starts much earlier. According to the “fraud diamond” (Wolfe and
Hermanson, 2004) fraud (and manipulation) has four preconditions. Against the
first, the “capability”, unfortunately there are no countermeasures.
What about the “weakness in the system”? Especially in play-money predic-
tion markets, but basically in all prediction markets, problems arise if traders form
coalitions or if one trader controls more than one account (no matter if he created or
hacked them). These weaknesses cannot be turned off, but several countermeasures
can hamper this kind of fraud. In the examples of Hansen, Schmidt, and Strobel
(2004) it is described that a delay in activating new accounts efficiently helped to
slow down and reduce the effect of fraud. This may already scare off fraudsters
that are only interested in “quick returns”. However, there remains the trade-off be-
tween security and comfort of registration. Huang (2016) and Huang and Shoham
(2014) suggest to implement trading limits in the context of prediction markets fea-
turing a market scoring rule. This idea transferred to markets where supply and
demand meets directly would mean to limit the amount of stocks (or money) which
can be traded between two accounts. There may also be a time component in this
restriction. Though this may effectively slow down fraud by hampering common
trading strategies, there is also a trade-off: Traders may perceive the match of trades
not comprehensible when their trades are mapped to “suboptimal” orders (as the
“optimal match was prevented by volume restrictions). Other measures to decrease
fraud opportunities is a careful contract design (Hansen, Schmidt, and Strobel, 2004)
or the deployment of bots (George Mason University, 2015). As a countermeasure
against politically motivated manipulation of prices, Berlemann and Schmidt (2001)
suggested to show only long averages on the prices as forecasts (24h). As it is hard
to manipulate prices for long periods, this may discourage manipulators, as their
actions have only marginal effect on the forecasts.
Probably the most promising approach to prevent fraud is thinking about the
role of incentives. Incentive compatibility means that for a risk-neutral agent the
best strategy is to follow the rules. This may be reached if all participants truthfully
reveal any private information asked for by the market mechanism (Schröder, 2009).
A market is not incentive compatible if traders can obtain a higher profit through
fraudulent actions or if participants avoid to participate as they fear manipulation.
A good, although admittedly hard, way to prevent manipulative behavior within the
market, is to create a “[...] design that makes it more lucrative to play according to the
rules” (Schröder, 2009, p. 18). For manipulative behavior to happen in prediction
markets, there must be an incentive inside or outside the market that is stronger
than the incentive that can be reached by playing according to the rules. Therefore,
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it is important to think about which conflicting incentives can occur for traders or
groups.
Dimitrov and Sami (2010) is presenting a setting of two parallel prediction mar-
kets with different incentive schemes. Participants have the ability to trade on both
markets. If the incentive in the second market is stronger, manipulative agents can
start to trade irrational in the first market, to make the price in the second market
follow and to open profit options. Dimitrov and Sami (2010) characterized the weak
perfect Bayesian equilibrium for such a case and found that the payoffs were unique
across all equilibria. Chen and Kash (2011) consider conflicting incentives in predic-
tion markets with scoring rules that are used for decision-making. They argue that
the experts trading in the market do not necessarily want to select the optimal deci-
sion, but generate the highest payoff. If the scoring rule is not suitable for truthful
elicitation of information, the incentive for the expert is in conflict with the goal of
a prediction market operator. The problem in general, when prediction markets are
used for decision-making, is examined by Othman and Sandholm (2010). For some
participants this can create strong outside incentives, if they would benefit of certain
outcomes. They can be incited to strategically manipulate the market probability. If
this issue is known in a market, it can also lead to distrust between the participants.
Chen et al. (2015) studied conflicting incentives inside and outside the market. They
concluded that conflicting incentives not necessarily may damage information ag-
gregation in equilibrium and showed some examples. However, there were also
many situations, where information loss was inevitable. In addition, Malekovic, Su-
tanto, and Goutas (2016) found that the intention to manipulate in a setting compa-
rable to a prediction market using a market scoring rule, raises with the information
asymmetry between the participants. It also decreases with the complexity of the
scoring rule.
A prediction market engineer should keep conflicting incentives in mind when
designing the market and contracts. This should include considering if there are
other prediction markets that offer comparable contracts with different incentive
schemes, and adapt accordingly or even drop the own contract. It has also to be
considered how results are communicated, which persons should be excluded from
participation and to which extent decisions are directly bound to the outcome of
prediction markets. In markets where prizes are raffled among the best traders, this
may include to only offer “non-sharable” prizes (in contrast to money, as in Bohm
and Sonnegard (1999)). As the price may not be shared among a coalition, the incen-
tive for the coalition to work together becomes weaker. To sum up, fraud to occur
needs incentives and thinking about conflicting incentives in advance may reduce
fraud and manipulation distinctly.
Finally, according to the “fraud diamond”, a trader has to be convinced, ratio-
nalized that the fraud and manipulation is worth the risk. Several small design
adaptions are conceivable in prediction markets that may help manipulators and or
fraudsters to change their mind. Some of them have been suggested in various aca-
demic literature. A brief summary can be found in Table 7.4. However, no empirical
evidence on such a measure is reported in the literature yet.
TABLE 7.4: List of suggested or discussed design elements for the
prevention of manipulation
Reference(s) Suggestion/Findings
Publicity and Access
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TABLE 7.4: List of suggested or discussed design elements for the
prevention of manipulation
Reference(s) Suggestion/Findings
Rhode and Strumpf (2008) Non-public markets: No differences between
anonymous and public markets regarding
manipulation.
Hansen, Schmidt, and Strobel
(2004) and Bohm and Sonnegard
(1999)
Reduce press coverage.
Hansen, Schmidt, and Strobel
(2004)
Publication delay in press coverage hinders
manipulation.
Hansen, Schmidt, and Strobel
(2004)
Account activation delay hinders manipula-
tion.
Hansen, Schmidt, and Strobel
(2004)
Display long averages as predictions hinders
manipulation.
Ho and Chen (2007) from Buckley
and Doyle (2017)
“Limit the Stake” limits manipulation.
George Mason University (2015) Do not use large extrinsic prizes
George Mason University (2015) Require more user information
George Mason University (2015) Publicize blocking of users
Contract Design
Hansen, Schmidt, and Strobel
(2004)
Trade small parties within the “other parties”
stock or trade them as winner-takes-all con-
tracts. Second suggestion is, however, un-
clear to which extent this would solve the
problem. There is more capital needed to
change the decision in case of clear losers, but
not in case of high uncertainty.
Huang and Shoham (2014) Implement trading limits (in markets with a
Market Scoring Rule).
This work (Section 7.6.4) Opening auction to prevent shallow markets
in the beginning.
Technical Design
George Mason University (2015) Bots make collusion more difficult. If the set
up for bots is facilitated for more users, this
may prevent fraud.
Kloker and Kranz (2017) Use warnings based on suspicious points.
This work (Section 7.6.4) Use categories for the ranking to ensure that
traders, knowledgeable in only one category,
find their expertise reflected.
7.6.4 Adaptions to the FAZ.NET-Orakel
Contents of this section are in part adopted from Kloker et al. (2018b).
See Section A.1 for further details.
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Warnings
Initial cases of fraud in the FAZ.NET-Orakel and feedback from single fraudsters
showed that the participants were obviously not aware of the detection algorithm
or felt smarter than the algorithm. Some even reported that they were not aware
that manipulative or fraudulent attempts may lead to an exclusion from the mar-
ket (though this was written in the terms). The George Mason University (2015) re-
ported that after the publication of blocked accounts, manipulation was virtually not
existent. This suggests that it may help to prevent manipulation and fraud if traders
are made aware of the consequences. For this reason warnings were displayed to
traders, when their trading behavior showed a hint of fraudulent patterns. If the
pattern continued their account was locked, displaying a message that they should
contact the administrator. A screen-shot of the later message is illustrated in Figure
7.10.
FIGURE 7.10: Message “Account locked” as displayed to traders that
showed a suspicious pattern.
Topic-specific Rankings
In May 2017 a fraudulent account agreed to participate in a telephone interview. This
revealed a very interesting and yet not considered source of incentive in literature.
The trader was especially knowledgeable in areas of economics. Indeed, he won the
tournament of the last EIX version, which focused mainly on economic indicators.
The focus of the FAZ.NET-Orakel is, however, much broader, why his good perfor-
mances in the economic indicators was opposed to a moderate performance in other
topics (politics or entertainment). This was diametrical to his self-image and frus-
trated him, for which reason he started to perform fraud in non-economic markets
until he reached a position in the ranking that he perceived to be fair. To prevent
or at least hamper this kind of fraud, topic specific rankings were introduced along-
side the already existing overall ranking (see Figure 7.11). Hence, participation in all
markets is not mandatory in order to be listed in the top positions of the rankings
regarding certain topics.
Opening Auctions
In August 2017 several users complained that especially at the market start, low
liquidity is used to gain windfall profits from uninformed traders. Bohm and Son-
negard (1999) already found shallow markets to be a popular aim for fraudulent
behavior, as well. To prevent such wind-fall profits, opening auctions were intro-
duced. Opening auctions are starting 24h before the normal CDA trading is possi-
ble. All submitted orders within this time are collected and centrally matched at the
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FIGURE 7.11: Screen-shot of the ranking overview. Several sub rank-
ings were available.
FIGURE 7.12: Screen-shot of the trading screen during the opening
auction.
end of the opening auction phase at the price that results in the maximum transfer of
stocks. By doing so, it is ensured that there is a certain liquidity at the beginning of
the market and the start price is fair. Hence, there is no shallow market and poten-
tial windfall profits are equally distributed among all informed traders. The trading
interface during the opening auction is illustrated in Figure 7.12.
Tool for Crowd-based Manipulation and Fraud Detection
In October 2017 a survey revealed that still many users perceived that there exists
cheating on the market. Potentially by patterns that are too creative for the current
algorithm. Some users offered to support detecting these fraudulent accounts, if they
got access to the trading data. For this reason the tool for crowd-based manipulation
and fraud detection was developed that was described in more detail in Section
7.4. However, besides the detection of fraudulent and manipulative actions, it has
some preventive character as well. The tool is accessible from each market and has
therefore some visibility (though not overly emphasized).
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7.6.5 Evaluation of the Adaptions and Conclusion
Contents of this section are in part adopted from Kloker et al. (2018b) and Kloker
et al. (N.D.).
See Section A.1 for further details.
To evaluate the applicability of countermeasures against manipulation and fraud
is always very hard, as the phenomenon cannot be reasonably induced in the FAZ-
.NET-Orakel setting and its occurrence is also dependent on many other variables
(overall activity, markets, topics, etc.). Assess preventive design elements is even
harder. Therefore, the features were evaluated continuously in close exchange and
discussion with the super-users of the FAZ.NET-Orakel. Briefly, it can be concluded
that after the warnings and the updated ranking virtually no fraudulent action was
observed anymore, besides by some intentionally losing accounts (as also observed
by the George Mason University (2015)). Manipulation was, however, still persis-
tent. After the introduction of the opening auction, complaints regarding fraud dur-
ing low liquidity phases was decreased. To get an impression on the preventive char-
acter of the crowd-based manipulation and fraud detection tool, a survey among all
active participants (more than 10 orders placed, N = 514) was performed, of which
n = 29 responded. Among others, the participants were asked how easy they per-
ceived the opportunity for manipulation and fraud before and after the introduc-
tion. Although the sample size was small (n = 29), a one-tailed, paired Wilcoxon
Rank Sum test showed that the perceived opportunity was significant lower after
the introduction of the artifact (p = .087).
However, especially regarding manipulation, during the first year there was only
one event where manipulation was to be expected, as it was politically controversial
and the incentives from outside of the market were high (Deck, Lin, and Porter, 2013;
Rhode and Strumpf, 2008). Hence, it is hard to separate which underlying reason,
the implementations or the missing incentives, led to virtually no observations of
manipulation.
Still, the adaptions can be regarded as successful and can be suggested for im-
plementation in future prediction markets as this relatively small effort may have a
huge impact and distinctly raise prediction quality and participation.
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Have a message and be one.
Oswald Chambers
8.1 Conclusion
This thesis instantiated one Delphi-Market in the form of the FAZ.NET-Orakel. In
Section 3, the diversity of potential integration approaches already suggests that
it is not possible to evaluate the concept of Delphi-Markets with only one artifact.
Instead, besides elaborating the concept theoretically, the instantiated artifact was
used to improve the crowd-based judgmental forecasting methodology in four ways.
These four research projects were motivated by the JFIM that was introduced in
Section 2.1.3 and which corresponds to the four dimensions of error by Armstrong
(1985). In the JFIM these errors are located at the intersections of the six core aspects
of forecasting methods by Lyon and Pacuit (2013) and the factors “motivation” and
“cognition”, which enrich the six core aspects with a human component.
With the first research project outlined in Section 4, it was demonstrated that pre-
diction market trading behavior is an indicator to select potentially knowledgeable
participants as experts for RTD studies. The sampling is, however, not only lim-
ited to the selection for RTDs. Companies applying prediction markets may identify
knowledgeable employees for other forms of expert panels or to better understand
the importance of an individual employee in a team for its information flow. The
research project showed the general applicability of the approach to select informed
traders or high-performers based on historical data. To finally assess the accuracy
and information gain induced by this approach, a long-term field study would be
required. Theory, however, suggests that this selection approach may improve the
diversity of viewpoints and information considered (Welty, 1972; Green, Armstrong,
and Graefe, 2007) as well as the general rigor of the Delphi methodology (Hasson
and Keeney, 2011). In the FAZ.NET-Orakel, anecdotal evidence showed that self-se-
lection of participants on the RTD that were recruited among the prediction market
participants leads to a very similar panel. Mostly those participants took part in the
RTD that also performed significantly well in the prediction market. It is subject to
future research how the information flows are designed in detail and to distinguish
if high-performers are likely to take part in RTD studies or if the participation in
RTD studies leads to better prediction market performance. In Chapter 4 only the
suggested selection approach “The Potential” (see Section 3.1.2) was implemented.
Future work may evaluate the other approaches, especially “The Bohemian” as a
potentially interesting approach to further enhance expert selection.
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In the second research project outlined in Section 5, a social RTD approach was
motivated, suggested, and evaluated in order to address the problem of low reten-
tion in Delphi studies. This sRTD was implemented in the FAZ.NET-Orakel. In a
preliminary online experiment and a subsequent field study in the context of the
2017 German Federal Election it could be demonstrated that allowing social interac-
tion in form of labeling in the discussion can raise retention among the participants
over Delphi rounds. The effect in the field study seemed to be explained by the
positive labels. As this was a field experiment, not only the intention to participate,
but also the actual behavior could be measured. For this reason it is to assume that
the approach would work in other real-world settings as well. Allowing social in-
teraction, though there is full anonymity, raises retention. This may be especially
interesting in company settings, where a workers council or a labor union are very
sensitive towards every form of participation that may potentially allow the identi-
fication of individual employees. Due to restrictions and low general participation
in the RTD these results should, however, be verified by future long-term studies.
Yet, it also cannot be said what effect the certain topical background had on the re-
sults. Interactions between the prediction market component and the RTD seemed
to have no effect on the retention. Therefore, a cautious conclusion may also be that
the theoretical potential derived in Section 3 to use prediction markets in order to
provide incentives for the RTD may not hold at least in the integration approach on
a user-level.
In the third research project outlined in Section 6, a common problem of many
forecasting methods, but especially prediction markets, is addressed: The partition
dependence bias. In two consecutive online experiments the moderators “complex-
ity” and “expertise” were elaborated. Both showed an effect on the occurrence of
partition dependence. However, though complexity moderated the partition depen-
dence, it was yet not possible to finally assess in what way it is related to a raising
or decreasing effect. The reason for this is that measuring the cognitive load and
therefore active processing type according to the Dual-Process Theory turned out to
be unreliable. Expertise, however, systematically decreased partition dependence.
In the context of Delphi-Markets it therefore has to be considered, if this may be an
additional potential for an integrated approach. Prokesch, Gracht, and Wohlenberg
(2015) already selected participants for a hidden market. The experiments in Section
6, in addition, reproduced the effect previously found by Sonnemann et al. (2013) in
CDA markets for LMSR markets. This emphasizes the importance to further under-
stand the phenomenon of partition dependence. While for expertise a decreasing
effect was demonstrated, future research should address a more in-depth elabora-
tion of complexity and further moderators such as motivation.
In the fourth research project outlined in Section 7, the FAZ.NET-Orakel was
extended by a crowd-based manipulation and fraud detection artifact (and several
further small design improvements) in order to address the problem of manipula-
tion and fraud. Manipulation and fraud is one of the five open questions regarding
prediction markets (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006a; Buckley and Doyle, 2017). The
suggested and implemented artifact addresses several yet unsolved problems: (1)
The detection of (creative) attacking strategies beyond the capabilities of rule-based
algorithms. (2) The detection of manipulative patterns that may harm the market
but are not necessarily against the rules. (3) A mechanism to deal with inconclu-
sive cases of manipulation and fraud for those cases in that the operator would not
have any means to deal with. In addition, the artifact may have a preventive char-
acter and, therefore, improve the market quality even before price manipulations or
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fraud happen. These findings and the underlying approach are of relevance for ev-
ery setting, where prediction markets are only run as a supplementary instrument
and should not require too much attention of the IT department for supervision and
development. The approach is not based on complex algorithms and may even work
entirely without any administrator to ultimately decide on manipulative and fraud-
ulent cases. The approach enabled the crowd to discuss on ambiguous cases and
anecdotal evidence showed that the discussions on the few suspicious cases were
carried out on a content level. Participants tried to comprehend the potentially un-
derlying information. Therefore, the introduction of this tool may even have the
same positive effects as attributed to the integration on a market-level approach (see
Section 3.1.2), though to a very limited scope. Yet, there is not sufficient long-term
data in order to evaluate long-range effects of this tool on the market. In addition, it
cannot yet be concluded how and to which extent the tool may be misused or subject
to manipulation and fraud itself. However, it provides a simple and convenient way
that is easy to implement for practitioners, to secure a prediction market against a
wide spectrum of potential attacks beyond the capabilities of detection algorithms1.
The current thesis contributes with four research projects in the context of the
FAZ.NET-Orakel to four prevalent problems in judgmental forecasting methods (es-
pecially prediction markets). In addition, it is the first implementation and elabo-
ration of a Delphi-Market with public access that implemented a user-based inte-
gration. Although many of the suggested design elements and artifacts may need a
further validation with long-term data, they may help researchers and practitioners
in building better judgmental forecasting tools and understand common errors as
well as their reduction.
8.2 Outlook
Future of current research
Finally, the question remains, how the future of the Delphi-Markets will look like?
Section 3 outlined that there are plenty of possible approaches to integrate prediction
markets and RTD. Yet, it is not clear if there is “the one” dominant design. Probably,
the design decision should always be made in light of the context of each specific
forecasting task and potential challenges. The FAZ.NET-Orakel will be continued in
order to collect more long-term data and to re-validate the previous findings, both
regarding the retention in RTD and the crowd-based manipulation and fraud detec-
tion tool. It is of special interest to observe these two artifacts in the context of a
forecasting event of high interest, such as the upcoming German Federal Elections.
In addition, the expert selection algorithm elaborated and suggested in Section 4,
which was evaluated on historical data, also has to prove itself on “live” data. This,
even though already implemented in the FAZ.NET-Orakel, remains as an outstand-
ing task.
Research on the partition dependence bias should focus on finding experimental
designs that allow to decompose the effect of individual moderators. The experi-
ments outlined in Section 6 can be understood as an exploration of possible moder-
ators, which involved more or less rudimentary complexity, expertise, motivation,
risk affinity, and enjoyment. While complexity and expertise seemed to have the
most explaining power, more isolated evaluation of each individual moderator is
required in order to fully understand the bias.
1Though it is not argued that the tool may not be run accompanying a detection algorithm.
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Future research opportunities
Prediction markets as a way of participation In a broader perspective, prediction
markets will probably gain in importance in companies and in politics. Participation
in companies is a growing field that currently receives a lot of attention in academic
research (Wagenknecht, Filpe, and Weinhardt, 2017; Niemeyer et al., 2016). Predic-
tion markets have become more and more adaptable and easy to use and, therefore,
qualify for decision support and forecasting in companies (Buckley, 2016). They
provide a convenient way to allow employees express their estimation on questions
regarding the future, new ideas, or even the success of managerial measures. How-
ever, in which way prediction markets and Delphi-Markets influence the willingness
of employees to participate, the quality of decision-making, and the overall culture
in a company is yet an open research question.
Predictions based on distorted samples In politics prediction market feature some
favorable properties, especially regarding current trends in the political discourse,
such as greater polarization and stigmatization, and the extended use of social net-
works (Yang et al., 2016; Brug, Fennema, and Tillie, 2000; Lee et al., 2014). Prediction
markets can adapt to fast changing information better than many other methods. In
addition, they are relatively robust against distorted samples and fear of stigmati-
zation as participants remain anonymous. And though participants do not have to
reveal their preferences, the trading behavior can be used as a kind of Bayesian Truth
Serum, as it was shown that the depot structure of individual traders can be related
to party preferences with high accuracy (Kranz et al., 2014). In order to foster these
favorable properties, prediction markets may be integrated with online social net-
works. Such an integration may help to reduce the judgment bias in the predictions
(Graefe, 2014; Kranz et al., 2014). An integration of a prediction market with a social
network was also already demonstrated recently by Qiu and Kumar (2017).
From expectation to opinion With an increasing reach of prediction markets, es-
pecially towards participants that are not used to markets in general, the interfaces
of prediction markets have become more easy (hidden markets) and intuitive. Such
a simple market interface is implemented, for instance, in the MicroMarkets inter-
face (see Section 3.2.3). These almost gamified interfaces, however, raise the ques-
tion to which extent they really still collect the expectation of a participant or only
a mere opinion. In addition, the playful design of the MicroMarket may stimulate
risk-taking (nudged to move the sliders more towards the ends). These factors put
the challenge to the researcher, how the individual inputs should be interpreted and
potentially modified before aggregated in a market mechanisms – or if this is not
necessary at all.
Hybrid markets It is also very likely that prediction markets will be populated
not only with human, but also artificial agents in future (regardless if this “bots”
act independently or with instructions and in the name of real persons). Such hy-
brid markets have already been tested and evaluated positively (Nagar and Malone,
2012) and the George Mason University (2015) suggested them as a measure against
manipulation and fraud. However, which potentials hybrid markets bear is yet an
open research question.
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A.1 Disclosure of own contributions
It is common in academic research that in the continuous discussion and exchange
with other researchers a research project is improved, shaped, evaluated, and even
sometimes completely inverted. Research is to a large extent team work, as in many
cases a single person would not be able to perform the data collection alone or know
all available literature by heart. Same is true for presented research, many hands
and heads shaped the results to small or sometimes even significant extents. These
persons were attributed an appropriate credit, sometimes also resulting in a co-au-
thorship of those papers on which this thesis is based. This section intends to con-
stitute in detail which of the parts were performed by the author of this thesis and
which parts were a joint work, in order to help the reader assess the efforts and
achievements of the author’s work.
Kloker et al. (2016) is a joint paper with Dr. Tobias T. Kranz, Dr. Tim Straub,
and Prof. Dr. Christof Weinhardt, published as a Full Paper in the Proceedings of
the Second Karlsruhe Service Summit Research Workshop 2016. My contributions
consisted of:
• The literature review.
• The theoretical foundations to suggested approaches.
• The formulation of the proposal.
• The writing of all sections.
• The presentation of the paper.
Kloker (2016) is a single-authored working paper.
Kloker, Straub, and Weinhardt (2017a) is a joint paper with Dr. Tim Straub and
Prof. Dr. Christof Weinhardt, published as a Prototype Paper at DESRIST 2017. My
contributions consisted of:
• The literature review.
• The refinement of the research question.
• The suggested selection strategies ii) and iii) and their derivation.
• The artifact development.
• The writing of all sections.
• The presentation of the paper.
Kloker and Kranz (2017) is a joint paper with Dr. Tobias T. Kranz, published as a
Research in Progress Paper in the Proceedings of the 25th European Conference of
Information Systems 2017. My contributions consisted of:
• The literature review regarding attacking strategies and sources of incentives.
• The extension of the fraud cube with the dimension “source of incentive”.
• The implementation and calculation of the benchmark scenario.
• The comparison of the suggested approach with the benchmark scenario.
• The discussion.
• The writing of all sections.
• The presentation of the paper.
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Kloker et al. (2017) is a joint paper with Dr. Tim Straub, Dr. Tom Zentek, and Prof.
Dr. Christof Weinhardt, published as a Research in Progress Paper in the Proceed-
ings of the 17th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation 2017.
My contributions consisted of:
• The literature review.
• The derivation and formulation of the research question.
• The draft for the research design.
• The draft for the experiment design.
• The implementation and execution of the experiment.
• The implementation of the evaluation scripts.
• The evaluation with several consultation cycles.
• The discussion.
• The writing of all sections.
Kloker, Straub, and Weinhardt (2017b) is a joint paper with Dr. Tim Straub, and
Prof. Dr. Christof Weinhardt, accepted and presented at the Collective Intelligence
Conference 2017. My contributions consisted of:
• The literature review.
• The derivation and formulation of the research question.
• The draft for the research design.
• The draft for the experiment design.
• The implementation and execution of the experiment.
• The implementation of the evaluation scripts.
• The evaluation with several consultation cycles.
• The discussion.
• The writing of all sections.
Kloker et al. (2018c) is a joint paper with Dr. Tim Straub, Dr. Stefan Morana, and
Prof. Dr. Christof Weinhardt, published as a Full Paper in the Proceedings of the 26th
European Conference on Information Systems 2018. My contributions consisted of:
• The literature review.
• The derivation and refinement of the research question based on Kloker et al.
(2016).
• The draft for the research design.
• The experiment design for the online experiment based on Kloker et al. (2016).
• The implementation and execution of the online experiment.
• The implementation of the evaluation scripts.
• The evaluation with several consultation cycles.
• The study design for the field study.
• The implementation and execution of the field study.
• The evaluation and discussion.
• The writing of all sections.
• The presentation of the paper.
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Kloker et al. (2018b) is a joint paper with Dr. Tim Straub, Dr. Stefan Morana, and
Prof. Dr. Christof Weinhardt, presented as a Prototype Paper at DESRIST 2018. My
contributions consisted of:
• The literature review.
• The derivation and formulation of the research question.
• The design and implementation of the design elements (1-3).
• The design and implementation of the crowd-based manipulation and detec-
tion tool (4).
• The survey design of the evaluation survey.
• The implementation and execution of the online survey.
• The evaluation of the online survey.
• The writing of all sections.
Kloker et al. (2018a) is a joint paper with Frederik Klatt, Jan Höffer and Prof. Dr.
Christof Weinhardt, published as a Full Paper in the “Foresight” journal. My contri-
butions consisted of:
• The derivation and formulation of the research question.
• Guidance regarding the research method.
• Guidance regarding the literature review.
• Guidance regarding the research design.
• The data and basic processing.
• Guidance and help regarding the feature selection, implementation, and evalu-
ation.
• Guidance regarding the interpretation of the results.
• The discussion.
• The writing of all sections.
Kloker et al. (N.D.) is a joint paper with Dr. Tim Straub, Dr. Stefan Morana, and
Prof. Dr. Christof Weinhardt, currently unpublished and in the state of a Working
Paper. My contributions consisted of:
• The literature review.
• The derivation and formulation of the research question.
• The design and implementation of the crowd-based manipulation and detec-
tion tool.
• The development, operation and maintenance of the FAZ.NET-Orakel.
• The project management and all contacts to the project partners and super-users.
• The survey design of the evaluation survey.
• The implementation and execution of the online survey.
• The evaluation of the online survey.
• The discussion.
• The writing of all sections.
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Kloker et al. (2019) is a joint paper with Dr. Tim Straub, Dr. Tobias T. Kranz,
and Prof. Dr. Christof Weinhardt, accepted in an reduced Version to be published
as a Chapter in “Delphi-Verfahren: Konzept, Varianten und Einsatzbereiche in der
Gesundheitswissenschaft”, eds. M. Niederberger, O. Renn. My contributions con-
sisted of:
• The literature review.
• The co-derivation of the potentials.
• The derivation of the challenges.
• The development of the User-level and Delphi-Question-level approaches.
• The formalization and discussion of all approaches.
• The writing of all sections.
Kloker, Straub, and Weinhardt (N.D.) is a joint paper with Dr. Tim Straub and
Prof. Dr. Christof Weinhardt, under review in an extended version as a Full Paper
in the “Group Decision and Negotiation Journal”. My contributions consisted of:
• The literature review.
• The derivation and formulation of the research questions based on Kloker (2016)
and Kloker et al. (2017).
• The section on experiment 1 is adapted from Kloker et al. (2017).
• The experiment design for experiment 2.
• The implementation and execution of experiment 2.
• The evaluation and discussion of experiment 2.
• The general discussion.
• The writing of all sections.
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A.2 Different trees for trading-based expert selection
TABLE A.1: Different trees for trading-based expert selection (some
examples). The first column indicates if only the identified three
(market maker, spread, trading volume) or all attributes were pro-
vided to the tree algorithm. The attributes listed in the second column
show, which attributes were considered by the tree.
Atttributes minsplit Accuracy Precision
three Market maker 40 85% 47%
three Market maker, Trading vol-
ume
20 88% 71%
three Market maker, Trading vol-
ume, Spread
17 87% 60%
all Market maker, Trading vol-
ume, Spread, OB size
15 86% 54%
three Market maker, Trading vol-
ume, Spread
15 87% 60%
all Market maker, Trading vol-
ume, Spread, OB size, market
activity, limit order
14 86% 54%
three Market maker, Trading vol-
ume, Spread
14 87% 60%
all Market maker, Trading vol-
ume, Spread, OB size, market
activity, limit order
13 88% 64%
three Market maker, Trading vol-
ume, Spread
13 88% 75%
all Market maker, Trading vol-
ume, Spread, OB size, market
activity, limit order
12 89% 69%
three Market maker, Trading vol-
ume, Spread
12 88% 75%
three Market maker, Trading vol-
ume, Spread
10 86% 54,5%
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A.3 Questionnaire items
TABLE A.2: Survey items of the follow up questionnaire of the pre-
liminary experiment in Section 5.6.1.
Item Subconstruct Loading Short
Addressability
Es war mir möglich ein Bild von
manchen Teilnehmern des Surveys zu
machen.
Social Com-
fort
positive add01
Das Interface vermittelt mir das
Gefühl, dass die anderen Teilnehmer
und ich in einem persönlichen Bezug
zueinander stehen.
Perceived So-
cial Presence
positive add02
Das Interface vermittelt mir das
Gefühl, dass ich mit den anderen
Menschen interagiere.
Perceived So-
cial Presence
positive add03
Das Interface vermittelt mir ein
Gefühl von Geselligkeit.
Perceived So-
cial Presence
positive add04
Das Interface vermittelt mir das
Gefühl, dass die anderen Teilnehmer
menschlich sind.
Perceived So-
cial Presence
positive add05
Ich habe mich während des Surveys
unwohl dabei gefühlt, meine Mei-
nung auszudrücken.
Social Com-
fort
negative add06
Das Interface gibt mir ein Gefühl
der Zusammenarbeit mit den anderen
Teilnehmern.
Spirit positive add07
Ich fühle mich wichtig in diesem In-
terface.
Spirit positive add08
Das Interface vermittelt mir kein
Gemeinschaftsgefühl.
Spirit negative add09
Ich fühle mich in dem Interface fehl
am Platz.
Spirit negative add10
Anonymity
Ich hatte das Gefühl, dass die anderen
Teilnehmer in der Lage waren, meine
Antworten und Ideen zu mir zurück-
zuverfolgen.
negative ano01
Commitment
Ich bin dazu bereit mehr als normal-
erweise erwartet zu investieren.
positive com01
Ich habe ein Gefühl von Loyalität den
anderen Teilnehmern gegenüber.
positive com02
Ich habe vor, den Survey weiter zu
verfolgen.
positive com03
Reputation
Wenn ich mein Wissen mit den an-
deren Teilnehmern teile, erwarte ich,
dass die anderen Teilnehmer ihr Wis-
sen auch teilen.
Reciprocity positive rep01
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TABLE A.2: Survey items of the follow up questionnaire of the pre-
liminary experiment in Section 5.6.1.
Item Subconstruct Loading Short
Es hat für mich keinen Vorteil mein
Wissen mit den anderen Teilnehmern
zu teilen.
Perceived
Value
negative rep02
Ich denke, die anderen Teilnehmer
honorieren meinen Beitrag.
Feeling as an
Expert
positive rep03
Ich würde mich selbst als Experte in
dem Thema bezeichnen.
Feeling as an
Expert
positive rep04
Ich hatte das Gefühl, dass mein Wis-
sen keinen Mehrwert bringen konnte.
Feeling as an
Expert
negative rep05
Ich hatte das Gefühl, dass ich durch
mein fachliches Wissen über das
Thema einen wertvollen Beitrag bei-
steuern konnte.
Feeling as an
Expert
positive rep06
Ich denke, die anderen Teilnehmer
profitieren von meinem Wissen.
Feeling as an
Expert
positive rep07
Es ist vorteilhaft für mich, mein Wis-
sen mit den anderen Teilnehmern zu
teilen.
Perceived
Value
positive rep08
Insgesamt hat Teilen mit den anderen
Teilnehmern einen guten Gegenwert.
Perceived
Value
positive rep09
TABLE A.3: Items for knowledge and experience in the preliminary
experiment for partition dependence in Section 6.3.
Item Construct Loading Coding
Diesel Price
Are you regularly drive a car? Experience positive binary
Have you been refueling a car within
the last 2 weeks?
Knowledge positive binary
DAX-30
Are you interested in the DAX-30 in
general?
Experience positive binary
Have you followed the development
of the DAX-30 within the last two
weeks?
Knowledge positive binary
Deutsche Bank’ stock
Are you interested in the Deutsche
Bank’ stock in general?
Experience positive binary
Have you followed the development
of the Deutsche Bank’ stock within
the last two weeks?
Knowledge positive binary
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TABLE A.4: Items for REI-10 in experiment 2 for partition depen-
dence in Section 6.4.
Item Construct Loading Coding
Ich mag es nicht, viel nachdenken zu
müssen.
Need for Cog-
nition
negative Likert-5
Ich versuche Situationen zu vermei-
den, die tiefgründiges Nachdenken
über etwas erfordern.
Need for Cog-
nition
negative Likert-5
Ich bevorzuge etwas zu tun, das
meine Denkfähigkeiten herausfordert
gegenüber etwas, das wenig Nach-
denken erfordert.
Need for Cog-
nition
positive Likert-5
Ich bevorzuge komplexe Probleme
gegenüber einfachen Problemen.
Need for Cog-
nition
positive Likert-5
Es stellt mich kaum zufrieden, für
lange Zeit über etwas scharf nachzu-
denken.
Need for Cog-
nition
positive Likert-5
Ich vertraue meinen anfänglichen
Empfindungen gegenüber Menschen.
Faith in Intu-
ition
positive Likert-5
Ich glaube, dass ich meiner Intuition
vertrauen kann.
Faith in Intu-
ition
positive Likert-5
Meine anfänglichen Eindrücke von
Menschen sind fast immer richtig.
Faith in Intu-
ition
positive Likert-5
Wenn es darauf ankommt Menschen
zu vertrauen, kann ich mich normal-
erweise auf mein Bauchgefühl ver-
lassen.
Faith in Intu-
ition
positive Likert-5
Ich kann normalerweise spüren, ob
eine Person richtig oder falsch liegt,
auch wenn ich nicht erklären kann
wie.
Faith in Intu-
ition
positive Likert-5
TABLE A.5: Items for the context specific questionnaire for the current
processing type in experiment 2 for partition dependence in Section
6.4.
Item Construct Loading Coding
iPhone
Durch Erfahrungen mit vergleich-
baren Situationen in der Vergan-
genheit fällt es mir leicht eine
Preiseinschätzung in dieser Situation
abzugeben.
Heuristic pro-
cessing
positive Likert-7
Bezüglich des wahrscheinlichen
Preises des iPhone 7S in Deutschland
bei dessen Markteinführung bin
ich bereit, mich auf Experten zu
verlassen.
Heuristic pro-
cessing
positive Likert-7
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TABLE A.5: Items for the context specific questionnaire for the current
processing type in experiment 2 for partition dependence in Section
6.4.
Item Construct Loading Coding
Ich konnte eine Entscheidung
darüber treffen, wie ich den
wahrscheinlichen Preis des iPhone 7S
in Deutschland bei dessen Marktein-
führung einschätze, ohne eine große
Menge zusätzlicher Informationen zu
suchen, indem ich mein vorhandenes
Wissen genutzt habe.
Heuristic pro-
cessing
positive Likert-7
Um vollständig bezüglich des
wahrscheinlichen Preises des iPhone
7S in Deutschland bei dessen Markt-
einführung informiert zu sein, habe
ich das Gefühl, dass ich besser dran
bin, je mehr Anhaltspunkte ich
bekommen kann.
Systematic
processing
positive Likert-7
Ich bemühe mich stark, sorgfältig die
relevanten Informationen bezüglich
des wahrscheinlichen Preises von
neuen iPhones bei deren Marktein-
führung herauszufinden.
Systematic
processing
positive Likert-7
Wenn das Thema des wahrschein-
lichen Preises des iPhone 7S in
Deutschland bei dessen Marktein-
führung aufkommt, versuche ich im-
mer mehr darüber zu erfahren.
Systematic
processing
positive Likert-7
Wenn ich auf Informationen zum
Thema des wahrscheinlichen Preises
des iPhone 7S in Deutschland bei
dessen Markteinführung stoße, ist es
wahrscheinlich, dass ich innehalte
und sorgfältig darüber nachdenke.
Systematic
processing
positive Likert-7
Coalitions
Durch Erfahrungen mit vergleich-
baren Situationen in der Vergangen-
heit fällt es mir leicht eine Entschei-
dung in dieser Situation zu treffen.
Heuristic pro-
cessing
positive Likert-7
Bezüglich der wahrscheinlichen
Koalitionsbildung nach der Bun-
destagswahl 2017 bin ich bereit, mich
auf Experten zu verlassen.
Heuristic pro-
cessing
positive Likert-7
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TABLE A.5: Items for the context specific questionnaire for the current
processing type in experiment 2 for partition dependence in Section
6.4.
Item Construct Loading Coding
Ich konnte eine Entscheidung
darüber treffen, wie ich die
wahrscheinliche Koalitionsbil-
dung nach der Bundestagswahl
2017 einschätze, ohne eine große
Menge zusätzlicher Informationen zu
suchen, indem ich mein vorhandenes
Wissen genutzt habe.
Heuristic pro-
cessing
positive Likert-7
Um vollständig bezüglich der
wahrscheinlichen Koalitionsbildung
nach der Bundestagswahl 2017 in-
formiert zu sein, habe ich das Gefühl,
dass ich besser dran bin, je mehr
Anhaltspunkte ich bekommen kann.
Systematic
processing
positive Likert-7
Ich habe mich stark bemüht,
sorgfältig die wissenschaftlichen
Informationen bezüglich der
wahrscheinlichen Koalitionsbil-
dung nach der Bundestagswahl 2017
herauszufinden.
Systematic
processing
positive Likert-7
Wenn das Thema der wahrschein-
lichen Koalitionsbildung nach der
Bundestagswahl 2017 aufkommt, ver-
suche ich immer mehr darüber zu er-
fahren.
Systematic
processing
positive Likert-7
Wenn ich auf Informationen zum
Thema der wahrscheinlichen
Koalitionsbildung nach der Bun-
destagswahl 2017 stoße, ist es
wahrscheinlich, dass ich innehalte
und sorgfältig darüber nachdenke.
Systematic
processing
positive Likert-7
TABLE A.6: Items for the expertise questionnaire in experiment 2 for
partition dependence in Section 6.4.
Item Construct Loading Coding
Könntest du jemandem viel über
dieses Thema erzählen?
Expertise positive Likert-7
Würdest du darüber einen
Zeitungsartikel lesen?
Expertise positive Likert-7
Denkst du, dass Freude dich zu
diesem Thema befragen würden?
Expertise positive Likert-7
Hat dich dieses Thema schon mal be-
troffen?
Expertise positive Likert-7
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